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ABSTRACT
CHOLERA IN THE LARGE TOWNS OF THE WEST AND EAST RIDINGS OFYORKSHIRE, 1848-1893
This study discusses the three cholera epidemics in 1848-49, 1853-54 and 1865-66, focussing on how the disease was experienced and acted upon, as well as its impact in the four . large towns of the West and East Riding of Yorkshire (Bradford, Hull, Leeds and Sheffield). It does this comparatively and sets cholera outbreaks in the context of local social, administrative and geographical factors. The main thesis is that historians should not talk about the national experience of cholera for the period 1848-66, rather they should recognise different experiences and impacts between towns, through time and at different levels of society. A subsidiary argument, however, is that the scares which occurred in the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s can be considered at the national, even international level.In 1848-49 there were major differences in mortality between the four towns, with Hull and Sheffield at two ends of the spectrum nationally and regionally. In 1853-54 and 1865- 66 none of the four towns experienced a major epidemic, though they did experience exceptional levels of public health activity, such that an 'epidemic consciousness' can be identified. While nationally there was an incremental fall in cholera mortality over the three later epidemics, in the four towns there was a single fall after 1849. As each threat passed there was growing confidence that cholera was controllable, though it never lost its power to 'shock'.In 1848-49 there were major differences between the towns in levels and forms of activity both to the approach and the containment of the epidemic. This was due to a number of variables: social relations and class attitudes, the role of the medical profession, theories of cholera's etiology (including the gradual adoption and adaptation of Snow's ideas), local reactions to relations with central government, the intensity of the mortality crisis and past experiences of epidemic diseases. The most striking feature in 1853-54 was the lack of variation in official actions across the towns. During and after the 1866 epidemic a two-tier approach was adopted, with cholera increasingly seen as a port disease.Was cholera the local sanitary reformers' best friend? The answer given is no, but this is qualified in several ways.The commonest middle class view of the later epidemics was that those who suffered were culpable, due to their ignorance and fecklessness.. In other words, the problem was not so much the disease as the people. Working class reactions to sanitary reform were not characterised, as is often said, by ignorance or hostility, rather they were varied and patterned. Actions were guided by a specific, usually local, understanding of urban disease ecology and of the wider determinants of health and disease. This knowledge of the local physical environment was linked to views on rights and responsibilities. The working class did not share the one dimensional environmentalism of the sanitarians? instead they contended that many other factors were determinants of health, not least wages and hours of work.
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1.1. CHOLERA AND ITS HISTORY.
1.1.1 MAIN THEMES OF THESIS
Cholera and its impact are amongst the most well known 
and most widely discussed topics in nineteenth century medical 
and social history. Is there then, anything new to say on the 
topic? This thesis will argue that there is, by exploring new 
empirical and methodological terrain. For Britain at least, 
the detailed studies of cholera focus almost exclusively on 
the first epidemic in 1831-32, and consider the disease 
primarily at the national level. In this study the focus is 
on the three later epidemics - 1848-49, 1853-54 and 1865-66 
and on how the disease was experienced and acted upon at the 
local level.
Methodologically, this study will analyse, compare and 
explain the experience of the disease in the four large towns 
of the East and West Ridings of Yorkshire - Hull, Bradford, 
Leeds and Sheffield - and will set cholera outbreaks in the 
context of local sanitary reform. The main thesis is that 
historians should not talk about the national experience of 
cholera for the period 1848-66, but must recognise that there 
were very different experiences and impacts between towns, 
through time and at different levels of society. A subsidiary 
argument is that after 1866, while there were no further 
cholera epidemics, the scares which occurred in the 1870s, 
1880s and 1890s can be considered at the national, even 
international level.
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Until the 1960s there were two quite distinct histories 
of cholera in nineteenth century Britain. One was written by 
medical historians and was concerned largely with medical 
science, especially the evolution of knowledge of the disease, 
and how this led to the control of the disease.1 The second 
was produced by social historians, for whom cholera epidemics 
were shock events which both highlighted the consequences of 
rapid industrialisation and urbanisation and, in turn, 
stimulated public health reforms.2 These two discourses 
tended to be quite separate, with different approaches and 
interests. In recent decades there has been a growing 
dissatisfaction with the assumptions of both approaches, 
especially the separation of the medical from the social and 
vice versa. This has given impetus to the emergence of a new 
area of scholarly work, the social history of medicine.
Social historians of medicine have rejected traditional 
assumptions by considering medicine as itself a social 
activity, linked at all levels and in various ways to the 
wider society.3 In short, the social history of medicine 
recognises that there was more to medicine than its developing 
scientificity. Also, social historians have used beliefs about 
health and disease to illuminate social structures, social 
relations and ideologies. Predictably, the development of a 
social history of medicine has been accompanied by major 
revisions of medical and social history with, unsurprisingly, 
a large new literature on cholera.
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1.1.2 CHOLERA AS A TOOL FOR HISTORICAL ANALYSIS.
Asa Briggs was the first British scholar to discuss 
cholera's potential as a tool for historical analysis, an 
issue he raised in a response to a collection of essays on 
cholera in Europe edited by Louis Chevalier.4 Whilst Briggs 
pointed to what he thought were a number of deficiencies in 
Chevalier's work, he was in full agreement with the general 
approach which stressed the social significance of cholera 
epidemics. For Briggs, cholera's importance to the historian 
arose out of its profound social and political impact. 
Cholera's approach invariably heightened existing social 
tensions, but its main effects were felt when it arrived in a 
country or community. Under these circumstances, Briggs 
argued, the disease tested local administrative structures, 
exposed social and political relations, and provoked serious 
social conflicts. For these reasons he believed the study of 
cholera promised to be much 'more than an exercise in medical 
epidemiology.'5
Essentially,. Briggs' article was programmatic, its main 
intention being to demonstrate the scope for further research 
into what he considered to be an important though neglected 
chapter in social history. His main reservations about the 
Chevalier essays were that although they discussed cholera 
epidemics in different towns and countries, the opportunity 
for comparison between the experience of cholera in different 
localities had not been fully exploited. Similarly, Briggs 
argued that the essays had been conducted within too narrow a
4
range of reference, concentrating almost exclusively on the 
first epidemic, such that comparisons with the later epidemics 
were precluded. Lastly, Briggs was also critical of the way 
in which no attention was paid to the way in which later 
developments in medical science threw light on the events of 
1831-32.
Briggs was not alone in recognising the potential of more 
detailed research into cholera. The following year, the 
American historian Charles Rosenberg published The Cholera 
Years, which was the first comprehensive monograph on the 
social history of cholera.6 Rosenberg focussed on successive 
American cholera epidemics and used cholera as a vehicle to 
examine a number of social, economic, political, cultural and 
medical themes, and the complex interrelationships between 
them. Particular emphasis was placed on using cholera 
epidemics to reveal and analyse important aspects of social 
change. Rosenberg also developed a form of comparative 
analysis, both temporally and geographically, whereby the 
different experiences of the three epidemics across North 
America were considered. In a subsequent article, Rosenberg 
reiterated his belief that epidemics were an important tool 
for social and economic analysis.7 Successive cholera 
epidemics, he argued, provided convenient points of entry into 
nineteenth century society and were effective devices for 
sampling changing social and economic relationships.
Between them, Briggs and Rosenberg paved the way for 
further research and particularly for developing comparative
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studies. Paradoxically, those historians who have since 
contributed to the social history of cholera in England have 
mostly confined their efforts to the rigorous investigation of 
the first epidemic. Moreover, the potential of comparative 
studies, identified by Briggs and developed by Rosenberg, has 
also been neglected.
1.1.3 fTHE RETURN OF THE PLAGUE * - CHOLERA, 1831-32
There are two important monographs, by Morris and Durey, 
which have examined the 1831-32 epidemic in a national context 
and several articles which focus on local experiences.8 To 
varying degrees these works adopted similar approaches to 
those suggested by Briggs and Rosenberg, in that, as well as 
providing a narrative of the epidemics, they used cholera to 
examine a range of themes. Moreover, they leave the reader in 
no doubt as to why, in a century when severe epidemics of one 
disease or another were rarely absent, cholera, which was a 
rare visitor to Europe and whose demographic impact was 
relatively minor, was regarded as 'the classic disease of the 
age’.9 The title of Durey's book, The Return of the Plaque, 
provides a clear indication of how contemporaries perceived 
and reacted to the arrival of cholera.xo It was clear from 
the social upheavals seen in European towns affected by 
cholera, that it could generate a crisis of considerable 
magnitude, comparable to the plague experiences of the 
fifteenth and seventeenth centuries.
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Cholera’s social and political impact was such that a 
number of historians have used cholera epidemics as a ’test* 
for the stability of a particular society. With regard to the 
first British epidemic, Durey argued that the disease 
’unsettled the normal functioning of society and brought to 
the surface latent class antagonisms1.11 Morris took a 
similar stance, contending that the epidemic strained society 
to the utmost and was a 'test of social cohesion’.12 Both 
agree that British society withstood the strain.
Although the first cholera epidemic undoubtedly led to 
pronounced social dislocation, there are several problems with 
Morris and Durey's methodology. The argument that the 
epidemic of 1831-32 represented an exceptional or isolated 
crisis which disrupted the normal functioning of society can 
be challenged. Whilst the epidemic was the first serious 
public health crisis of the century and, in this respect, was 
an exceptional event, there is little evidence to show that 
the socio-political developments which accompanied it were 
unusual. Most historians agree that the 1830s and, indeed, 
the entire period 1800-1850 was riddled with crises of one 
sort or another, some of which have been interpreted as 
examples of overt political or class conflict which posed a 
far more serious threat to social stability than the cholera 
disturbances of 1831-32. When this is taken into account, 
heightened class tensions, far from being abnormal, were in 
fact a recurrent phenomenon. Moreover, there are additional 
dangers in singling out a particular year or crisis and 
examining it in isolation. For example, both Morris and Durey
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argued that the popular disturbances triggered by cholera were 
usually local responses precipitated by deep rooted working 
class anxieties about body-snatching, dissection and the 
disruption of customs by preventive actions. As such they 
were judged to have been limited reactions to specific 
grievances directed against medical men or other 'officials’ 
rather than examples or expressions of overt class conflict. 
This type of analysis applied to, for example, the Captain 
Swing riots or the disturbances which accompanied the 
introduction of the New Poor Law, might also conclude that 
they too were limited local reactions to very specific 
grievances. Most social historians, however, see a pattern of 
class struggle.13
As Richard Evans has pointed out in a recent article, 
both Morris and Durey took the expectation of cholera leading 
to serious social upheaval and possibly revolution as a 
starting point for their analyses.14 Therefore, their 
conclusion - that the cholera related events of 1831-32 - 
demonstrated the inherent stability and durability of British 
society - was foreordained by the assumption that only 
revolution would have demonstrated the opposite. Evans' 
analysis of the relationship between successive cholera 
epidemics and political turmoil in Europe led him to argue 
that, in view of the relatively small number of lives claimed 
by the disease, 'it is perhaps expecting too much of an 
epidemic disease like cholera if one expects it to lead 
directly to revolution'.15
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One of the most striking features of the various studies 
on the first British cholera epidemic is that, in keeping with 
and contributing to the traditions of the social history of 
medicine, a phenomenon previously thought of as ’medical’ is 
now discussed as part of, rather than separate from, the wider 
social, cultural and political context. In one way or 
another, the fact that cholera impinged upon all facets of 
life and was a matter of concern to all members of society 
meant that it attracted comment from individuals and 
institutions across the entire community. The use of various 
sources, including newspapers representing all forms and 
shades of opinion, medical journals and records, sanitary 
surveys, business records, diaries, parliamentary papers and 
reports, and local government records, has enabled historians 
to piece together a comprehensive description and mount a 
rigorous analysis of all facets of the first epidemic. These 
have been used to illuminate and evaluate contemporary power 
structures, class values, attitudes and relationships as well 
as medical theory and practice, sanitary conditions and public 
health arrangements, the influence of religion and its 
relationship with science. The sheer number of publications 
on the epidemic of 1831-32 and their diversity lends support 
to Rosenberg’s claim that cholera is a valuable tool for 
social and economic analysis.16 Similarly, the variety of 
ways in which cholera has been used by historians and the 
number of insights it has provided, stand as testimony to the 
development of the social history of medicine as an area of 
scholarly endeavour.
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A major limitation of the historiography of the British 
cholera epidemics is that few historians have examined the 
later epidemics. Those that have written on them, have done 
so incidentally whilst highlighting developments in public 
health or, more rarely, medical science. Exceptions to this 
trend are Kearns, who examined the spatial incidence of the 
later epidemics and argued that in 1853-54 and 1866 cholera 
was predominantly a disease of the major seaports and Luckin 
who has considered the London epidemic of 1866.17
Although a thorough study of the later epidemics in 
Britain has not yet been produced, one British historian has 
recently published a book which does looks at successive 
epidemics but in Germany. In Death in Hamburg, Richard Evans 
provides a detailed narrative of the city's cholera 
experiences through the nineteenth century, culminating in the 
great epidemic of 1892.18 Evans explores the epidemic from a 
number of angles, examining its social geography, the 
reactions and behaviour of different social and political 
groupings, and the response of the medical profession. He 
concludes by assessing the longer term impact of the epidemic 
on matters like sanitary reform, and Hamburg’s social and 
political structures. By asking why the epidemic of 1892 was 
so severe, he sets himself the task of providing a detailed 
analysis of the city’s social and political history throughout 
the period 1830-1890 and developing these issues into a case 
study of the urban environment and its relationship with 
disease and mortality.
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Given the high regard with which the studies of Rosenberg and 
more recently that of Evans are held, it is surprising that 
the later British epidemics have not been studied by 
historians to any great extent, especially as mortality levels 
in 1848-49 were nearly double those of the first epidemic.
TABLE 1.1
DEATHS FROM CHOLERA IN ENGLAND DURING THE MAIN EPIDEMIC YEARS 
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY,
Year 1831-2 1848-9 1853-4 1865-6
Deaths(Wohl) 32,000 62,000 20,000 14,000
Deaths(Reg-Gen) 32,000 55,181 24,516 15,668
(from A.S. Wohl, Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian 
Britain, 1983, p. 118 and Annual Reports of the General- 
Registry Office, 1848-1867) There are many different figures 
cited, but what is important here is the relative number of 
deaths in the various epidemics.)
A number of reasons can be suggested as to why the later 
epidemics have not been thoroughly investigated. There is 
certainly a feeling that the first epidemic made the greatest 
overall impact on British society and that during the later 
cholera years the disease failed to provoke responses similar 
to those seen in 1831-32.19 There is also a view that many 
important aspects of the later epidemics have been covered in 
narrower studies on disease etiology and public health.
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Nevertheless, these viewpoints raise as many questions as they 
answer. For example, one might ask in what ways did the 
social response to the later epidemics differ and why was this 
so? Given that the social history of medicine aims to study 
medicine in context, it is a major failing that cholera has 
not been more thoroughly investigated in the different and 
changing contexts of 1848-49, 1853-54 and 1865-66. This 
thesis also looks at the cholera scares in 1871-72, 1883-84 
and 1892-93. Indeed, cholera was never absent from Britain 
between 1847 and 1895 and deaths never fell below 200 per 
annum, although the major epidemic years do stand out. (FIGURE 
1.1)
1.1.4 CHOLERA AND PUBLIC HEALTH REFORM
Since the publication of Creighton’s A History of 
Epidemics in Great Britain, historians have explored the links 
between epidemics and public health reform. This has led to 
the familiar claim that cholera was the sanitary reformers’ 
best friend.20 Cholera, more than any other disease, is said 
to have ’shattered complacency and opened the public mind to 
the idea of sanitary reform1.21 Predictably, a strong 
argument has been built around the view that the first cholera 
epidemic provided much of the impetus behind public health 
agitation in the 1830s and 1840s. Proponents of this view 
support their claim by pointing to the ways in which the first 
epidemic revived the rare precedent of state intervention in 
the field of public health and, in the long term, awakened a 
’sanitary consciousness1 amongst a small number of people who
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eventually formed the nucleus of the so called 'sanitary 
movement’. That the renewed threat of cholera in the late 
1840s coincided with major public health legislation has been 
interpreted as further evidence of a causal connection between 
cholera and reform.22 Indeed, it is suggested that whilst the 
threat of cholera was instrumental in the creation of a 
General Board of Health (G.B.H.) headed by Edwin Chadwick, the 
Board's failure to arrest the epidemic of 1853-54 contributed 
to both Chadwick's dismissal and the Board's eventual 
demise.23 The fear aroused by cholera did not diminish in the 
1850s and 1860s. Historians have pointed out that the 
Sanitary Act of 1866, which is now acknowledged as a major 
landmark in the history of nineteenth century public health 
reform, again coincided with a fresh epidemic.24 Similarly, 
both the 1872 and 1875 Public Health Acts were passed as 
cholera once again threatened Britain. Given these 
conjunctures, it is easy to see how cholera has long been 
regarded as the sanitary reformers' best friend.25 This study 
seeks to answer a different question, namely, was there a 
close causal connection between cholera epidemics and sanitary 
reform at the local level.
Until recently, much of the literature on public health 
has tended to focus either on the leading lights of the 
sanitary movement or on seeking to identify a pattern of 
reform. Edwin Chadwick's role as a propagandist and 
instigator of reform has been well documented, as have the 
lives of other eminent reformers such as Sir John Simon and 
William Farr.26 Although there have been several articles and
13
minor publications on the activities of reformers at the local 
level, the history of public health has been dominated by 
studies of national figures and what are deemed to have been 
the major pieces of national legislation.27
One of the first historians to contend that there was a 
clear historical pattern to social reform in the nineteenth 
century was Oliver MacDonagh, who produced what he termed 'a 
five stage model of administrative growth1.28 When discussing 
the models application to public health reform it is 
convenient to treat it as a two stage process, the first part 
characterised by the recognition of 1 social evils1 and the 
formulation of legislative remedies, and the second by the 
administrative actions of state departments and their 
personnel. When applied to the history of public health 
reform the model does initially seem attractive. Indeed, a 
good case could be made for cholera playing a significant part 
in the identification of Social evils1 and providing at least 
some of the stimulus for early attempts at amelioration. The 
appointment of Chadwick as head of the G.B.H., or Simon as 
head of the Medical Department of the Privy Council, might 
well be interpreted as the beginning of the second stage of 
MacDonagh!s process. A number of historians have argued 
against this model and have suggested alternatives.29 Others 
have argued that there was no discernible pattern to health 
reform.30 Moreover, and of greater relevance to the history 
of public health and this thesis, MacDonagh failed to take 
account of the fact that many reforms were the result of local 
initiatives and that most legislation passed by central
14
government was permissive, with adoption and implementation 
left to local authorities. For historians like Wohl, 
attention to local actions is imperative because ’however much 
direction central government might give from above, 
ultimately, the health of the nation depended on sanitary 
measures at local level'.31
Much of the work on public health reform at the local 
level has shown that the nature and pace of improvements 
differed from place to place and was governed or influenced by 
a number of variables. The problems posed by local geography 
and economic structures have been suggested as important,'as 
have class relations, attitudes to central power, the growth 
of civic pride and perhaps public health ’crises’.32 Whilst 
these factors may have varied in importance and impact from 
place to place, an increasing number of studies suggest that 
the most crucial determinants of policy and action wereclocal 
social and political structures, along with technical and 
legal, difficulties.33
A common problem with local studies is that too often 
they remain just that, and while the multiplication of such 
studies will be valuable, it is vital that these are brought 
together and related to each other and to the national scene. 
The recent emphasis on reform at local level and more 
especially, evidence of different rates of progress, implies 
that a third chronology of public health reform based upon 
developments at the local level could be added to two already 
acknowledged by historians, namely ’the familiar story of
15
royal commissions and public health acts1 and the second 
involving measurable improvements in the nation's standard of 
health.34 However, this third chronology will not just emerge 
from the addition of more pieces to the mosaic, patterns and 
the overall picture have to constructed from the pieces.
1.1.5 CHOLERA AND THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF MEDICINE
At the end of the last century it was Creighton who 
established the notion of the nineteenth century as an age of 
epidemics. This view has never been seriously challenged, 
despite the fact that the century's two major killers, 
diarrhoea and tuberculosis, were endemic diseases.35 
Historians who have concentrated upon medicine-as-science have 
discussed epidemic diseases in terms of how understanding of 
their etiology and nature grew, allowing for ever more 
effective prevention and control.36 In this context, the fact 
that Britain escaped cholera when it reached Europe again in 
1871-2, 1883-84 and 1892-93 is seen to be significant.
However, more socially minded historians now recognize that 
knowledge of cholera's specificity was vslow to develop and 
even slower to be accepted, and that the factors which led to 
the control and diminution of endemic and epidemic diseases 
were not only the result of specific actions, but also due to 
more general improvements in diet, environmental conditions 
and sanitary reform.37 Thus, while Snow had suggested a 
water-borne route for cholera transmission as early as 1848,
16
the bacillus was not identified until 1883-84, and even then 
there remained doubters until the 1890s.3s
With regard to the four main cholera epidemics, the 
uncertainty over the nature and causes of the disease is often 
used to illustrate the deficiencies of early and mid­
nineteenth century medical knowledge and practice. For 
example, it has been argued in Kuhnian terms, that in the 
early 1830s medical science was pre-paradigm, hence the 
apparent difficulties in conducting a rational debate or 
investigations.39 The most celebrated episode in the 
development of the understanding of cholera has undoubtedly 
been the work of John Snow. From 1849 onwards, Snow 
’correctly1 argued that cholera was transmitted by 
contaminated water. What used to interest historians was why 
his contemporaries paid his views scant regard. Nowadays 
historians of medicine are more sensitive and recognise that 
in the 1850s there were good reasons for doubting Snow's ideas 
and evidence.40 The general point is that theories of the 
nature and etiology of cholera should be discussed in context, 
not against some timeless standard of rationality or as steps 
towards the revelation of ’correct' understanding.
What historical debate there has been about cholera's 
etiology has been dominated, not by the controversies 
surrounding the recognition of its infective nature after 
1850, but by the abandonment of contagionist views in the 
1830s. Ackerknecht's claim that the change to anti-
17
contagionism was influenced by 'non-scientific' forces was for 
many years the standard account.41
The essence of Ackerknecht’s argument was that in the 
1830s the scientific and medical evidence on whether cholera 
was transmitted by contagion or through the atmosphere was 
equivocal. In these circumstances, he suggests that theory 
choice was determined by the opposition of powerful economic 
and political groups to quarantine and cordons, measures which 
were associated with contagionism. In other words, sanitary 
practice and its implications determined medical knowledge. 
Thus, the acceptance of anti-contagionism is ultimately 
explained by the rise of the bourgeoisie, liberalism and free 
trade. Pelling's work, which admittedly focuses on British 
rather than European medicine, has shown that there was no 
simple change of theory and that scientific and 
epidemiological debates were more complex. Significantly, she 
shows that contagionism and anticontagionism were not 
exclusive categories.42 Thus, it was possible to hold 
different views with respect to different diseases, and even 
the same disease in different circumstances. More 
importantly, she contended that by far the most common medical 
view was 'contingent contagionism' which held that 
predisposing factors, normally environmental, could facilitate 
contagion. More generally, Pelling attacked the notion that 
mid-nineteenth century medicine and epidemiology were 
'unscientific' and offered a sensitive account of the to us 
strange brew that was sanitary science.
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Recently, Roger Cooter has presented a critique of both 
Ackerknecht and Pelling.43 Inspired by the belief that both 
historians offered models of separate things called 'medicine' 
and 'society' interacting, and that both produced histories of 
'medicine as science' with society tagged on, Cooter provides 
a new interpretation of anti-contagionism, in which he 
attempts to discuss medicine and society as constitutive of 
each other. Following Mary Douglas's view that ideas of 
pollution and disruption of the natural order always express 
concerns about the social order, he claims that the 
anticontagionist's avoidance of specificity, and its stress on 
the atmosphere, expressed the contradictions of the new 
capitalist order and the bourgeiosie's desire for change.44 
Air, it is said, was what divided people, yet was common to 
all; what was essential to life, yet was polluted and 
poisoned; what was a mere part of the environment, yet was 
ingrained with moral qualities.
It is often argued that the implicit moralism of 
anticontagionism and the wider sanitarian programme 
disappeared with the discovery of specific etiologies for 
infectious diseases after 1875. Shryock said that once the 
cholera bacillus was identified, it 'made clear just what 
measures were necessary in order to protect people from 
further cholera invasions'.45 This position can be challenged 
on two counts. Firstly, any idea or theory is open to various 
interpretations and how it is read is a contingent matter. 
Secondly, nineteenth century medical theories, as Ackerknecht 
showed, were always seen in terms of their practical
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implications for prevention and cure. Moreover, germ theory 
was not discovered in isolation and then applied to practical 
problems, but was constituted in the context of specific and 
historically contingent medical and public health practices.
In their studies of the social history of cholera, both 
Morris and Durey use the classic ’two nations’ model of social 
relations and social structures. This thesis uses the same 
model and broadly adopts the same view of class, namely that 
it was about interests and power. The ’two nations’ were the 
middle class who had the means to change their own lives and 
the lives of others, and the working class who had few choices 
and felt unable to influence events. When defined in these 
terms class is not something which can be isolated, rather as 
Thompson argues, it is about historical relationships, being 
about developing interactions between social groupings.
Class happens when some men [and women, sic], as a result 
of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and 
articulate the identity of their interests as between 
themselves, and as against other men [and women, sic] 
whose interests are different from (and usually opposed 
to) theirs.46
Indeed, this view is more appropriate to the later epidemics 
than to 1832, in that by mid-century England was a more mature 
class society. By 1848-49 the lines were clearly drawn 
between two main classes; the overt struggles of the 1830s and 
1840s were more muted, but class remained the main way in 
which events were perceived and acted upon. In the pursuit of
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their interests, classes engage in what has classically been 
termed ’class struggle1, however, at few points in time have 
interests been pursued unilaterally. By the late 1840s most 
historians agree the middle and working class had reached an 
accommodation, some talk of ’class collaboration’ and others 
of 'the Age of Equipoise’.47 This study will explore the 
nature and influence of class differences in perceptions and 
responses to cholera and public health issues.
Within the two classes there was a broad consensus of 
interest and identity but this did not mean there was 
unanimity on all matters nor that there were no differences 
within classes. For example, with regard to the public health 
measure of vaccination against smallpox, some in the working 
class welcomed the protection offered by state provision, 
while others regarded it as a coercive action and likely to 
damage their health. There were also differences between 
working class communities, as in Keighley where there was mass 
civil disobedience. The impact of internal stratification, 
say, between skilled and unskilled, and over religion, 
ethnicity and gender can be seen in the differential adoption 
of alternative medical practices such as medical botany, 
homeopathy and hydropathy. While it is possible to identify 
differences within the working classr even sub-classes, there 
was more that united than divided them. Namely, the common 
experience of powerlessness, economic insecurity and grinding 
poverty, and the social apartheid from those who had power and 
wealth.
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If anything, the middle class was more divided and it has 
been more common for historians to talk of the middle classes 
than a single middle class. But the argument here is again 
that more united than divided them. Historically, and a point 
which can be often lost in theoretical hair-splitting, ’from 
below1 they were seen as largely a single class. They were 
seen as those with the means to control affairs, for example, 
directly in the workplace or through housing, or indirectly 
through their control of the local economy or council. They 
may have bickered and been riven with differences, but they 
were at least in a position to bicker and to pursue their 
interests. In this thesis differences will be identified 
within the middle class itself, including differences between 
towns and over time. What united these•divergent tendencies 
was a common identity of those with the means and the 
opportunity to control affairs, and especially to determine 
the destiny of communities threatened by epidemic disease.
When cholera approached in 1831 the working class felt . 
universally threatened and there was little they could do to 
avoid the epidemic, on the other hand all sections of the 
middle class had a number of options. Property owners might 
flee, wealthy women might organise charities, doctors might 
help to control and treat the disease, local political elites 
might debate about what to do, how to do it and how much it 
might cost. The point is they all had options which arose 
from their social and economic position, in other words, from 
their class position. Discussions about the nature of class 
have occupied social historians since the 1960s, the point 
nowadays, essentially following Thompson, is that abstract
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discussions are futile as the essence of class was its 
relational character and historical specificity, hence the 
issue of class is pursued in the main body of the thesis.
No systematic attempt is made in this thesis to analyse 
the local political response in terms of party. Given the 
scope of the study, four towns over two decades, local 
political variables have been introduced only where they were 
overtly important. The background of party in-fighting and 
other factors remains to be fully explored, though it does 
seems this will be of more importance to the long term 
development of sanitary reform than to short term responses to 
epidemics.
1.1.6 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis will follow the lead of earlier studies by 
using cholera to illuminate and explore a number of themes and 
issues. Central to this approach is the contention that 
cholera was the 'shock disease1 of the nineteenth century and 
that for contemporary society, cholera epidemics were 
stressful events, perceived and responded to as serious 
crises. Although this study will use a similar methodology 
and framework of analysis to those developed by Morris and 
Durey and examine similar themes, it differs in a number of 
ways. The most obvious difference is that it focuses on the 
three later epidemics and the subsequent cholera threats which 
have been entirely neglected. Thus, it involves the
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application of a proven approach to a neglected area.
Extending the chronological range will allow a more systematic 
analysis of continuity and change in the cholera experience.
As noted before, to date historians have either explored the 
national picture or produced case-studies of local cholera 
outbreaks. This study is again novel in developing a 
comparative study of local experiences in a specific region, 
though it does move out from this focus to the national and 
ultimately international dimensions of the disease.
In the second section of this Introduction the major 
developments in public health policy and practice in the 
period 1832-1848 are discussed. Here, particular attention is 
paid to two related themes: the significance and impact of the 
first cholera epidemic and the growth and mounting influence 
of the sanitary movement in the 1840s. As numerous studies 
have shown, the latter culminated in legislative action, most 
notably the Public Health Act, 1848 which established the 
G.B.H. as the government agency, which in 1848-49, was charged 
with devising and co-ordinating the nation's defences against 
cholera. A short introduction to the economic, social and 
epidemiological history of each of the four towns before 1848 
follows.
Part 2 The study of the 1848-49 cholera experience begins 
with a brief description of the epidemic's chronological, 
geographic and demographic features nationally and locally.
The main part of this section concentrates on examining the 
various social and political responses to cholera at different
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levels in each town. The responses of different social 
classes and other groupings to cholera1s approach and arrival 
will be considered, as will those of the various and diverse 
local authorities. Through this, access will be gained to 
official and wider middle class social attitudes and values. 
Working class and popular responses to the epidemic are 
discussed from two perspectives: firstly, in terms of a 
reaction to sanitary propaganda and secondly, in terms of what 
will be argued was a distinct working class view of health and 
public health. Continuities and discontinuities with the 
epidemic of 1831-32 are also discussed. In some respects it 
has not always been possible to conduct as rigourous an 
analysis of certain factors as originally intended. Limited 
space, itself the result of the decision to mount detailed 
case-studies of each epidemic for all four towns, has meant 
that the impact of local political structures on responses to 
cholera has not been studied in depth.
Part 3 The third part of the thesis examines the 1853-54 
epidemic. Like the previous section, it begins with a brief 
discussion of the epidemic’s chronological and geographical 
features and its demographic impact. It will be shown that 
whilst cholera failed to establish itself in an epidemic form 
in the four towns, there were significant actions and 
important changes from 1849. In this context the important 
question of what constituted an epidemic is raised. It will 
be suggested that in mid-Victorian Britain epidemics are best 
understood as social events triggered by a natural phenomenon 
or a perceived threat, rather than as purely biological
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events. This, it is argued, was evident not just at the 
official level, but across the entire social spectrum as an 
’epidemic consciousness’ emerged.
In 1853-54 sanitary precautions were complemented more 
extensively with medical measures. Indeed, once the epidemic 
was imminent or in progress, efforts were directed towards 
prophylaxis and treatment as much as sanitation. In the 
1850s, organised medicine was still striving for reform and 
had not yet won occupational monopoly. Therefore, cholera 
crises provided an opportunity for practitioners of 
alternative medicine to advance their claims and to improve 
their social position. This situation allows an examination 
of the conflicts and rivalries within the orthodox branch of 
the profession, and between it and the wider medical 
community. This section concludes with a brief assessment of 
sanitary policy and practice in the period 1854-65. Again it 
must be stressed that because of the other tasks in hand, this 
has not been covered in the same depth as in epidemic years. 
Where this study departs from the orthodoxy is in moving away 
from detailed single or two town studies. If one chooses to 
paint on a larger canvas, then one has to use broad brush 
strokes.
Part 4 The study of the 1865-66 season begins by outlining 
the spread of the disease, and its limited mortality in the 
four towns. This is followed by a discussion of the debates 
about the etiology of cholera and how the advice of the 
Medical Department of the Privy Council, the new central
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government agency, had changed from 1854. These followed from 
various developments in medical science which took place 
between 1854 and 1866. In this context, particular emphasis 
is placed on assessing the extent to which the work of men 
like John Snow and William Budd influenced the Privy Council 
and the medical profession in general. The strategies of 
prevention in each of the four towns is discussed and 
illustrates that the threat of cholera, even without a 
mortality crisis, was still capable of triggering an epidemic 
of public health activity.
Part 5 The final section presents a brief account of 
responses to the three main cholera threats after 1866 and the 
conclusion. The latter is presented under the following 
headings: the comparative history of cholera; continuity and 
change in experiences, official responses, and popular 
responses; and finally, cholera and sanitary reform.
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1.2. CHOLERA AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 1830-1849.
1.2.1 EPIDEMICS, CHOLERA AND PUBLIC HEALTH REFORM BEFORE 1848.
With the disappearance of the plague at the end of the 
seventeenth century there began a period in which epidemics 
were not a major feature in British history. Despite frequent 
short term mortality crises, which were often the result of 
localised fever or smallpox outbreaks, public interest in the 
field of health beyond that of the individual was minimal and 
government action rare.48 The situation changed dramatically 
in the late 1820s when the approach of the cholera pandemic 
provoked new interest in public health. The government was 
alive to the potential danger due to events that followed in 
the wake of the disease elsewhere and acted accordingly.
Steps were taken to avert the threat and, when these failed, 
to contain the epidemic.
The responsibility for dealing with cholera was placed 
with the Privy Council, which was already responsible for the 
nation’s rudimentary health administration.49 On learning 
that cholera had reached Riga, where hundreds of cargo ships 
were preparing to sail to Britain, the Privy Council decided 
to introduce a system of quarantines, using the recently 
amended Quarantine Act of 1825.50 From May 1831, ships 
sailing to Britain from infected ports were required to 
proceed to any one of several quarantine stations, where they 
were held to allow any disease to show, before being permitted
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to dock.31 However, the knowledge that cholera had breached 
quarantines in other countries added to its reputation as a 
capricious and unpredictable disease and did little to reduce 
unease in Britain. To gather more information on cholera's 
etiology and mode of transmission, the Privy Council entered 
in-co correspondence with British doctors working in Russia and 
elsewhere. This was of little assistance as the replies 
received contained conflicting advice. To overcome this 
problem and to allay mounting anxiety, the Council elected to 
send a medical mission to St Petersburg to collect up tp date 
information first hand. Meanwhile, reviving a precedent set 
in 1805 when yellow fever threatened, the Privy Council asked 
Sir Henry Halford, President of the Royal College of 
Physicians, to advise on membership of a Central Board of 
Health (C.B.H.) whose role would be to make recommendations to 
the government on the best defences against the epidemic.32
By June 1831 the C.B.H. was in operation.33 Despite the 
uncertainty which surrounded cholera's etiology, the majority 
view on the Board was that the disease was contagious. 
Consequently, the government was advised to persist with 
quarantines. Mindful of the fact that cholera could penetrate 
even the most rigorous quarantine system, the Board also 
recommended that, in the event of the disease breaking out in 
Britain, the government should implement a number of 
additional measures, all based on contagionism. Internal 
quarantines were suggested, as was a system of expurgation, 
under which the sick would be removed to cholera hospitals, 
contacts to houses of refuge, and infected premises and their
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contents fumigated or destroyed.54 It was also proposed that 
a network of local boards of health, comprising magistrates 
and other dignitaries, should be established to administer 
these measures. Fearful of the likely reactions to such 
coercive measures, the government rejected much of this advice 
as insensitive and provocative.55 The idea of internal 
quarantines was abandoned, but voluntary isolation of 
individual victims was recommended. This and the 
establishment of local boards of health to oversee preventive 
measures was accepted.
Cholera arrived in Britain in October 1831 at the port of 
Sunderland and quickly spread. By this time the Privy Council 
had changed the form of the C.B.H. Proven administrators and 
people with first hand experience of treating cholera in 
Europe replaced Halford's elite grouping. The new Board took 
a softer position on the questions of quarantines and 
coercion. Two factors, the apparent failure of existing 
controls and disruption of trade, fed the genuine medical 
uncertainty about the means of cholera’s transmission, and 
persuaded the Board to relax external quarantine. A sizeable 
part of the medical profession now doubted contagionism, 
believing that cholera was spread through miasmas.
Miasmatists held that cholera and other fevers were generated 
spontaneously in decaying matter and spread through the 
atmosphere, with individuals contracting the disease when they 
inhaled polluted or impregnated air. In 1832 the profession 
was temporarily united by the theory of 'contingent 
contagionism'. which held that cholera had its origins in, and
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was spread principally by miasmas, but could, in certain 
circumstances, be communicated from person to person.56 As 
the epidemic worsened in the summer of 1832, the advice issued 
by the C.B.H. and the actions of local boards were consistent 
with this theory. As well as isolating the sick in cholera 
hospitals, ensuring speedy interment of the dead and 
fumigating infected premises, emphasis was placed on removing 
the ’sources1 of the disease. Consequently, large scale 
cleansing and nuisance removal projects were undertaken by 
local boards of health and a ’Cholera Act' was passed by 
Parliament in February 1832 to speed up the creation of 
additional local boards and to enable them to raise sufficient 
funds to implement preventive measures. This was backed up by 
a stream of Orders from the Privy Council.57
Historians agree that local boards operated with varying 
levels of commitment, but that the actions of even the most 
enthusiastic did little to curb the epidemic.58 As an 
exercise in public health administration, however, the cholera 
arrangements of 1831-32 have been seen in a more favourable 
light. Arguably, the most significant development during the 
cholera crisis was the role of the government and its 
agencies. Whatever its motives and however faltering its 
actions, central government certainly took the lead in 
attempting to prevent cholera from arriving in Britain and, 
when this failed, to limit its effects. Although the state 
had demonstrated a willingness to intervene in health matters 
on previous occasions, its role had never extended beyond 
introducing quarantines and making contingency plans. Thus,
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whilst the establishment of the C.B.H. and local boards were 
not without precedent, their operation on the scale seen in 
1832 was.59 Furthermore, local government actions, 
particularly once the epidemic was underway, were crucial, not 
least for the precedent set in central-local government 
relations.60 The local boards of health which became the 
vehicle of action have been described by one historian as a 
’major innovation of the first cholera epidemic1.6X
In 1831-32 the complex and fragmentary structure of 
local government that existed in many towns represented a 
considerable obstacle to effective local action. The creation 
of a network of local boards of health was intended to provide 
a solution to this problem. When it became apparent that the 
work of boards was being hampered by other factors, the 
government and its agencies responded positively. The Cholera 
Act and a succession of Orders in Council strengthened the 
hand of local boards of health. The government's pragmatism 
was not confined solely to overcoming difficulties encountered 
at the local level. Account was also taken of shifts in 
medical opinion. That local boards of health were given the 
power to undertake cleansing duties and nuisance removal 
operations in the summer of 1832 was not so much the result of 
demands for this facility, but because medical opinion was 
swinging towards the miasmatic theory.62
The separate analyses of Morris and Durey on the social 
response to the cholera epidemic of 1831-32 demonstrate that 
the level of sanitary activity during the cholera epidemic was
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unprecedented. Many communities, including those in 
Yorkshire, were so unused to this type of intervention that, 
in the fraught circumstances of the day, they regarded it with 
suspicion and resentment and, on occasions, resisted it 
violently.63 Indeed, 'from below' the actions of the 
authorities were often perceived as oppressive state action 
rather than beneficial measures. However, once the epidemic 
subsided, the level of public health activity fell away.64 
In the immediate aftermath of the epidemic the Cholera Act was 
revoked and the C.B.H. and local boards of health were 
disbanded. This resulted in the closure of cholera hospitals, 
dispensaries and houses of refuge, the end of free medical aid 
to the poor and termination of sanitary cleansing measures. 
Thus, within months of the epidemic waning, sanitary and 
medical preventive activity returned to former low levels, 
often nothing. Moreover, individuals at all levels of 
society, along with the government, the press and even 
sections of the medical profession, seemed anxious to forget 
the epidemic.65
Consequently, issues of health and sanitation, which for 
two years had been subject to widespread attention and debate, 
quickly faded. As such, the cholera epidemic of 1831-32 can 
be characterised as a temporary crisis which met with a 
vigorous but temporary response. This viewpoint is reinforced 
by the consensus amongst historians which holds that few 
lessons were learned from the epidemic. There is no evidence 
of cholera leading to lasting reforms or improvements in 
public health arrangements. As Morris put it, in the decade
33
after the epidemic, ’cholera played no part in social policy- 
making' , hence the notion that cholera was the sanitary 
reformers' best friend is found wanting.66
This verdict is too harsh as it can be shown that the 
first cholera epidemic had indirect influences on the creation 
of public health policy, especially as it influenced a number 
of people who were to play an important part in the public 
health campaigns of the 1840s. At the local level a number of 
individuals strove to keep the public health issue on the 
political agenda. The most influential of these were based in 
the growing industrial towns of the north of England, the most 
celebrated being Robert Baker, a Leeds surgeon. Acting at the 
behest of Leeds Town Council in 1833, Baker produced his now 
famous report on the Leeds epidemic, which included a 'Cholera 
Map' showing that the epidemic had been most severe in those 
districts where environmental conditions were worst.6-7 In 
the short term Baker's report had little effect. However, 
some six years later he produced a statistical survey, which 
re-emphasised the relationship between poor sanitary 
conditions and ill health and it was this document which was 
part of the inspiration for the Leeds Improvement Act, 1842.68
The use of statistics to illustrate the link between 
insanitary conditions and urban disease proved to be an 
invaluable weapon in the campaign for reform and was exploited 
by reformers at both national and local levels. Sanitary 
reports and statistical surveys, like Baker's, were produced 
and compiled in several other towns by local statistical
societies and medical men.69 At national level, Edwin 
Chadwick, Secretary to the Poor Law Commission, played a vital 
part in initiating sanitary surveys and attracting publicity 
for what eventually became the 'public health movement'. 
Chadwick was amongst the first to recognise the value of 
statistics. Although his earlier proposals for including 
improved public health provision as a part of the Poor Law 
Amendment Act, 1834 had been rejected, he was successful in 
persuading Parliament to include Clauses requiring registrars 
to include the cause of death in the Registration of Deaths 
Bill, 1836.70 When the Bill became law, he also persuaded the 
Registrar General to appoint a skilled statistician, William 
Farr, as a compiler of abstracts. In the Annual Reports of 
the Registrar General, Farr used statistical data, and 
particularly comparative statistics, to demonstrate that death 
rates in the most insanitary towns could be reduced to the 
same level as that for 'Healthy Districts' if the government 
took steps to introduce comprehensive sanitary measures.71 
Statistics, it was argued, were 'irrefutable facts' which 
could not be disputed by opponents of reform.
Acting in an official capacity, Chadwick enlisted the 
help of three medical men, James Kay, Neil Arnott and Thomas 
Southwood Smith in 1838, to examine conditions in some of 
London's worst fever districts.72 Their work concluded that 
the moral shortcomings of the poor were largely to blame for 
the high incidence of fever, but that the poor would not be in 
a position to help themselves until their living conditions 
were improved. To achieve this, it was argued, sanitary
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powers should be given to local Poor Law Guardians.73 The 
link between ill health, poverty and the environment was 
central to the public health movement’s quest for reform. 
Chadwick and other reformers argued that the filthy and 
overcrowded conditions in the new urban environment were 
responsible for the generation and spread of urban diseases. 
Experience showed that the incidence of these diseases - 
diarrhoea, dysentery and typhoid, which many contemporaries 
referred to under the generic term ’fever’ - was highest 
wherever insanitary and overcrowded conditions existed. 
Increasingly, therefore, ’fever' was regarded as an urban 
phenomenon, and was blamed for debilitating or killing the 
proof. It followed that because urban diseases claimed the 
lives of family breadwinners or left people unable to work, 
there was a direct link between them and the level of 
pauperism.74 Hence, for Chadwick, sanitary reform was vital 
in order to keep local poor-rates to a minimum.
Closely linked to the view that disease caused poverty 
were the vexed and intimately related questions of the 
specificity, origin and spread of urban disease. After the 
first cholera epidemic the medical profession was once again 
divided over these issues.75 The miasmatic theory gained 
wider acceptance in the late 1830s and was openly supported by 
sanitarians like Southwood Smith who declared that the higher 
rates of mortality in urban areas were the result of 
'effluvial poisons’ rather than 'greater misery'.76 Chadwick 
and his disciples were staunch believers in this theory and 
were convinced that disease was propagated amongst the poor by
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atmospheric poison resulting from filth, overcrowding, lack of 
drainage and defective water supply. They also rejected the 
notion of specific disease entities, arguing that diarrhoea, 
dysentery and typhoid were forms of ’fever’ whose generation 
was the result of certain atmospheric conditions.77 Thus, 
Chadwick and like minded sanitarians argued that comprehensive 
sanitary reforms would prevent the generation and spread not 
only of ’fever’, but also of epidemic diseases like cholera.78
With the publication of a number of reports, articles and 
surveys which highlighted the squalor and unhealthiness of the 
new, yet quickly deteriorating, urban environment, not to 
mention the link between disease and pauperism, pressure for 
some kind of action grew around 1840. After the investigation 
into the London fever epidemic by Kay, Arnott and Southwood 
Smith, the government decided that an extended enquiry was 
necessary before further action could be taken. Chadwick 
shouldered the responsibility for this project and, in 
addition to making his own investigations, drew upon reports 
and evidence supplied by a number of local sanitary reformers. 
In 1842 Chadwick's Report of an Inquiry into the Sanitary 
Conditions of the Labouring Population of Great Britain was 
published.79 This epic work contained lurid details of the 
whole gamut of health problems and moral degradation which 
existed in urban areas. Significantly, it also set out a 
coherent programme of reform legislation which, following the 
precedent of the 1831-32 cholera epidemic and, more recently, 
the Poor Law and Factory Acts, stressed the need for local 
action under central guidance. As an exercise in propaganda,
37
the Chadwick report was an undisputed and immediate success. 
The Report was widely read andr more importantly, had a 
profound impact on middle class opinion which was shocked by 
many of its revelations and moved by its moralistic message. 
Whilst the report undoubtedly brought the public health 
question to the fore, it did not prompt an immediate 
legislative response.
After the publication of Chadwick's report, a public 
health movement coalesced and gathered momentum. In 1843 the 
Home Secretary set up the first of two Royal Commissions on 
the Health of Towns, both of which thoroughly investigated 
public health conditions and reiterated the case for 
amelioration. In 1844 the Metropolitan Health of Towns 
Association was established, its chief aim being to press for 
reform. Members of the Association included utilitarians and 
several eminent medical men, various aristocrats including 
Earl Grey and Viscount Morpeth, and members of the Young 
England group such as Disraeli.80 Health of Towns 
Associations were quickly established in many provincial 
centres and, within a matter of months, were functioning as 
'one of the most effective pressure groups in British 
history'.81
As.the composition of the Metropolitan Health of Towns 
Association indicates, the public health movement comprised 
individuals from a variety of backgrounds and with varied 
interests. Similarly, it was a fusion of metropolitan and 
provincial factions which sought to influence government at
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both national and local levels. The reformers were motivated 
by a number of factors. Some, like Lord Ashley, were 
influenced by humanitarianism, others were Evangelicals, or 
Tory paternalists. In the provinces, many were medical men 
with close social and working relationships with the poor. 
Others saw the public health movement as a vehicle for 
overcoming their social marginality.82 However, utlitarianism 
was arguably the most decisive factor. This was certainly the 
case with those individuals like Southwood Smith and, more 
crucially, Chadwick, who exerted the greatest influence. 
Chadwick’s unswerving belief in Benthamite philosophy equipped 
him with the means to counter even his most severe critics.
That it took the public health movement several years to 
persuade government that reforms were both desirable and 
necessary, was in part a reflection of the opposition to 
reform. Just as reformers were motivated by different 
influences and factors, so too were their opponents.83 Many 
people regarded state intervention in any sphere of social or 
economic life as unnatural and pernicious. Others were 
frightened it would lead to increased centralisation and 
consequent loss of local autonomy. Even more serious 
reservations and objections arose from the question of how the 
programme of reform envisaged by Chadwick and his associates, 
with its massive sanitary engineering projects, would be 
financed. Arguments for ’economy1 loomed large in the debates 
which eventually accompanied the introduction of legislation 
at national and local level. To an extent, Chadwick was able 
to pre-empt this form of criticism with a persuasive line of
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argument which embodied the basic tenets of utilitarianism.
He asserted that reforms in public health were necessary to 
ensure the greater happiness of the greatest number at least 
cost. With reference to the specific question of finance, 
Chadwick readily admitted that the public would have to pay 
for improvements in sanitary provision through local rates. 
However, he went on to explain that because reforms would 
eliminate disease, the main cause of poverty, they would lead 
to a reduction in pauperism and eventually a reduction in 
local rates. Thus the reforms would be self-financing.
In 1846 the pressure for reform bore fruit when the 
government passed the Nuisance Removal Act (N.R.A.) which gave 
magistrates the power to prosecute those responsible for a 
variety of sanitary nuisances, and the Public Baths and 
Washhouses Act, which permitted local authorities to provide 
these facilities. In 1847 followed the Town Improvement Act, 
the Water Act and the Cemeteries Act which respectively 
empowered local authorities to provide drainage, water 
supplies and public cemeteries.84 However, the great landmark 
has always been seen to be the Public Health Act, 1848 which 
historians have argued was the great achievement of the early 
public health movement.
The Act aimed to work through local boards of health, 
which were to be given responsibility for the construction and 
management of sewerage and drainage systems, wells and water 
supplies, for removal of nuisances, for the control of cellar 
dwellings and other property unfit for habitation, and for the
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provision of burial grounds, parks and public baths.85 The 
Act also established the G.B.H. - with Chadwick at its head, 
whose role was to sanction the formation of local boards and 
provide advice. Those historians who have examined the Act's 
impact on sanitary reform all agree that it did not live up to 
expectation.86 This was largely due to the permissive nature 
of many of its Clauses and the fact that the Board's powers 
were poorly defined. Even in those towns where the death rate 
exceeded twenty three per thousand of the population and the 
Board could demand the establishment of local boards of 
health, it was unable to guarantee that local authorities 
would use the powers available to them.87 A deep seated local 
suspicion and resentment of central authority further 
undermined the Act and the Board.
Several historians have pointed out that the burst of 
legislation after 1846 coincided with the renewed threat of 
cholera. Some have argued the case for a direct connection 
between the new pandemic and the passage, after two 
unsuccessful readings, of the Public Health Act.88 On close 
inspection the evidence suggests that whilst cholera was 
instrumental in giving Parliament a greater sense of urgency, 
this resulted in the passage of legislation that was 
incomplete and poorly thought out.89 From this perspective, 
far from being the sanitary reformers' best friend, cholera 
may actually have hindered their efforts by weakening the 1848 
Act. One of the ironies surrounding the 1848 Act was that as 
it was intended to provide a gradual solution to the problems 
of fever and other epidemic and endemic diseases, it was
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poorly designed to meet the exigencies of the new cholera 
threat when that erupted in 1848.
The G.B.H. was established by the time cholera arrived. 
For this epidemic no special legislation was deemed necessary, 
but if there was an equivalent of the Cholera Act 1832 it came 
in the form of the 1848 Nuisance Removal and Disease 
Prevention Act (N.R.D.P.A.), which was a refinement of the 
N.R.A., 1846, which had itself been passed to help combat the 
temporary crisis of local fever outbreaks.90 The N.R.D.P.A., 
which could only be put into effect by an Order in Council, 
allowed the G.B.H. to instruct local authorities, especially 
Poor Law Guardians, to abate nuisances and provide medical 
treatment for the sick. However, a number of factors 
prevented the Board from meeting its main objective which was 
securing preventive action at the local level.91 The Act did 
not allow the G.B.H. actually to create local boards of 
health. Instead of consolidating cleansing functions under 
one authority, the Act merely gave superintending powers to 
Boards of Guardians, allowing them to act in default of other 
local authorities. Thus, when the N.R.D.P.A. was put into 
force in the autumn of 1848, preventive action at the local 
level often became the responsibility of Boards of Guardians, 
bodies committed to the principle of ’less eligibility1, and 
to whom the idea of meeting the cost of sanitary and medical 
preventive measures was often an anathema. This situation, 
contrasted sharply with that in 1831-32 when preventive 
measures at the local level were delegated to boards of health 
created specifically for the purpose of implementing
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preventive measures. The chances of the G.B.H. securing 
uniform and comprehensive action at the local level were 
further undermined by the fact that it did not possess the 
powers to compel local authorities to implement either the 
provisions of the N.R.D.P.A. or any other regulations 
issued.92
The inherent weaknesses of the N.R.D.P.A. were not the 
only factors which jeopardised the G.B.H.'s preventive 
strategy. As numerous studies have confirmed, the Board 
itself was hugely unpopular with many local authorities and 
rate-payers, largely as a result of general hostility towards 
central power. Local authorities and rate-payers were not 
alone in viewing the Board with suspicion. Many medical men, 
and especially those in the provinces, were implacably opposed 
to the Board, fearing that it would force many junior medical 
men into public service where they would be exploited.93 
Relations between the Board and the medical profession were 
also damaged by Chadwick’s failure to hide his contempt for 
the profession and particularly those medical men who 
disagreed with the Board's ideas on disease causation.94 All 
these factors, coupled with its inexperience, ensured that the 
Board’s first eighteen months proved to be amongst the most 
difficult during the ten years of its existence.
In many respects, developments in individual towns and 
cities paralleled those which occurred nationally, with 
reformers using statistical and sanitary surveys to highlight 
the need for sanitary intervention on the part of local
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authorities. The West and East Riding towns were fairly 
typical. Works similar to those produced by Robert Baker in 
Leeds were published by George Calvert Holland in Sheffield in 
1842, by the Sanatory Committee of Bradford Woolcombers in 
1845 and, under threat of cholera, by the Sanitary Committee 
of Hull Medical Society in 1847.95 Agitation for reform at 
the local level met with different levels of success in each 
locality. As early as 1842, the Leeds Improvement Act was 
passed, giving Leeds Town Council wide ranging powers to 
improve public health conditions.96 Sheffield Town Council 
appointed a Health Committee in 1846, passed a bye law in 1847 
to tighten public health regulations and in 1848 commissioned 
its own sanitary survey of the town.97 Less significant 
developments occurred in Bradford and Hull. Following 
incorporation in 1847, Bradford Town Council established a 
sanitary committee and passed a bye law empowering it to deal 
with minor nuisances.98 In Hull, the only significant 
improvement came in 1845 when a new and more plentiful supply 
of water was obtained from the River Hull.99
In terms of producing results, many of the reforms and 
improvements of 1840s at the local level proved to be 
inadequate or disappointing. The Leeds Improvement Act, in 
particular, failed to live up to expectation. Hennock argued 
that although it ranked as ’one of the pioneering measures in 
the history of public health in England1, thirty years or so 
after it was passed 'the contrast between what the 
comprehensive ideas embodied in the Act and what had actually 
been achieved was still great enough to cause comment1.100
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By 1848, sanitary reformers, both nationally and locally, 
had produced a lot of words (reports, legislative enactments, 
articles, blue books), but little action. It took a second 
cholera epidemic to turn words into action; whether this was 
temporary or permanent action remains to be seen.
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1.3. THE CONTEXT: THE FOUR TOWNS
1.3.1. LEEDS
By the 1840s, Leeds was one of England's largest and most 
important manufacturing towns. Although its growing 
prosperity was due in part to the expansion of its 
engineering, leather, mining and dressmaking industries, the 
mainstay of the economy was the manufacture and finishing of 
woollen cloth. The importance of the textile industry was 
such that in 1841 it provided employment for almost 40% of the 
town's work force.101
The success of the Leeds textile industry was due in part 
to the willingness of a handful of local millowners to 
experiment with technological innovations. Mechanisation of 
the industry was first attempted by Benjamin Gott at the end 
of the eighteenth century. Despite the success of Gott's 
ventures - he opened the world's first fully integrated 
woollen mill in 1826 - he had few imitators for several 
decades. From 1830 onwards, however, the development of 
reliable steam driven machinery persuaded ever growing numbers 
of manufacturers that centralised, mechanised production would 
significantly increase output and profitability. Thereafter, 
the factory took over from the small shop as the typical unit 
of production.10:2
The transition from traditional or domestic to factory 
based production after 1830 played a major part in deepening 
the divisions between capital and labour. At mid-century
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James Hole, an Owenite and fierce social critic, described how 
in Leeds, 'Class stands opposed to class1.103 Those 
historians who have examined social relations in mid­
nineteenth century Leeds are in broad agreement with Hole, 
arguing that a clearly defined class structure had 
developed.104 The only debate in this area has been over why 
the town quickly lost its reputation as an early 'centre of 
Radical and working class movements' and, more specifically, 
why Chartism failed to achieve the mass involvement seen in 
other parts of the West Riding.105
The expansion of the textile and other manufacturing 
industries after 1800 attracted large numbers of migrants to 
Leeds. This, coupled with the surplus of births over deaths 
within the town, led to a dramatic rise in the town's 
population. Census returns indicate that the number of people 
living in the borough increased from 53,000 in 1801 to 83,000 
in 1821 and 172,000 in 1851.106 The majority of the town's 
population lived in the heavily industrialised, centrally 
located in-township; in fact, the 1851 census showed over
100,000 people, approximately 60% of the borough's population, 
lived there.107
Inevitably, the concentration of industry and vast 
numbers of people into such a small geographical area led to 
serious environmental problems. Severe overcrowding, 
industrial pollution, lack of basic amenities and rudimentary 
sanitation combined to make life extremely uncomfortable for 
all citizens and positively dangerous for the majority. The
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appalling sanitary conditions which blighted the town provided 
an ideal environment in which endemic diseases such as fever 
and tuberculosis and epidemic diseases like smallpox and 
influenza could thrive. This was reflected in the town's 
persistently high death rate.
Cholera first visited Leeds in 1832, when it claimed the 
lives of over seven hundred people. Predictably, the 
overcrowded and squalid in-township bore the brunt of the 
mortality.108 The epidemic provoked different forms of 
behaviour from the middle and working classes. Local 
officials responded to the threat of cholera by mounting a 
cleansing campaign of unprecedented intensity, clearing away 
filth and nuisances, whilst the local elite reacted in 
traditional fashion, raising a voluntary subscription for the 
relief of the poor.109 The response of the working classes to 
cholera and the measures taken to combat it was relatively 
muted. Angry scenes, sparked by the implementation of medical 
precautions, were reported but rioting and disorder on the 
scale seen in other towns and cities did not develop.
Baker's famous investigations of the epidemic failed to 
make an impression on the ruling elite and nothing was done 
immediately to improve sanitary conditions. Towards the end 
of the 1830s, however, Baker's second report, this time at the 
behest of the Council, was a major stimulus to the Improvement 
Act noted above.110
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1.3.2. SHEFFIELD
During the first half of the nineteenth century the 
Sheffield steel industry expanded to such an extent that at 
mid-century 90% of British steel and 50% of European steel was 
produced in the town.111 These eyecatching statistics 
prompted one contemporary observer to comment that 'Sheffield 
is as completely the metropolis of steel as Manchester is of 
cotton or Leeds of woollens'.112 What made Sheffield's pre­
eminence in steel making all the more remarkable was the fact 
that the industry was little more than an adjunct to the 
town's largest industrial sector, the lighter metal trades, 
which included the manufacture of cutlery, silverware and 
agricultural tools.113 That four times as many people were 
employed in the light trades as the heavy trades in 1850 
provides a clear indication of their relative importance.
Thus, as well as being Europe's biggest producer of steel by 
the 1840s, the town was also 'the great seat of the cutlery 
and other hardware manufactures1.114
Sheffield's economic and industrial development between 
1800 and 1850 was particularly noteworthy because it was 
achieved without the assistance of fundamental changes in the 
methods, organisation or relations of production. One 
historian has recently pointed out that both the heavy and 
light trades developed 'mass production by traditional 
methods'.115 Just as new production techniques failed to 
supplant traditional methods and specialisations, the large 
factory failed to replace the small workshop as the main unit 
of production. As late as 1850, there were no more than
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fifteen firms employing more than a hundred workers and in the 
light trades, where traditional specialisations were 
particularly prevalent, 'the concept of a self contained 
factory ... was alien'.116
The rapid growth of labour intensive industries after 
1800 lured thousands of migrants to the town.117 As a result, 
its population grew threefold from 45,000 in 1801 to 135,000 
in 1851. As was the case in the other fast growing industrial 
towns, the vast majority of citizens had to contend with 
atrocious living conditions, grinding poverty and the constant 
threat of disease.
Whilst historians recognise that Sheffield shared much in 
common with other large towns, they point out that its social 
structure and relations differed significantly to those in 
places like Leeds, Bradford and Manchester. For a variety of 
reasons - these are explored later - the divisions between 
capital and labour developed slowly in Sheffield. As late as 
1843 a local man reported that it was still 'not easy to draw 
the line in Sheffield between men and masters'.118 Whilst 
Sheffield society was, as Pollard pointed out, relatively 
homogeneous until after 1850, strains did develop between the 
different classes. This was the case in 1832 when cholera 
visited the town.
The first epidemic killed over four hundred people, 
mainly in the slum districts on the banks of the rivers Don 
and Sheaf.119 The local authorities attempted to thwart the
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disease by hastily implementing sanitary and medical 
preventive measures. As was the case elsewhere these measures 
were resented by the poor. Consequently, large sections of 
the local community were gripped by panic whilst others 
vigorously resisted ’interventionist1 medical precautions.
When the epidemic subsided the extraordinary measures were 
abandoned and the town’s sanitary administration and social 
relationships returned to ’normal'. Despite incorporation in 
1835 there were no significant administrative innovations in 
Sheffield’s sanitary arrangements until the mid-1840s when 
working and middle class agitation for reforms began to pay 
modest dividends.
1.3.3. HULL
During the first half of the nineteenth century Hull had 
established itself as Britain’s third busiest port in terms of 
volume of trade, surpassed only by Liverpool and London.120 
The rapid growth of the town and port was very closely 
connected to the industrialisation of its north midlands and 
West Riding hinterland, with Hull acting as a vital trade link 
with the countries of northern Europe. This was evident in 
the type of goods traded through the port. During the first 
half of the century ever increasing volumes of raw materials 
for industry, such as bar iron, timber, wool, flax, rags and 
linseed, and various foodstuffs required to feed the 
burgeoning population of the industrial north were all 
imported and transhipped inland by road, waterways or, after 
1840, railways. The import trade was complemented by a 
flourishing export trade, consisting principally of woollen
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and cotton yarn, finished textile goods, machinery and other 
capital goods.121 Towards the middle of the century passenger 
traffic - made up mainly of European emigrants travelling to 
America - also began to make a contribution to the local 
economy, providing revenue for shipping and railway companies 
and hoteliers. The importance of docking and shipping 
industries was such that in 1851, they provided work for over
7,000 men, just less than a tenth of the town’s total 
population.12 2
Hull’s economic aggrandisement was not due solely to 
trade. Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, shipbuilding had been a major source of employment 
and although the industry went into decline after 1830, it 
still provided work for over five hundred men in 1851.123 By 
mid-century a number of new industries had been introduced, 
including fishing and fish curing, seed crushing and flour 
milling, engineering, and the manufacture of paint and 
chemicals. Whilst these ’new' industries were poised to make 
a significant contribution to Hull's economic fortunes in the 
second half of the century, they were still embryonic in 1850. 
There was, however, one notable exception to this pattern - 
the cotton industry - which was first started in the 1830s 
and, by 1851, provided employment for over 2,000 people in 
five fully mechanised mills.124 The industry was doubly 
exceptional as not only was it the only sizeable manufacturing 
industry, but it was also the only sector in which large 
employers predominated.
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The growth of the port and the development of new 
industries in the period 1800-1850 attracted large numbers of 
people from places as far away as Ireland and Lancashire.125 
As a result, the town experienced a rapid rise in population 
from 29,000 in 1801 to 84,000 in 1851. At mid-century the 
majority of the population lived in either the overcrowded Old 
Town quarter or the recently built tenements and courts of 
Sculcoates, the Mytons and the Groves. Contemporary 
descriptions of these areas reveal that they were all blighted 
by the typical problems of rapid and unplanned 
urbanisation.126 Further health problems were posed by Hull’s 
vulnerability to ship-borne infections; thousands of foreign 
seamen visited the town each year and were accommodated in the 
town's notoriously unhealthy lodging houses.
By the mid-century the town's social structure was in a 
state of flux. The working class was made up of several 
disparate groups. A relatively small industrial proletariat 
was emerging from the factory based cotton industry, but the 
majority of workers were employed in sectors associated with 
the port, where employment was precarious. In addition to 
having to contend with cyclical unemployment, these workers 
were also bound up in a system of casual employment. Here, 
the cash nexus operated in its crudest form, work was 
irregular, wages poor and employers remote. For this section 
of the working class, opportunities for effective political 
organisation were few; indeed, it was not until the 1860s that 
the town's dockers were able to stage effective action.127 
Not surprisingly, the working class did not develop a
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reputation for radicalism. Hull did have a sizeable middle 
class comprised of merchants, professionals and a few large 
scale manufacturers. Political power lay firmly with this 
capitalist elite and in the 1830s and 1840s was often used to 
'resist pressure for reforms of any description.
In 1832 around three hundred lives were lost to 
cholera.128 The epidemic created something of a dilemma for 
the town's ruling elite as the government's system of 
prevention - quarantines - threatened severe disruption of 
trade and, for that matter, employment. In the event, 
quarantines and other public health measures were implemented. 
The crisis passed off without serious disturbances and was 
quickly forgotten by all but a handful of local medical men 
who conducted a vigorous debate amongst themselves about the 
best methods of treating the disease.
1.3.4. BRADFORD
Between 1800 and 1850 Bradford grew from being little 
more than a relatively minor outpost of the West Riding 
textile industry into what has been described as 'one of the 
most remarkable phenomena of the British Empire'.129 This 
description owes much to the two most salient features of the 
town's history in the first half of the nineteenth century: 
its emergence as a manufacturing centre of international 
repute, and its spectacular eightfold increase in population.
Throughout the entire nineteenth century, growth and 
prosperity were completely dependent upon the expansion of the
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worsted industry. By 1830, Bradford was already Britain's 
largest producer of worsted cloth and, from this position, it 
quickly overtook its erstwhile rivals, Leeds and Halifax, to 
become the centre of the industry's finishing and marketing 
sectors by 1850.130
The rapid expansion of the worsted industry was largely 
due to technological and organisational changes in methods of 
production and the willingness of local manufacturers to 
experiment with fibres other than wool.131 Mechanisation 
played a vital role in stimulating the growth of the local 
economy. As was the case in other branches of the textile 
industry, spinning was the first part of the manufacturing 
process to be transformed by the introduction of steam powered 
machinery. By 1830 the whole of this sector had been fully 
mechanised. With the introduction of reliable powerlooms 
after 1830 the shift towards centralised, factory based 
production gained momentum with the result that by 1840 
mechanised weaving had become the norm.132 By the mid-1840s 
woolcombing was the only part of the manufacturing process 
which had not been mechanised. Following the introduction of 
Lister's highly successful 'nip-machine' in 1845, this last 
stronghold of domestic production succumbed. Thus, in just 
over fifty years the transition to the fully fledged factory 
system in the worsted industry was complete. By the fifth 
decade of the nineteenth century Bradford more than any other 
town in the West Riding could lay claim to being the classic 
town of the industrial revolution.
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Throughout the period 1800-1850 people flocked to the 
town in the hope of finding employment as either domestic 
producers or factory operatives. This led to an explosive 
increase the population from just 13,000 in 1801 to 104,000 in 
1851, a rate of growth which was quite exceptional even by 
contemporary standards.133 The almost total reliance on a 
single branch of the textile industry left the town vulnerable 
to frequent trade depressions with the result that mass 
unemployment was common. The problem of poverty was 
exacerbated by the displacement of thousands of handloom 
weavers. Not surprisingly, the twin processes of 
industrialisation and urbanisation created environmental 
conditions in which disease was ever present. As a result, 
the first half of the century saw a steadily rising mortality 
rate and very high levels of infant and child mortality.134
The growth of the worsted industry and the manner in 
which it was achieved, had a number of implications for the 
town's social structure and relationships. Predictably, 
Bradford was an overwhelmingly working class town, with over a 
quarter of its population working as factory operatives in the 
worsted industry.135 The lot of Bradford's labouring classes 
was particularly hard as the town did not have a sizeable or 
well established middle class to cushion the blow of frequent 
trade depressions through traditional charitable or 
philanthropic gestures. The town's working class developed a 
reputation for an unruliness which later developed into 
radicalism. As Briggs has noted, the famed 'propensity to 
riot' was far more marked in Bradford than in neighbouring
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Leeds.136 Indeed, throughout the period 1830-1848 social and 
political tensions ran high and led to serious clashes between 
operatives and the forces of law and order on numerous 
occasions. Not surprisingly, the town was a major centre of 
physical force Chartism and the scene of serious rioting in 
1848. According to one historian, such disturbances, along 
with frequent industrial disputes, were clear manifestations 
of what contemporaries termed ’the capital-labour issue1. 137
Surprisingly, perhaps, cholera failed to take hold in 
Bradford in 1832. The disease was reported to have claimed 
the lives of only fifteen people. However, the threat of 
cholera did provoke the local authorities into rare if limited 
action. Vigorous health measures were not seen again until 
fever reached epidemic proportions a decade and a half later.
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PART 2 
1848-49
Part 2 is presented in two sections: 2.1, 2.2. and 2.3, 
followed by their footnotes on pages 135-48; and Parts 2.4, 
2.5 and 2.6, followed by their footnotes on pages 214-25.
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2.1. INTRODUCTION
Britain's second cholera epidemic was part of a pandemic 
which again originated in the Indian sub-continent. It first 
appeared in epidemic form in India during the hot season of 
1845 and spread quickly through the Punjab and into 
Afghanistan.1 The disease quickly moved westwards, reaching 
several parts of the Middle East, including Aden, Persia and 
Asiatic Turkey in 1846. By September 1847 cholera had reached 
Moscow, where its progress was temporarily checked by the 
onset of the harsh Russian winter. The westward march resumed 
in the spring of 1848. By June it had reached St. Petersburg 
and Berlin, and was also present in Finland and Sweden. Three 
months later, the disease arrived at Hamburg and Rotterdam, 
both of which were just three days sailing time from Britain's 
east coast ports. Little over a month later it crossed the 
North Sea.
The 1848 cholera season began, apart from a number of 
'imported' cases, at Southwark in London on 22 September, but 
the General Board of Health (G.B.H.) did not issue its 'First 
Notification of Cholera' until 5 October, following 
simultaneous outbreaks at Newhaven and Edinburgh. Throughout 
the autumn and winter Scotland bore the brunt of the epidemic, 
with Glasgow, Edinburgh and industrial Lanarkshire 
experiencing serious outbreaks.2 Early in 1849, however, 
there was a marked decline in incidence, presumed to be due to 
colder weather; this trend continued such that by April it 
seemed that the epidemic was over.
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Hopes that Britain might have escaped a serious epidemic 
were shortlived. In May 1849, cholera struck again in towns 
as far apart as Gloucester and Durham. Within a month, the 
disease had spread to such an extent that the G.B.H. admitted 
that cholera had reappeared 1 in various and distant places in 
England, Wales and Scotland’.3 By the end of June, many large 
towns including Manchester, Plymouth and Bristol were affected 
and, ominously, all attempts to arrest its progress were 
failing. During the summer of 1849 deaths mounted and rapidly 
passed the total mortality for the 1831-32. However, as 
previously the crisis ended abruptly, yet by the end of the 
year over 60,000 lives had been lost.
The government response was that the epidemic was not a 
national problem. Committed as it was to the miasmatic theory 
of disease causation, the G.B.H. believed that there was no 
need to police national boundaries with quarantines. Indeed, 
the Board believed that outbreaks were due to specific local 
sanitary and environmental conditions.4 This view of the 
disease was mirrored in the legislation under which it was 
fought. Most of the powers of the Nuisance Removal and 
Disease Prevention Act, 1848 (N.R.D.P.A.), were discretionary 
and vested in local authorities whose structure and functions 
were extremely varied. It is, therefore, wholly appropriate 
to consider the 1849 epidemic at the local level.
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The epidemic of 1848-49 caused significantly higher 
levels of mortality in the large towns of the East and West 
Ridings than the 1832 epidemic, except in Sheffield.
TABLE 2.1
DEATHS FROM CHOLERA IN THE FOUR LARGE TOWNS OF YORKSHIRE, 1832 
AND 1849
TOWN 1831-32 1848-49
Hull and Sculcoates 300 1,834
Leeds and Hunslet 700+ 2,323
Bradford 15 426
Sheffield and Ecclesall 400+ 150
Sources: Parts 1.3.1,2,3 and 4. and Report of the Cholera 
Epidemic of 1866 in England, 1868.
The approximate figures for 1832 are said to represent 
significant underestimates, due to diagnostic uncertainties 
and low rates of reporting, yet the same reservations apply to 
the later data despite improvements in medicine and civil 
registration in the intervening years.5 The mortality rates 
in 1849 varied between the towns (see TABLE 2.2), with Hull 
and Leeds experiencing very high levels.
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TABLE 2.2
TOTAL DEATHS AND MORTALITY RATES IN THE FOUR LARGE TOWNS OF 
YORKSHIRE, 1849
TOWN TOTAL
DEATHS
DEATHS PER 
10,000 POPN.
Hull and Sculcoates 1,834 200
Leeds and Hunslet 2,323 125
Bradford 426 28
Sheffield and Ecclesall 150 12
England (average) 53,293 30
Source: Report of the Cholera Epidemic of 1866 in England, 
1868.
In 1831-32, local cholera outbreaks or epidemics followed 
a characteristic pattern.6 Beginning in undramatic fashion 
with sporadic or isolated cases appearing over some weeks, the 
disease spread slowly but persistently for a number of weeks 
before entering an explosive phase, in which the number of 
cases and deaths escalated dramatically. Once the epidemic 
had ’peaked1, however, it quickly went into decline and within 
a matter of weeks had completely disappeared.
In 1849 local epidemics followed a similar course. 
However, establishing precisely when the epidemic began in a
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particular locality is problematic. The events of 1849 
confirm that the beginning of a cholera epidemic was rarely a 
clear cut event, with a period of uncertainty and confusion 
preceding official and public recognition. This was due 
firstly to the occurrence of isolated or 'imported' cases 
amongst an otherwise 'healthy' indigenous population. Several 
such cases, usually in people who had developed cholera 
symptoms after returning home from a visit to an infected area 
(or in the case of Hull, from an infected country), were 
reported in each of the four Yorkshire towns. Although these 
often prompted scares, they were usually played down by 
medical men and local authorities who, following 
anticontagionist doctrines, saw cholera spread by malign 
environments not sick people. Secondly, because the early 
stages of cholera were similar to, and easily confused with, 
those of a number of endemic diseases, such as diarrhoea and 
dysentery, instances of mistaken diagnosis were common. It 
should be remembered that the notion of disease specificity 
was still in the making, so a serious case of diarrhoea might 
transmute into Asiatic cholera. Disputes over diagnosis 
between members of the medical profession, or between them and 
other officials, were a further consequence of this situation, 
and one which often led members of the lay community to 
question or reject medical opinion. Acceptance that epidemic 
cholera was present usually followed the occurrence of a 
critical number of cases and deaths amongst local people, or 
where victims exhibited the unmistakable symptoms of 'true' or 
'advanced' cholera. The problems over the designation of an
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epidemic were evident in Yorkshire's four largest towns in 
1848-49.
This part of the thesis details in turn the patterns of 
the epidemic in each town and the official and popular 
responses. The discussion of the four towns begins with Hull, 
the first and worst affected of the towns.
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2.2. HULL
2.2.1. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE EPIDEMIC.
As an East coast port which conducted most of its trade 
with the Baltic ports, it is hardly surprising that Hull was 
one of the first British towns to experience a 1 cholera scare' 
during 1848. The first reported cases were imported from 
Hamburg, occurring amongst seamen at the end of September 
1848.7 Despite official national policy being based on 
anticontagionism, the implementation of a limited form of 
quarantine by the port authorities was claimed to have 
successfully confined the disease to the stricken vessels. A 
further and more serious scare followed some three weeks 
later, when several suspicious cases were reported amongst the 
people of the town itself.8 However, after a short period of 
dispute and vacillation, local medical men announced to a 
relieved public that the cases had been of 'English' rather 
than 'Asiatic' cholera.9
There were no further reports or. rumours that cholera was 
present until the summer of 1849. During the first three 
weeks of July an unspecified number of suspicious cases and 
nineteen alleged cholera deaths were reported. As had been 
the case the previous autumn there was doubt over whether or 
not the deaths were attributable to 'true' Asiatic cholera, 
not least because increased mortality from 'summer diarrhoea' 
and similar disorders was common at that time of year. That 
'special causes' were assigned to several of the nineteen or
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so 'cholera deaths' reported before 23 July merely added to 
the uncertainty.10 Indeed, when it transpired that one of the 
deceased had eaten 'an enormous quantity of peas', another 
'much bad fruit' and that some of the others had visited 
infected localities prior to the onset of symptoms, it was 
asserted that there were no grounds for 'a wild panic'.
A further two cases, this time of 'true' cholera were 
diagnosed in the Myton district during the third week of 
July.11 The disease quickly became established, such that 
these cases were later deemed to be the first cases of the 
epidemic proper.12 Initially the disease spread slowly, 
claiming the lives of around fifty people during the first 
fortnight of August.13 Thereafter, the number of new cases 
and deaths began to increase with enormous speed as the 
epidemic spread into other parts of the town and entered its 
most explosive phase. Mortality levels reached a peak in 
September, with cholera and premonitory diarrhoea claiming the 
lives of almost 400 people in the first week of the month, an 
unprecedented 500 during the second week and well over 300 
during the third.14 The epidemic became less severe towards 
the end of September and in October declined with remarkable 
speed. Indeed, during the week ending 20 October, the local 
Registrar had occasion to record just eight deaths, the last 
marked the end of the epidemic.
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2.2.2. THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE, 1848.
News that cholera was affecting Moscow in 1847 caused a 
wave of concern amongst the medical profession and members of 
the general public in Hull. The experience of the first 
epidemic, when cholera spread unimpeded from Russia to Britain 
in little over a year, led to demands for the town's 
authorities to take immediate steps to avert another 
disaster.15 With the assistance of the local press, the 
medical profession began to agitate for improvements in the 
town's sanitary condition.
In November 1847, the recently formed Hull Medical 
Society (H.M.S.) appointed a sanitary committee which invited 
the Town Council to co-operate with it 'in providing against 
the reappearance of cholera’.16 The Town Council and two 
local Boards of Guardians were more concerned about the 
current fever epidemic (probably typhus) than the threat of 
cholera.17 Nevertheless, the Council's decision to create its 
own Sanitary Committee to put the Nuisance Removal Act 
(N.R.A.) into force, in the hope of quelling the fever 
epidemic, was seen as an encouraging sign. Indeed, it was 
observed that this, along with 'other indicators', 
demonstrated that there was a 'determination not to allow the 
cholera to re-appear among us without some preparations to 
mitigate its horrors'.18
Within a month of its formation, the Sanitary Committee 
of H.M.S. produced a comprehensive report. This contained the
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familiar catalogue of nuisances and sanitary defects in each 
district and, as well as making numerous recommendations 
designed to bring about gradual but lasting improvements in 
the standard of the townfs public health, identified a variety 
of ’local evils calling for immediate remedy in anticipation 
of cholera'.19 In addition to focussing public attention on 
the full spectrum of health hazards, the Report highlighted 
what was considered to be the major obstacle to improvement - 
the way in which the responsibility for sanitary arrangements 
was divided between separate agencies.20
The problems of divided responsibility and over-lapping 
jurisdiction were evident in most large towns in the 1840s, 
but were particularly serious in Hull because of the number of 
agencies involved. Firstly, there was the Council, which was 
responsible for water supply and a limited range of cleansing 
and scavenging duties. Next came the two Boards of Guardians 
who had authority for nuisance removal and disease prevention. 
The provision and upkeep of drains and sewers was vested in 
two sets of Improvement Commissioners or, in those areas it 
owned, the Dock Company.21 The situation was further 
complicated because the removal of night-soil was left to 
private contractors. The net result was that work in crucial 
areas, such as scavenging, was done imperfectly, if at all.22 
The Committee's view, that sanitary conditions could not be 
improved until all 'matters affecting the public health' were 
carried out by one and the same authority', was shared by 
members of the public and the local press.23
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Whilst news of cholera’s approach in 1847 and the scourge 
of typhus led to an upsurge of interest in the public health 
question in Hull, the recommendations made by medical men and 
other sanitary reformers were ignored by the authorities. In 
1848 pressure for sanitary improvements and contingency plans 
intensified as cholera again moved ever nearer .
Increasingly, the local authorities were admonished for their 
apparent indifference to sanitary precautions. At the 
beginning of the year, a local resident wrote of his belief 
that the authorities were acting as if ’they held their 
offices for no other purpose but to hinder every benevolent 
work'.24 Despite repeated and vociferous demands for action, 
and criticism from the Health of Towns Association, the local 
authorities did little to improve sanitary conditions or to 
make plans for the threatened epidemic.25 In July the threat 
was such that the Sanitary Committee of H.M.S. attempted once 
again to force the hand of the authorities. The Committee 
prepared a document outlining a number of anti-cholera 
measures and sent copies to members of the Council's Sanitary 
Committee, the Mayor and local newspapers.26 Significantly, 
no mention was made of the need for major improvements or 
sweeping changes in the structure of the town's sanitary 
administration. Instead, the Committee urged a combination of 
temporary medical and sanitary measures. When the document 
was eventually discussed at a meeting of the Town Council, the 
majority view was that enough had already been done to prepare 
the town and that further measures would merely cause alarm 
amongst the general public.27
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By the beginning of September 1848 cholera had reached 
Hamburg, Rotterdam and the majority of Baltic ports, none more 
than three days' sailing away. The national government passed 
and adopted the new N.R.D.P.A., but the authorities in Hull 
did nothing. However, the official abandonment of quarantine 
was particularly welcomed, as the local economy was already 
suffering as a result of the Danish blockade which prevented 
access to the Baltic ports. The inevitable happened at the 
end of September when a German ship, 'The Pallas', arrived in 
the Humber with several cholera patients on board.23
Ironically, the events which followed the ship's arrival 
actually deflected criticism from the Town Council and the 
Boards of Guardians. When it became known that the infected 
ship was moored on the Humber, the mood changed from one of 
tension to one of alarm.29 Yet it was the actions of central 
government officials not the presence of an infected ship 
which caused controversy. The public watched in disbelief as 
'The Pallas' was placed under quarantine by local customs 
officials acting at the command of the Privy Council in 
London. Under the terms of the quarantine, only medical men 
were permitted to visit the ship. All other communication 
between the ship and the shore was to be cut for a minimum of 
six days after the last death.30 The Privy Council applied 
the same terms of quarantine to stricken ships arriving at 
other ports and introduced a shorter period of quarantine for 
all ships which had sailed from uninfected ports.3^
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Disbelief at this decision soon gave way to anger. A 
hard hitting editorial in the Hull Advertiser demanded that 
the name of the official who gave the order to place 'The 
Pallas' under quarantine should be made available to the 
public.32 The paper's anger at the decision was such that it 
urged the Mayor to sail out to the ship 'to haul down the 
yellow flag'. The Eastern Counties Herald took a similar 
stance, arguing that quarantine was an absurdity, which acted 
to the annoyance and injury of individuals and to the 
detriment of trade.33 The Hull quarantine controversy quickly 
became the focus of national attention. The Times described 
the situation as intolerable because not only was freedom of 
movement being tampered with, but trade was being damaged, 
perishable goods lost and important business appointments 
broken.34
At both local and national level, therefore, quarantine 
was attacked for being inconsistent with current theories of 
disease causation and the preventive strategies urged by the
G.B.H. Why, asked the Hull Advertiser, had quarantine been 
imposed when local medical men and Dr Grainger of the G.B.H. 
had been to Hamburg and, after observing the epidemic and 
discussing it with German medical men, had declared that 
cholera was not contagious? 35 Why, demanded the Times, 
should the Privy Council be allowed to undermine the G.B.H., 
local government and the vast majority of the medical 
profession with its 'ridiculous proceedings'?36 In the event 
these questions were never answered. The Privy Council 
abandoned the quarantine on 18 October and, with reports of
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cholera cases occurring amongst local people in Hull and its 
rapid diffusion in Scotland, the controversy faded as 
attention returned once again to internal sanitary policing 
and medical precautions. It seems that while medical opinion 
and the G.B.H. had moved to anticontagionism, the Privy 
Council had not.
For a few weeks the quarantine issue dominated the local 
news and diverted attention away from the campaign to force 
the town's authorities into implementing preventive measures. 
However, reports of cholera cases amongst the indigenous 
population in mid-October prompted further demands for 
action.37 That medical opinion was divided over whether or 
not the cases alleged to have occurred in Hull itself were of 
'English' or 'Asiatic' cholera was of no consequence to the 
Advertiser; what mattered, it argued, was that repeated calls 
for sanitary precautions had been ignored by the local 
authorities. In self-righteous tones the paper declared that 
now cholera was present in the town,
'The chidden and rebuked alarmists of the last ten 
months, whose voices conveyed ... an unwelcome message to 
the great bulk of the middle classes, now stand forth as 
prophets in the very eyes of the men who denounced 
them'.38
On a more conciliatory note it added that now cholera had been 
diagnosed 'the authorities of Hull will do all in their powers 
to save the lives of the inhabitants *.
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There was no shortage of advice regarding what course of 
action should be taken. The Sanitary Committee of H.M.S. re­
emphasized the need for the formation of a single sanitary 
authority with jurisdiction over the whole borough, which 
could put cleansing and nuisance removal operations into 
immediate effect and prepare a scheme for medical care and 
treatment.39 The G.B.H.’s Medical Inspectors, Drs Sutherland 
and Grainger, made similar recommendations when they visited 
Hull in October. They conducted an enquiry into the cases 
reported to have occurred amongst local people, pointing out 
that the various provisions of the recently invoked the 
N.R.D.P.A. could be implemented most effectively if the 
authorities - the Council and two Boards of Guardians - formed 
a joint sanitary committee or, better still a Local Board of 
Health (L.B.H.).40 In case the local authorities chose to 
ignore this advice, the local newspapers were quick to point 
out that, under the terms of the Act, the existing Poor Law 
authorities had the necessary powers to take whatever steps 
were necessary for the repression of nuisances and the 
provision of medical facilities.41 However, with the 
exception of limited nuisance removal, neither the Council nor 
the Guardians took further action.
The authorities’ failure to respond was a matter of deep 
concern to Hull’s sanitary lobby and, most notably, members of 
the Medical Society. The gravity of the situation was such 
that a number of councillors and rate-payers decided not to 
wait for the local authorities to act. At the beginning of 
October, certain members of the Council voted to support a
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motion requesting the G.B.H. to apply the Public Health Act 
(P.H.A.).42 Despite considerable hostility from a number of 
councillors, an acrimonious Council meeting ended in victory 
for the reformers. A petition requiring the support of 10% of 
the town’s rate-payers was prepared for circulation. The Hull 
Advertiser, which had played a major role in bringing sanitary 
problems to the public's attention, regarded this as excellent 
news. It urged local rate-payers who valued 'their own lives 
and the lives of the poor' to sign the petition without 
delay.43 In the event, the authorities' failure to respond 
positively to public opinion made a major contribution to 
putting the reform process into motion.44
2.2.3. THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE, 1849
Although cholera's failure to establish itself in Hull in 
1848 and the decline of the epidemic nationally in the winter 
of 1848-49 took the edge off the sanitary question, there were 
further calls from local medical men, members of the public 
and the local press for the authorities to take advantage of 
the winter respite to initiate cleansing and general sanitary 
measures.45 During the spring and early summer of 1849, the 
news that was cholera was moving overland towards Hull sparked 
off renewed complaints about the state of the town, the 
authorities seeming reluctance to take remedial steps and the 
lack of medical planning. As indicated earlier, there was a 
spate of scares during the early summer, but an epidemic was 
not designated until mid-July when cases were confirmed in 
Myton.46 Before this it was reported that, with the exception
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of a 'laborious and tedious process for abating a few 
nuisances, no steps of a really preventive nature had been 
taken'.47 Indeed, the Sculcoates Board of Guardians, who were 
generally considered to be more progressive than their 
counterparts in the Holy Trinity and St. Mary's (Hull) Union 
district, had spent only £15 on nuisance removal operations in 
the first six months of the year.48
Predictably, confirmation that cholera was present in 
July and the knowledge that the authorities had done little to 
alleviate the danger, led to demands for immediate action. 
Twenty three local medical men wrote to the Mayor and urged 
sanitary and medical measures similar to those suggested by
H.M.S. and the G.B.H.49 Dr Sutherland of the G.B.H. again 
visited the town to carry out a sanitary survey and advise the 
local authorities on the best mode of prevention.50 At a 
meeting with the Sanitary Committee of Hull Board of 
Guardians, Sutherland urged comprehensive sanitary cleansing 
operations and the implementation of a system of medical care. 
The latter included: (i) the division of the Union into 
separate medical districts; (ii) the provision of 
dispensaries, a diarrhoea hospital and a House of Refuge;
(iii) the appointment of house-to-house visitors to detect 
cases of premonitory diarrhoea, to instruct patients to seek 
medical treatment and to provide advice on matters of hygiene 
and diet; (iv) the removal of cholera patients' families to 
the House of Refuge; and (v) the thorough cleansing and 
limewashing of patient's houses.51
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Sutherland's directions were by no means new. Indeed, 
similar plans had been publicised over the previous nine 
months. However, as local sanitary reformers had predicted, 
Hull's complex administrative arrangements proved to be a 
major obstacle. Since the N.R.D.P.A. had been put into force 
in October 1848, both Boards of Guardians had been informed of 
their responsibilities on several occasions.52 However, at a 
meeting of the Hull Guardians it transpired that just one 
Guardian realised that they, rather than the Council or the 
two sets of Improvement Commissioners, were responsible under 
the Act.53
After Sutherland (and the local press) had clarified 
responsibilities and explained the need for immediate action, 
there were signs that both Boards of Guardians were at last 
prepared to act. However, once the epidemic had arrived 
sanitary measures had to be augmented by curative measures.
The Hull Guardians acquired premises for use as dispensaries, 
employed druggists, appointed several medical men to provide 
care for the sick, and proposed that nuisance removal should 
be stepped up.54 The Sculcoates Guardians were also reported 
to have adopted 'very energetic measures' for the removal of 
nuisances, cleansing the houses of the poor and the provision 
of medical relief.55 In July, the Advertiser was still quite 
optimistic that, 'If [the authorities] faithfully execute the 
trust reposed in them, we shall have no more Cholera'.56
However, as cholera began to spread across the town, it 
became apparent that action had been too little as well as too
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late. Mr Chatam, Clerk of Sculcoates Union, conducted a 
sanitary inspection of the town at the beginning of August and 
discovered that there was still 'a frightful neglect of duty' 
on the part of both Boards of Guardians.57 Throughout August 
belated efforts were made to cleanse the town. In Sculcoates, 
the Guardians and Improvement Commissioners claimed to have 
redoubled their efforts to remove nuisances, cleanse houses, 
yards, drains and streets and to prosecute offenders for 
infringing the N.R.D.P.A. However, hastily conceived measures 
did not always have the desired effect. For example, in an 
attempt to provide a quick solution to the long-standing 
problem arising from the storage of night-soil in residential 
areas, the Sculcoates Guardians hired a plot of land some two 
miles outside the town and announced that they would prosecute 
any contractor who failed to use it.58 The plan quickly 
backfired as both householders and contractors refused to use 
the tip because of its distance from the town. Worse still, 
several contractors stopped collecting night-soil altogether, 
fearing that storing manure in their own yards would result in 
prosecution.59
During the first fortnight of September the epidemic 
intensified dramatically. The average number of deaths each 
day from cholera and premonitory diarrhoea reached 57 in the 
week ending 6 September and rose to 72 per day the following 
week.60 Cholera was present across the whole town and claimed 
middle as well working class victims. With this frightening 
upturn in mortality the preventive measures implemented by the 
authorities yet again came under scrutiny. The Herald
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described the existing means of combating the epidemic as 
'puny’, whilst the Packet continued to condemn the 'shameful 
neglect' of the town's authorities.61 The Advertiser took a 
similar stance, arguing that had proper steps been taken and 
arrangements made earlier in the year, the inhabitants of Hull 
would not be suffering so terribly.62 The situation was so 
worrying that several anxious residents wrote to the G.B.H. 
complaining that the Guardians had utterly neglected its 
regulations and requesting that Sutherland be sent back to 
Hull.63 The Board complied and Sutherland returned on 13 
September to find 'the aspect of things even worse than had 
been represented'.64
Sutherland discovered that the Hull Guardians had 
completely disregarded the instructions he had given them in 
July. Thus, at the height of the epidemic, little had been 
accomplished in the area of nuisance removal, no cleansing 
teams had been organised, no houses had been limewashed, 
house-to-house visitors had not been recruited, insufficient 
medical men and medical staff had been appointed, a house of 
refuge had not been found, no accurate records of the number 
and location of cases had been kept, and, perhaps worst of all 
given the emphasis on early treatment of premonitory symptoms, 
the three dispensaries opened after Sutherland's previous 
visit had all been closed.65 The situation in the Sculcoates 
area was said to be marginally better. Cleansing and nuisance 
removal operations had been put into effect and the Guardians, 
aware of 'their previous woeful neglect', were at least in a 
position to act upon any further instructions Sutherland might
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issue.66 Having assessed the situation, Sutherland held 
urgent talks with both sets of Guardians. At separate 
meetings he ordered both Boards to engage the required staff, 
procure appropriate buildings and make the arrangements for an 
effective medical relief system. Within a matter of days both 
Boards had divided their areas into separate medical 
districts, set up systems of house-to-house visitation, opened 
houses of refuge, diarrhoea hospitals and twenty-four hour 
dispensaries, appointed additional medical men, nurses and 
cleansing operatives, stepped up cleansing and nuisance 
removal operations, and distributed leaflets and posters 
throughout the town informing the public of how the preventive 
system operated.67 The local newspapers were unanimous in 
their praise for these 1 excellent measures1, and reassured the 
public by pointing out that Sutherland was not the kind of man 
to be 'humbugged twice'.68
The strategy of containing the epidemic went ahead on two 
fronts. An attempt was made to prevent the disease breaking 
out by removing the various nuisances from which it was 
thought to emanate, or where appropriate, through the 
cleansing, limewashing and disinfection of previously infected 
premises. The system of medical prevention turned out to be 
more significant. This was based on visitors calling at every 
house in a given district to establish whether occupants had 
diarrhoea or other premonitory symptoms. When diarrhoea was 
discovered patients with mild symptoms were sent to the 
dispensaries where they were provided with free medicines. 
People with more severe symptoms were visited by a medical man
88
andr if necessary, taken to the diarrhoea hospital. When 
visitors discovered cases of ’true’ cholera, the patient was 
treated at home, but other residents were sent to the house of 
refuge or if they had premonitory symptoms, the diarrhoea 
hospital.
By 28 September the system was in operation throughout 
the entire town and within days the number of new cases began 
to decrease markedly. Sutherland interpreted this as 
conclusive evidence of the efficacy of the G.B.H.'s 
strategy.69 The Hull newspapers agreed. At the beginning of 
October, the Advertiser attributed the diminishing number of 
new cases and the declining average daily mortality to the 
zeal with which medical men had carried out the General 
Board’s regulations.70
The G.B.H. blamed the local authorities’ failure to 
respond to the threat of cholera on official incompetence and 
the Guardians philosophical acceptance of the view that 
cholera was a form Divine intervention beyond human aid.
Local reformers believed that behind the various excuses lay 
the complacency and parsimony of a local elite whose main 
concerns were keeping rates down to an absolute minimum and 
retaining their hold over the institutions of local 
government. The failure to respond to the threat or arrival 
of cholera (or to initiate sanitary improvements) was 
symptomatic of the fact that political power in Hull lay 
firmly in the hands of a tight knit oligarchy which 
represented the interests of the town's capitalist class. The
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attitudes and behaviour of both sets of Guardians, the 
Council, individual Guardians and Councillors in a private 
capacity, magistrates, and even the town’s M.P. suggest that, 
when its economic interests were jeopardized, the elite class 
was ready to close ranks to block reforms or improvements 
which might prove costly. There is another strand to this 
argument. The protection of elite interests was dependent on 
their control of the various branches of local government 
which was itself perpetuated by a high level of cross 
membership. Retaining this control was seen as paramount. 
Thus, the local authorities had a strong interest in keeping 
parochial and municipal spending to a minimum since to do 
otherwise might possibly lead to a rate-payers revolt. The 
determination not to lose control of local government led to a 
particularly strong suspicion of central authority. This 
provides a partial explanation of the authorities refusal to 
act upon the directives of the G.B.H., yet is illustrated most 
graphically by the fact that in 1849, the Hull Guardians were 
the only such body not to have submitted to the central 
control of the Poor Law Board. The Advertiser remarked that 
this was the kind of attitude that excluded Hull, ’from the 
light of social progress’."71
2.2.4. THE MIDDLE CLASS
Analysis of cholera’s first visit to Britain has shown 
that people’s reactions to the disease and their behaviour 
throughout the epidemic were, to a great extent, governed by 
the resources, customs and conventions associated with their
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class position. Amongst the options open to members of the 
middle class was the chance to become involved in the fight to 
prevent or curb the epidemic. This could be achieved 
officially, through membership of, or work for, a L.B.H., or 
unofficially through any one of several charitable works or 
gestures. Because the poor lacked the resources, financial 
and practical, and were far more likely to be affected by the 
disease, the task of devising and implementing assistance was 
a middle class prerogative.
Broadly speaking, the situation was the same during the 
second epidemic. The 'official response’ was essentially a 
middle class response, orchestrated by government agencies, 
the institutions and officers of local government and, of 
course, members of the medical profession. However, the 
situation differed in that under the terms of the N.R.D.P.A.; 
preventive measures at the local level were delegated to 
existing local government agencies, usually Boards of 
Guardians, rather than to local boards of health established 
specifically to administer remedial and preventive initiatives 
and policies. If the local authorities so desired, this could 
lead to a situation where those who wanted to contribute to 
the preventive effort were forced to work outside the official 
machinery.
In Hull, perhaps an extreme example of this kind, 
official measures were so limited that there was little scope 
for involvement through existing agencies. But why were the 
local elite and officials so indolent, especially given the
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town's vulnerability as a low-lying port? In the initial 
stages of the epidemic the Hull Guardians claimed their 
failure to act upon the directives issued by the G.B.H. had 
been due to a misunderstanding of how the N.R.D.P.A. worked. 
Towards the end of the epidemic they propounded the view that 
cholera was 1 a divine visitation ... utterly beyond human 
aid'.72 Neither claim was plausible. Shortly after the 
epidemic began, both of Hull's Boards of Guardians had their 
legal obligations explained to them and still failed to act. 
Furthermore, although there had been a widespread belief in 
divine retribution during the first epidemic, by 1849 it was 
rarely cited as a theory of disease causation.73 On closer 
inspection it becomes clear that the desire to preserve low 
rates coupled with an utter disregard for the plight of the 
poor was the most pressing consideration for the local 
authorities. This was illustrated by official attitudes to 
implementation of the N.R.D.P.A., the cost of which would have 
been borne by rate-payers.
At a meeting of the Hull Guardians held at the beginning 
of September 1849 for the purpose of setting the poor rate for 
the ensuing six months, the Governor of the Hull Guardians 
expressed the view that the N.R.D.P.A. was an 'expensive piece 
of machinery' and 'an umbrous load'.74 Implementing the Act, 
he explained, would cost 'a serious amount of money, and to 
carry out the extreme of the law would, perhaps, revolutionise 
Hull'. Predictably, the Governor's remarks caused outrage 
amongst the sanitary lobby. He and his colleagues were 
rebuked for their 'cool effrontery' in comparing 'the
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inconveniences ... resulting from the N.R.D.P.A. with the 
calamitous results of cholera’.'75 That financial 
considerations were given priority over preventing further 
loss of life led an editor of the Advertiser, also one of the 
town’s most committed sanitary reformers, to ask 'are we such 
worshippers of Mammon that an expenditure of £1,000 or £5,000, 
in the removal of nuisances is to be deemed as great a tragedy 
as the loss of hundreds of our fellow creatures?'76 In view 
of the fact that the Guardians viewed the N.R.D.P.A. as ’a 
curse as bitter as cholera’, it seems that in their case, the 
answer to this question was an unequivocal ’yes’.
Criticism of the Guardians attitude to nuisance removal 
was not confined to the issue of morality. It was argued that 
the whole basis of their reasoning was fundamentally flawed. 
Throughout the course of the epidemic and indeed, well before, 
local medical men and all the town's newspapers had repeatedly 
pointed out that money spent on preserving the public health 
would reduce both mortality and pauperism and would therefore 
actually lessen the burden on local rate-payers.77 That the 
Guardians failed to take cognizance of this widely voiced 
Chadwickian argument did not surprise the Advertiser which 
attacked what it considered to be the 'penny-wise pound 
foolish economy that prevails in the Hull Workhouse’ and which 
had, it added, prevented improvements in the management of the 
poor for several years.78
A reluctance to increase the burden of local poor rates 
was not the only reason why the Hull Guardians had
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reservations about implementing the N.R.D.P.A. During the 
course of the epidemic it transpired that they were actually 
amongst the worst creators of nuisances. On at.least two 
occasions the Sanitary Committee of the Hull Guardians was 
taken to court by their counterparts from the Sculcoates Union 
and convicted for creating nuisances.79 The private affairs 
of individual members of the Sanitary Committee gave rise to 
even greater concern. Members of both the Sculcoates and Hull 
Boards were included amongst the town's most notorious 
landlords, a class of people described as 'the rich 
proprietors of nuisances' and singled out for bitter criticism 
by the town's press.80 A double standard operated as one of 
Hull's biggest property owners was allowed a week to remove 
nuisances, whereas the magistrates made 'the poor do it 
immediately'.81 Not surprisingly, there were intimations of a 
conspiracy on the part of the Hull Guardians and the town's 
magistrates to impede the successful operation of the 
N.R.D.P.A. The Herald certainly detected a degree of 
'indecision and trifling in the conduct of both magistrates 
and Poor Law Guardians' which, it added, 'cannot be too 
strongly reprobated'.82 Two other groups who came in for 
criticism in the local press were the builders and owners of 
working class housing. Despite constant prompting, few if any 
landlords took steps to improve the conditions in and around 
their properties. Instead the responsibility for cleansing, 
nuisance removal and other sanitary measures was left to 
tenants, whom it was recognised did not have the resources to 
effect worthwhile improvements. Landlords and builders were 
denounced as 'Cholera Manufacturers' and members of the 'Anti-
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Health League', who refused 'to part with a few pounds ... to 
make their property other than a curse to the 
neighbourhood'.33 Such negligence, it was argued, stood as 
testimony to their 'gross disregard for anything other than 
obtaining exorbitant percentages on their investments'.84
During the first cholera epidemic, fear of contracting 
cholera or of serious social unrest were important factors in 
determining middle class responses. In so far as fear played 
a part in motivating Hull's Guardians and landlords in 1848- 
49, it seems to have been only a fear of the cost of a system 
of prevention. The behaviour of another section of the town's 
middle class indicates that they perceived the threat of 
cholera differently. Although the experience of the first 
epidemic and indeed, the first two months of the 1849 
epidemic, demonstrated that the vast majority of cholera 
victims were working class and the middle class was relatively 
safe, this does not appear to have reassured those who 
responded to the continuing spread of the epidemic by leaving 
the town. By the end of August, many 'respectable families' 
were reported to have left.35 Two weeks later the middle 
class exodus, like the epidemic, was reported to have 
continued unabated.36
That flight was an option only open to the middle class 
did not go unnoticed by the local press. Neither did the fact 
that a number of local dignitaries and officials were amongst 
those who chose to take this option. The knowledge that the 
majority of Town Councillors fled at the height of the
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epidemic provoked an angry reaction. To the Advertiser, the 
Councillor's decision to ’abandon the town to its fatef after 
doing absolutely nothing to prepare the town for the epidemic, 
was yet another example of official complacency and was 
’astonished that the Town Council ... manifested such an utter 
indifference to the lives of the people’.87
Whilst the local authorities had to be coerced into 
taking sanitary measures and providing medical aid and some of
the town’s most respectable families fled, one section of the
middle class did act. This group comprised journalists, 
medical men, churchmen and a number of individuals, who did 
whatever they could to campaign on behalf of the poor.
Broadly speaking this group constituted the town’s sanitary 
lobby, but although they were united in calling for sanitary 
improvements, they did not act as a single group or unified 
body. This was mainly because they did not have access to the 
resources or agencies to effect change, so each was confined 
to act within their own sphere.
Throughout the period 1847-49 the local newspapers did 
their utmost to spur the authorities into action. The 
Advertiser in particular was a source of constant propaganda 
and a persistent thorn in the side of the authorities.88 In 
addition to making the cases for preventive measures and 
lasting sanitary improvements, the newspapers provided the 
public with a variety of much needed information. In the 
absence of official sources of information, such as handbills 
and posters, the newspapers advised the public on cleansing,
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personal hygiene, diet, and other hygienic measures. They 
also supplied information on where and when medical aid could 
be obtained, recommended various medicines and treatments and 
kept the public up to date with the latest developments in 
medical thinking on disease causation and treatment. Another 
important role the newspapers took on was that of quashing 
rumours and allaying alarm. During the first epidemic rumours 
spread alarm amongst the public. As fear was considered to 
predispose the individual to cholera, the newspapers sought to 
provide accurate and up to date information on the epidemic *s 
progress. Much to the annoyance of the local authorities, all 
the town's newspapers published such returns of morbidity and 
mortality as they could obtain.
Obviously it was much easier for the newspapers to 
chastise and bully the local authorities and to provide the 
public with information than for any individual or group to 
finance and organise the type of sanitary cleansing operations 
required. Nevertheless, attempts were made by a number of 
individuals to assist the poor in this task. One of the 
town’s leading sanitary reformers offered to organise the 
removal of the worst accumulations of night-soil if the 
authorities would provide him with men and carts.89 Needless 
to say, the authorities chose not to accept. Without the 
authorities' cooperation it was impossible for the good 
intentions of middle class sanitary reformers to translate 
into a comprehensive and worthwhile cleansing campaign. As a 
result, middle class assistance in this area took the form of 
gestures designed to help the poor to help themselves. For
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example, a number of wealthier citizens paid for supplies of 
chloride of lime which was distributed free of charge to 
working class people whilst others provided the chemicals 
needed to fumigate houses.90
2.2.5 THE WORKING CLASS
The cholera experience was traumatic for Hull's working 
class. The disease left few families intact; many parents 
lost children, and a large number of children were orphaned. 
Suffering, grief and profound distress followed the disease. 
Those individuals and families stricken were often in 
desperate need of practical assistance, particularly nursing, 
and emotional support. With the virtual absence of an 
official system of medical care until mid-September, both 
these tasks fell to religious groups. Throughout the epidemic 
churchmen and lay people of various denominations worked 
tirelessly amongst the poor, providing both spiritual comfort 
for the dying and bereaved, and where possible, help with 
nursing the sick. Visitors from the Methodist Town Mission 
helped families to nurse their sick, attending up to ten 
serious cholera cases a day.91 A more unusual but equally 
benevolent course of action was taken by the Vicar of Holy 
Trinity who distributed free port to the poor in his parish; 
port wine, like certain spirits, was thought to afford a 
degree of protection against cholera.92
In addition to providing care and spiritual solace for 
the poor, sick, dying and bereaved, Churches offered comfort
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and reassurance for the entire community.93 Through Days of 
Humiliation, fasts and special religious services, massive and 
often inter-denominational congregations acknowledged the 
’hand of God in the present awful visitation’, repented their 
sins and prayed for 'the removal of the existing calamity’.94 
That these events were so well attended by both regular church 
goers and people who had never entered a church before, 
suggests that they were a source of consolation and hope. 
Donations were made to the collections at these services which 
were used for material relief amongst the poor and bereaved.
In addition to money, donations of food and blankets were 
made.95
Until Sutherland compelled both Boards of Guardians to 
implement the various provisions of the N.R.D.P.A. in mid- 
September, the poor were almost completely without the 
protection of ’official' medical care. Local medical men were 
forced to acknowledge that, prior to Sutherland’s September 
visit, many of the poor had died ’unseen’ and few cases of 
diarrhoea had been attended by medical men.96 Moreover, 
according to one source, at the height of the epidemic, there 
was not one place 'where a poor creature suffering from a 
bowel complaint ... can obtain a dose of medicine without 
paying for it’.97 As well as endangering the poor, the 
authorities' refused to employ sufficient medical men, 
chemists, nursing staff and visitors. Although there were 
allegations of medical men refusing treatment to the poor or 
charging exorbitant rates for their services, the bulk of
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evidence suggests that many medical men worked heroically 
throughout the epidemic.98
Predictions that cholera would claim the vast majority of 
its victims from the ranks of the poor were borne out. The 
analysis of Dr Cooper, Medical Superintendent to Sculcoates 
Guardians, revealed a high class specific mortality, with 
over 90% of its victims belonging to the ’Labouring 
Classes’.99 Only in Merthyr Tidfyl in South Wales did any 
other working class community suffer as much. Moreover, in 
the opinion of Sutherland, no other large working class 
community, received as little protection or assistance from 
the local authorities.100
Given that official medical and sanitary measures had 
angered the working class in 1831-32, it is interesting to 
look at the reactions of communities eighteen years on. In 
1848-49, it is clear that the working class would have 
welcomed and co-operated with official preventive measures had 
they been adopted earlier. In most towns visited by cholera, 
the local authorities issued a series of handbills and posters 
giving details of the official preventive measures and 
advising the public on the steps they could take to reduce the 
risk of contracting the disease. In Hull, the only 
'authoritative' advice the public received until mid-September 
came from the newspapers and possibly medical men. Several 
aspects of working class behaviour suggest that much of the 
advice issued by the papers was heeded.
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Medical opinion held that an unsuitable diet was likely 
to 'predispose1 the individual to cholera. Warnings about the 
need to avoid certain foodstuffs and drinks - fruit, 
vegetables, bad meat, offal and alcoholic beverages other than 
spirits - were published on numerous occasions.101 In 1849 
the level of unemployment and distress in Hull - a canvass of 
the town in July 1849 revealed that some 12,000 people were 
without sustenance - was such that for many people the act of 
obtaining any food at all, let alone a special diet, was 
already difficult enough.102 Despite this, it seems that 
people did make a conscious effort to modify their diets. 
Consumption of fruit and vegetables was reported to have 
fallen drastically during the epidemic.103 There is reason to 
doubt that working class drinking habits changed as funerals 
were said to be accompanied by much drunkenness.104 However 
other evidence points to a decline in beer drinking and an 
increase in the consumption of spirits, which were considered 
by the medical profession to be an effective preventive.105 
The shift in drinking habits was so dramatic that local 
innkeepers reported that 'only one pint of beer or porter is 
called where one hundred used to be ... whilst the demand for 
... brandy increases daily'.loe Warnings about the need for 
bodily and domestic hygiene were widely diffused.107 For 
working class people such instructions were often impossible 
to follow. In many districts the lack of running water made 
personal cleanliness difficult. Nevertheless, bodily hygiene 
does appear to have been important to many of the poorer 
citizens. In 1849 many operatives and artisans were reported 
to be in the habit of bathing at the New Waterworks, despite
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the fact that the baths were a considerable distance from the 
town.108
A number of factors combined to thwart working class 
efforts to achieve domestic cleanliness. Shortly before the 
epidemic began, Smith of Deanston noted that although the 
population were ’inclined to cleanly habits ... the want of an 
efficient house and street sewerage, with a convenient supply 
of water', meant that they could not 1 have that thorough 
cleanliness which is conducive to health’.109 Cooper 
proffered a similar view, commenting that under current 
sanitary arrangements the urban environment was such that it 
was impossible for people in most districts to keep their 
'houses free from the filth that surrounds them'.3-10 
Cleanliness and sanitation in and around working class homes 
was also jeopardized by the reluctance of tenants to make 
complaints. The Clerk to the Sculcoates Board of Guardians 
informed Smith of Deanston that many nuisances were not 
removed because people were ’often influenced by fear of their 
landlords from coming forward and giving the necessary 
information, and in some instances [said they did] not wish 
the nuisance removed’.111
In spite of these difficulties, and the fact that the 
working class did not have access to the necessary tools and 
resources to undertake major cleansing projects, attempts were 
made to remove nuisances from homes, yards and, on occasions, 
entire neighbourhoods. Limited forms of self-help in sanitary 
matters became a notable feature of the popular response. In
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the Sculcoates district gangs of local men removed nuisances, 
swilled the streets and disinfected drains and walkways with a 
solutions of bleach and vitriol.1X2 Elsewhere, brooms, 
chloride of lime and other chemicals donated by the middle 
class were gratefully received and, one must presume, used.1X3 
Several letters published in the press indicate that there 
were tangible signs of working class action. One 
correspondent applauded working class endeavours, but feared 
that once the epidemic had subsided, the poor’s extraordinary 
interest and participation in domestic hygiene would 
decline.XX4
These self-help initiatives demonstrate that working 
class people shared the view that insanitary conditions were a 
threat to health. A more militant response was the belief 
that the authorities' failure to undertake cleansing and 
nuisance removal operations on a worthwhile scale was an 
abdication of responsibility. This was illustrated by an 
incident which took place in Sculcoates. In an instance of 
direct action, the people of New George Street, disillusioned 
and angry about the Guardians’ failure to remove nuisances, 
took it upon themselves to clean up their neighbourhood and to 
deposit the resulting accumulations of rubbish on the 
doorsteps of local Guardians.1X5
Modification of diet and sanitary vigilance were just two 
aspects of the popular response to the epidemic which indicate 
that the poor were prepared to comply with official advice and 
would have supported a more positive 'official' preventive
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strategy. Their willingness to take up medical aid and 
treatment once it became available through official channels 
provides further support. When finally compelled to provide 
medical facilities and free treatment, the poor were the main 
recipients. However, Dr Cooper pointed out that initially the 
poor had to be encouraged to apply for treatment by house-to- 
house visitors. He attributed this to carelessness and 
apathy, plus ignorance of the fact that even the mildest bowel 
complaint could soon develop into Asiatic cholera.116 In 
fairness to the ’ignorant’, it should be pointed out that the 
provision of free medical aid represented such a dramatic 
turnabout in official policy that it was understandably met 
with suspicion. Moreover, there was a general reluctance 
amongst the poor to seek aid from the detested Poor Law 
authorities, especially for mild bowel complaints, a condition 
which many of them suffered more or less permanently. 
Nevertheless, once the preventive machinery was in operation 
approximately 5,000 applications were made for free medicine, 
the equivalent of one in ten of the population.117 Cooper did 
find certain aspects of the poor's behaviour commendable. He 
praised their 'readiness to give information’, which proved to 
be extremely valuable in directing the cleansing campaign.
The way in which they received visitors and acted upon their 
advice suggests that although the visitors' role was 
essentially 'intrusive' it was not resented by the poor. This 
represented a significant change from the situation in 1831- 
32, when visitors and other ’officials’ received a distinctly 
hostile reception in many working class communities.
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It would misleading to give the impression that the 
actions of working people were guided exclusively by the 
advice and instructions they received from newspapers, medical 
men, and other ’official' or middle class sources. Official 
'solutions’ were only adopted if they were consistent with 
working class understanding of particular problems. Shortly 
after cholera appeared in Hull, a local newspaper warned the 
public that discredited traditional practices such as 'the old 
nostrum of tar barrel burning' should not be revived.1X8 This 
advice was ignored. When it became apparent that the epidemic 
was spreading unchecked, tar burning became an integral part 
of the a working class self-help initiative. One eye witness 
claimed that so many barrels were lit at night that 'there was 
a ghastly glare all around' and that 'the night was as 
day'.XX9 Having been constantly told that cholera was spread 
through the atmosphere and that all smells were disease, the 
idea of obliterating smells and miasmas with acrid smoke was a 
rational way of trying to disinfect the atmosphere and reduce 
epidemic influences. 120
It seems likely that calls for the public not to resort 
to 'quack remedies' were also ignored.X2X For much of the 
epidemic period medical relief was difficult to obtain. This 
was especially so for the 'deserving poor' who could not 
afford to pay orthodox medical men, or secure the services of 
those overworked practitioners who provided ’unofficial' 
treatment free of charge, or because they were in receipt of 
wages, were ineligible for relief or treatment at either of 
the town's workhouses.122 Moreover, bitter public squabbles
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between local medical men over the efficacy of particular 
treatments, were hardly calculated to inspire public 
confidence in orthodox medicine.123 As several of Hull’s 
leading medical men complained, the public, whether through 
necessity or choice, sought cures and treatments from 
alternative practitioners including, medical botanists, 
chemists and druggists and patent medicine vendors.
Although the miasmatic theory dominated official thinking 
on disease causation in 1849, there was still widespread 
support for contagionism amongst medical and lay communities. 
Dr Sandwith, a respected figure in the local medical 
community, remarked that the number of deaths occurring 
amongst people who came into contact with the sick convinced 
him that ’cholera is infectious’.124 Various aspects of 
working class behaviour suggest that a significant numbers of 
local people drew similar conclusions.125 At the beginning of 
the epidemic, Dr Ayre, Chairman of the Council's Sanitary 
Committee, estimated that if the outbreak became severe, up to 
two thousand nurses would be required, but thought that the 
public's fear of fear of coming into contact with cholera 
patients would be a major obstacle to recruitment.126 Further 
evidence of a working class belief in contagionism came to 
light during the later stages of the epidemic when the 
Guardians decided to open two cholera hospitals and a house of 
refuge. One of these was in a densely populated street and a 
mob of over two hundred householders gathered to prevent 
'patients being conveyed there.'127 This assertive behaviour 
had the desired effect; in a rare concession to popular
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feeling, the Guardians abandoned their plans and instead used 
the Vagrant Office. The fear of contagion was reinforced by 
the news that a number of medical men and nurses had 
contracted cholera and contributed to widespread reluctance to 
enter either cholera hospitals or the house of refuge.128
Other forms of conduct also point to a popular belief 
that cholera was contagious. As the epidemic spread, people 
displayed a clear reluctance to leave their homes. By 
September, Hull’s normally teeming streets were reported to be 
virtually deserted and what activity there was revolved in the 
main around funeral processions.129 Shops and places of 
entertainment suffered serious loss of trade; it was observed 
that the only retailers who flourished during the epidemic 
were drapers who sold mourning apparel.130 Fear of contagion 
also discouraged people from visiting Hull. Such was the fear 
of entering the ’woe-smitten town’ that traders from outlying 
villages ceased to attend the market and the only people 
arriving at the railway station were mourners.131 The only 
time people demonstrated a willingness to congregate was when 
they attended special religious services.
2.2.6. LOCAL SANITARY ADMINISTRATION AFTER 1849
Given the severe nature of the epidemic it was perhaps 
inevitable that subsequently there would be intense pressure 
for changes in Hull’s sanitary administration. As indicated 
earlier, the structure of local government was identified as a 
major obstacle to both lasting improvements and to the
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implementation of temporary anti-cholera measures well before 
the epidemic began.132 The G.B.H.’s report on the town, not 
published until 1850, reached the same conclusion as local 
reformers, medical men and even members of the existing 
sanitary agencies.133 Smith of Deanston recommended that the 
powers of the P.H.A. should be applied to Hull, with the 
Corporation acting as a L.B.H. and having jurisdiction over 
the entire Borough.134 Before the G.B.H. could designate the 
Corporation a L.B.H., interested parties were given the 
opportunity to comment on the proposal. The 1 improvers', 
fearing that objections would be raised by the so called 'muck 
interest1, used the recent epidemic to push for immediate 
reform.135 When the municipal elections came round in the 
late autumn, the electorate was warned of the dangers of 
voting for 'economist' candidates who were, it claimed, 
unsuitably qualified for membership of a L.B.H.136 In a blunt 
editorial, the Advertiser reminded its readers that local 
medical men and 'the highest medical authority in England' had 
stated that the level of cholera mortality in 1849 was 
directly attributable to the absence of proper sanitary 
regulations.137 This, it claimed, was the fault of 'the local 
jurisdictions by which the town is afflicted'. It continued 
by pointing out that although the cost of improvements would 
have to be met by local rate-payers, the financial 
implications of epidemics like the recent cholera visitation 
were serious for all classes.
Legal procedures were finally completed in August 1852 
when, following Royal Assent, the Town Council met for the
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first time as the L.B.H.138 Immediately steps were taken to 
reorganise the town's sanitary administration, a number of 
Committees were elected and officers employed for a variety of 
sanitary functions formerly left to the Surveyors of Highways 
and Improvement Commissioners.139 The memory of 1849 was also 
evoked by improvers in an attempt to ensure that when the 
Board came into existence it would be controlled by 
sympathetic Councillors. In that the formation of the L.B.H. 
went a considerable way to solving the problems posed by the 
complex structure of local government in the town, a case can 
be made for cholera being a friend to sanitary reformers in 
Hull. However, and as the Hull Advertiser was well aware, 
administrative reform did not guarantee that sanitary 
improvements would be made. Whether or not new sanitary 
agencies in Hull and elsewhere would use the powers available 
to them under the P.H.A. (and local acts and by-laws) was an 
entirely different question.
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2.3. LEEDS
2.3.1. CHRONOLOGY OF THE EPIDEMIC
Although cholera1s presence in Hamburg in the summer of 
1848 and its arrival in Britain in September were widely 
reported by the press in Leeds, no cases of ’Asiatic’ cholera 
came to light in the town that year.140 The renewed threat in 
the summer of 1849 coincided with the beginning of the annual 
diarrhoea season, thus exacerbating the problems faced by 
medical men. Alarm grew in mid-June when a local newspaper 
reported that cases had occurred amongst Irish families in the 
Bank district.141 At the end of the month, however, it was 
announced that the disease was no longer present, though local 
medical men said severe diarrhoea was affecting several 
districts. In mid-July the situation changed, with newspapers 
reporting that a number of new cases in the Bank.142 Further 
cases occurred in the last week of July, and deaths in Hunslet 
at the beginning of August signalled the start of the epidemic 
proper.143 By 18 August new cases were being reported ’all 
over the Borough', though the number of fatalities was still 
relatively low.144 This was the calm before the storm.
Using the G.B.H.'s daily returns, which were published in 
the Times between 19 August and 15 September, it is possible 
to follow the epidemic's progress in the Leeds Registration 
District with relative ease.145 Up to 25 August, a total of 
80 lives had been claimed. Over the next three weeks the 
epidemic intensified alarmingly: 75 deaths were reported in
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the week ending 1 September, 188 in the week ending 8 
September, and 256 during the following week. In just three 
weeks the death toll had increased sixfold and stood at over 
600. Although there were occasional breaks in the official 
returns after 15 September, the epidemic continued to rage 
well into October. Weekly mortality did not fall below 140 
until mid-October. As had been the case in Hull, once the 
epidemic began to wane, it did so abruptly. A further 29 
fatalities were reported between 13 and 20 October; after this 
date only a handful of deaths were reported and by the end of 
the month cholera had virtually disappeared from the town.
2.3.2. THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE IN 1848
Under the terms of the N.R.D.P.A. the task of preparing 
the town for the impending epidemic fell to the Leeds 
Guardians. Mindful of the potential difficulties arising from 
a system of local government in which the responsibility for 
public health was divided between different agencies, the 
Guardians immediately approached the Town Council to request 
their co-operation in forming a joint Sanitary Committee to 
administer the various provisions of the Act.146
The move to establish formal co-operation between the 
Guardians and Council revived a precedent set during the 
successful campaign against fever in 1847, when the Town 
Council's Scavenging and Nuisance Committee assisted the 
Guardians.147 Working together, the two agencies had embarked 
upon an energetic campaign in which almost one thousand houses
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were disinfected and whitewashed, streets and courtyards 
cleansed and assorted nuisances removed. Because the vast 
majority of fever patients were poor, medical arrangements had 
been left to the Guardians.148 Medical relief and treatment 
had been provided by a team of specially recruited medical 
men, nurses and auxiliaries in the House of Recovery. As the 
fever epidemic intensified and demand for treatment increased, 
fever sheds had to be erected, further hospital accommodation 
rented and additional staff employed.149 Although the 
Guardians bemoaned the expense, it was felt that the 
preventive operation had been a success, not least because the 
Guardians had been 'aided most cordially by the Municipal 
Authorities'.150 Administratively, therefore, cholera was 
being treated initially as another fever epidemic.
In the autumn of 1848 it was decided that, in the event 
of cholera breaking out, medical care for the poor would again 
be provided by the Guardians. Following instructions issued 
by the G.B.H. and the Poor Law Board, the Guardians made 
arrangements for providing medical aid. Steps were taken to 
equip the Mendicity Office for use as a cholera hospital and 
to acquire premises for use as a house of refuge.151 
Meanwhile the joint Sanitary Committee (comprised of five 
Guardians and five Councillors) put a cleansing campaign into 
immediate effect. Placards and posters were distributed 
throughout the Borough informing the public of the Committee's 
intention to act upon any complaints of nuisances.152
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These measures were applauded by the local newspapers 
which had demanded positive action. The Leeds Times warned 
against 'Eastern fatalism1 and urged the public and the local 
authorities to unite in 'the one great object of diminishing 
the circumstances and conditions which ... increase the 
virulence and fatality of the disease'.133 The Leeds Mercury 
urged the authorities to 'bestir themselves' into undertaking 
comprehensive cleansing duties.134 As these prescriptions 
indicate, both newspapers, like the G.B.H., were miasmatist in 
outlook. Interestingly, however, they believed that although 
sanitary measures would ensure that cholera would be 'shorn of 
his destructive powers', they were not a certain means of 
prevention. Consequently, the public was warned of the need 
for moderation and temperance and, even more importantly, 
prompt treatment of even the mildest bowel complaint.133
2.3.3. THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE 1849
Although the epidemic did not affect Leeds in 1848, the 
Guardians continued to receive a steady stream of advice and 
instructions from the Poor Law Board and G.B.H., and continued 
to undertake nuisance removal work throughout the winter. 
However, visible public concern soon diminished. This 
situation changed when a spate of cases were reported in June 
1849. That isolated cases of 'English' cholera and diarrhoea 
were occurring amongst the impoverished Irish community in the 
notorious Bank district, sparked off renewed concern.
Warnings about the need for early treatment of diarrhoea, 
calls for sanitary vigilance and full details of the G.B.H.'s
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preventive strategy once again began to appear in the local 
newspapers.156 Although the cases were judged to have been 
diarrhoea rather than cholera, the joint Sanitary Committee 
began to put its preventive machinery into operation. The 
Mendicity Office was again prepared for the reception of 
patients, nurses were recruited, and whitewashing and other 
cleansing operations were started in the most insalubrious 
parts of the town.3-57
Confirmation of cholera in July prompted the ubiquitous 
Dr Sutherland to visit the town.158 As usual he conducted a 
sanitary inspection and held a meeting with the Sanitary 
Committee to discuss their preventive strategy.159 Sutherland 
found the Guardians 1 actively concerned with their sanitary 
duties', helped, he said, by the sanitary influence of recent 
rainstorms. He still pointed to the need for continued 
vigilance, especially in the poor areas.160
In August and September, the Sanitary Committee, which 
met three times weekly, responded to the continued spread of 
cholera by taking steps to provide the type of medical relief 
favoured by the G.B.H. The town was divided into four medical 
districts, each with its own Medical Officer who was 
instructed to attend 'all cases of cholera', to visit all 
'affected localities' and every house where the disease was 
prevalent to induce residents to give information about bowel 
complaints and nuisances. These Officers were also instructed 
to carry medicines with them to administer 'on the spot' to 
any person with diarrhoea.161 Where cases of diarrhoea were
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discovered, patients were told to visit the District Medical 
Officer to obtain treatment, or to apply for medicines at 
either of the two dispensaries in the town. Every effort was 
made to separate cholera patients from the healthy. Where 
possible cholera cases were treated at home, diarrhoea 
patients in hospital and the healthy removed to the house of 
refuge. Nuisance removal and sanitary cleansing operations 
were concentrated on those districts where cholera prevailed.
From the outset, the Sanitary Committee’s work was beset 
by problems and, despite repeated efforts to overcome them, 
never functioned efficiently. In the initial stages 
operations were hampered by labour problems, which led to the 
employment of paupers.162 Despite the fact that they were 
paid up to a shilling a day above the normal level of relief, 
and those engaged in emptying privies were each provided with 
free of shoes and trousers, they were not conscientious and 
had to be replaced.163 Cleansing operations were further 
handicapped when several scavengers contracted cholera.164
A more serious problem was the failure of local medical 
men to provide the Sanitary Committee with accurate returns of 
morbidity and mortality to help target preventive measures.165 
To overcome this problem, the Guardians wrote to all qualified 
medical men inviting them to notify all the cases of diarrhoea 
and cholera which they had treated.166 When this failed, a 
circular was sent demanding returns of cases and deaths and 
warning that failure to comply would result in a £5 fine.16*7 
This changed matters a little, although medical men still
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claimed they were unable to supply the requisite information. 
Some feared that members of the public would panic (and 
therefore 'predispose' themselves to the disease) if the full 
extent of the epidemic was known. Others, particularly those 
employed by middle class patients, did not inform the 
authorities because patients wished to avoid the stigma 
arising from a visit by a Poor Law doctor or sanitary 
operatives.168
The ferocity of the epidemic appears to have taken the 
authorities by surprise. Despite their experience of dealing 
with fever and the fact that they were able to spend the first 
six months of the year in preparation, their attempt to 
provide a comprehensive system of medical relief did not match 
the crisis. At the root of the problem was the unprecedented 
demand for medical aid which placed enormous strain on the 
Guardians and their resources. The Guardians failed to meet 
objectives in two crucial areas of medical relief: hospital 
accommodation and house-to-house visitation. 169
During the early stages of the epidemic the public had to 
apply to the Leeds Workhouse for free treatment. As the 
epidemic worsened, the Guardians found it necessary to open an 
additional dispensary and, as the demand for medicines 
increased, to make the surgeries of all medical men in their 
employ 'a place of relief for all applicants.'170 As this 
course of action suggests, there was a huge demand for free 
medical aid; according to several commentators, a large number 
of people were unable to procure either medicines or the
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services of a Medical Officer. In fairness to the Guardians, 
it should be pointed out that once it became apparent that 
medical treatment and medicines were not reaching those most 
in need, every effort was made to improve the situation. 
Through the local newspapers and the distribution of placards 
and posters, the public had been warned of the need for prompt 
treatment of bowel complaints since the previous autumn. To 
press the message home, the Guardians employed bellmen to 
travel around the town to inform people that ’proper 
medicines' were available free of charge from any one of the 
district surgeons.17x
Despite constant prompting many people did not seek 
treatment until they developed advanced symptoms.172 To 
overcome this and to assist with the identification of 
nuisances, the Sanitary Committee was urged to mount a more 
comprehensive system of house-to-house visitation.173 As the 
epidemic intensified the Guardians encountered great 
difficulty in recruiting sufficient appropriately qualified 
medical men to act as medical officers let alone visitors. In 
the event, they had to appoint a dozen medical students and a 
number of lay visitors in mid-September.174 However, a system 
of house-to-house visitation (involving 'medical visitation' 
to bring cases to treatment and 'lay visitation' for providing 
moral and sanitary advice) was not put into operation until 
the end of the month. Within a week or so it was abandoned 
because of the epidemic's diminishing virulence.175
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In the aftermath of the epidemic, assessments agreed that 
the Leeds Guardians, as in the fever epidemic of 1846-47, had 
done their utmost to preserve the public health. One local 
newspaper remarked that 'the Sanitary Committee have been 
fully equal to the emergency: when the public health was 
threatened they spared no expense'.176 By contrast, Leeds 
Town Council and the Hunslet Guardians were subject to severe 
criticism, albeit for different reasons. In the early 1840s 
the Council had taken a keen interest in the public health 
issue as evident in the famous Improvement Act.177 The 
benefits which should have accrued from this were not reaped 
as the Council came to be dominated by rate-payers' 
associations and councillors obsessed by 'economy'.178 
Although the Council obtained a further Improvement Act, under 
threat of cholera in 1848, it was unable to start work on a 
sewerage system as 'economist' councillors twice defeated 
motions authorising the project.179 The crisis of 1849 
focussed attention on the Council's long-standing neglect of 
its sanitary responsibilities and showed that no matter how 
assiduously the Guardians carried out the provisions of the 
N.R.D.P.A., temporary cleansing operations were not the answer 
to sanitary problems. The Leeds Intelligencer condemned the 
Council's 'murderous apathy' which, it argued, had handed over 
the poor to the extermination of 'typhus, scarlatania [sic] 
and cholera'.180 The Leeds Times mounted an equally savage 
attack on the Council arguing that it was 'utterly 
inefficient', views echoed in a stream of letters to the 
press.181 An inspection of the town by Augustine Reach 
shortly after the epidemic had revealed that the Guardians'
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cleansing campaign had been able to make little impact. He 
reported that sanitary conditions in 'vast districts of the 
opulent and important town of Leeds' were so appalling that 
'virulent and fatal as was the recent attack of cholera here, 
my wonder is that cholera, or some other disease almost 
equally as fatal is ever absent'.182
Whilst the Town Council was castigated for long term 
neglect of public health projects, the Hunslet Guardians were 
attacked for the sluggish and half hearted manner in which 
they implemented the N.R.D.P.A. The Leeds Times mounted a 
furious attack on them. It was said that they were loath to 
tackle the many nuisances in the area and especially those 
created or presided over by wealthy property owners.183 This 
attack drew an immediate response from the Secretary to the 
Hunslet Guardians who denied accusations of parsimony and 
complacency. He pointed out that members of the Guardians 
Board of Health had inspected sanitary conditions and had 
ordered workmen to empty privies and ashpits, cleanse sewers 
and drains and issued one hundred and fifty notices for 
'removal of nuisances, without respect of persons'.184 Whilst 
he did admit that sewerage and drainage in Hunslet were 
defective, he argued that the situation could not be 
effectively remedied by temporary measures. 'Rome', he 
argued, 'was not built in a day ... and Hunslet cannot be 
sewered in a week'.185
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2.3.4. THE MIDDLE CLASS
Throughout the cholera season, certain members of the 
middle class endeavoured to alleviate suffering amongst the 
poor through voluntary action. For example, shortly after the 
epidemic began, but well before the Guardians had organised 
sanitary or medical preventive measures in Hunslet, a local 
chemist provided the poor with free acid for use in cleansing 
operations. Mr Waterton, owner of an Alkali Works, 
distributed his renowned ’powders' to anyone requiring 
treatment for premonitory diarrhoea and other bowel 
disorders.186 As the epidemic intensified and the demand for 
hospital treatment increased, Waterton allowed the Guardians 
to use a large room at his works as a cholera hospital and 
provided a temporary wash-house for the use of the poor.187 
That these hospital facilities were the result of a private 
initiative suggests that criticism was justified.
In the Leeds Union District, charitable work and gestures 
complemented rather than compensated for official measures. 
Visiting the poor, whether in an official or voluntary 
capacity, was considered to be a valuable exercise because, in 
addition to ensuring that people sought immediate treatment 
and assisting with the identification of nuisances, it had a 
moral effect in alerting the poor to the dangers of 
intemperance and other vices.188 Several weeks before the 
Sanitary Committee's visitation scheme was put into operation, 
unofficial visitors were active in some of the town's most 
notorious districts. A local newspaper cited the efforts of
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two 'ladies' who gave unremitting assistance to the poor of 
the Bank district as just one of many ’instances of 
benevolence' which was helping to relieve ’the sombre aspect 
of suffering and privation’.189 Religious groups also visited 
the poor to provide help and solace and, no doubt, to preach. 
Throughout the epidemic, members of the Leeds Town Mission 
were constant companions to victims.190 Volunteers from the 
Church District Visiting and Benevolence Society were reported 
to be 'extremely active ... investigating cases of distress 
arising from cholera’ at the end of the epidemic.191 
Religious activity was not confined to work amongst the 
'deserving poor'. The Rev Dr Hook’s offer to administer 
religious instruction and provide spiritual consolation to 
'inmates' at the cholera hospitals was gratefully accepted by 
the Leeds Guardians.192
People who acted as visitors did so at great personal 
risk. According to contemporary theories of disease 
causation, cholera could be caught from either from the 
miasmatic air in affected districts, and perhaps from contact 
with a victim. In addition to the obvious danger of the 
disease, visitors also ran the risk of receiving a hostile 
reception from the working class. As Smith of Deanston noted 
when compiling his report on the Health of Towns in 1845, 
contact between the classes in certain parts of Leeds was 
minimal, and middle class forays into working class districts 
were likely to meet with taunts, insolence, rudeness and 
jealousy.193 There were, however, safer ways in which middle 
class people could help the poor.
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By mid-September the epidemic had led to financial 
hardship in many working class families. Recognising this, 
the Mayor and several ’influential townsmen’ opened a 
subscription list intended to ease suffering and distress 
amongst the poor.3-94 Donations were to be used to provide 
food, bedding, and clothing for people who had suffered 'on 
account of the prevalence of cholera’. As was the case with 
other acts of charity, it was hoped that the main recipients 
would be the deserving poor, who, it was argued, were 
'struggling, by industry and self privation, to avoid becoming 
chargeable to the rates of their respective townships’.195 
The subscription list raised a total of around £500. Although 
this was only one fifth of the sum contributed to a similar 
fund set up in 1831-32, it was actually more than many local 
Boards of Guardians spent on sanitary measures during the 
epidemic.196 Moreover, many people chose to make donations to 
alternative funds, most notably Church collections which were 
held at special services or on the Day of Humiliation.197 
This particular form of middle class response provides further 
evidence for Morris's claim that voluntary funds collected for 
the poor were central to organised class relationships in 
Leeds in the first half of the nineteenth century.198
Throughout 1848-49 the public was advised that were a 
number of steps they could take to augment official preventive 
measures.199 They could protect themselves and their families 
by paying attention to their diets, avoiding intemperance, 
seeking immediate treatment for bowel disorders and through
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bodily hygiene. A newspaper proffered a somewhat unusual 
explanation of why bodily hygiene was of the utmost importance 
during the epidemic. Departing from the more usual ’filth 
explanation’, which saw the body as an extension of the home 
or neighbourhood, it warned, in humoral fashion, that the body 
rid itself of waste material through the lungs, skin and 
bowels and, if any of these ’exits’ was blocked, excessive 
strain would be placed on the others. Therefore, it 
continued, 'daily ablution' was imperative in order to keep 
the pores open and to avoid placing extra strain on the 
bowels, a development which would lead to looseness and 
premonitory symptoms.200 Other calls for sanitary vigilance 
were based on the much more widely held belief that if people 
used 'more brooms and water then less medicine would be 
needed'.201 Every working class person was urged to regard 
themselves 'a sanitary commissioner’.202 It was said that 
official measures would be to no avail unless they were 
complemented by self-help, a message reinforced by the press. 
Long before the first cases, people were informed of the 
benefits arising from liberal use of chloride of lime which, 
it was claimed, acted as 'a safeguard in contagious disorders’ 
and 'entirely destroys the unhealthiness of the 
atmosphere’.203 Advice of this type shows how the threat of 
cholera was used by the middle class in an attempt to 
’civilise’ the working class; it was actually said that, 
'Cleanliness was ... next to Godliness'.204
The experience of the second cholera epidemic persuaded a 
significant number of local medical men and officials to argue
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that cholera was or could become contagious, in much the same 
way as analysis of the spatial incidence of the first by 
Robert Baker boosted miasmatist thinking.205 Until the 
epidemic was well underway, all newspapers and the majority of 
local medical men were decidedly miasmatist in outlook. In 
June, in a report which could just as easily have appeared in 
one of its rivals, the Mercury mounted an attack on the 
contagionist position. Echoing the views of the G.B.H., it 
announced that under no circumstances was cholera contagious 
and denounced the various preventive measures and responses 
associated with contagionist theory (quarantine, cholera 
hospitals, panic and flight from the sick) as 1 supererogatory 
evils'.206 Little over a month later the paper's confidence 
had been dented. Having witnessed and reported cholera's 
progress in Hunslet, the paper conceded that the deaths there 
were too 'numerous and divided' to be attributed to 
'predisposing causes ... or ... to sanitary defects'.207 
Cholera's spread to the middle classes added to the growing 
doubt surrounding the miasmatic theory of transmission. Both 
the Mercury and the Leeds Times were puzzled by the deaths 
amongst the respectable classes. How, pondered the former, 
could cholera claim the life of Councillor Wilkinson, who was 
a 'gentleman of very regular and temperate habits ... not in 
anyway predisposed to the disease?'208 The paper went some 
way to answering its question a month later when, in an 
editorial, it admitted that, 'we can't resist the evidence of 
a certain degree of infectiousness'.209
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Watching cholera spread into every part of Leeds and 
claiming the lives of both the middle and working class were 
not the only factors which persuaded the local newspapers to 
revise their opinions on the disease’s mode of transmission. 
Well before the epidemic 'peaked', the Intelligencer opined 
that of the various strands of evidence which undermined 
anticontagionism, the disease's tendency to strike members of 
the same family network who came into regular contact with 
each other, but did not live together was the most 
powerful.210 The experience of the unfortunate Craven family 
of Cavalier Street, Bank, was cited by all the newspapers to 
illustrate this point.211 Cholera was introduced into the 
Craven household by Mrs Craven after she had washed bedclothes 
belonging to a cholera patient. She, her husband and one of 
their children developed symptoms and died within five days of 
each other. After visiting the stricken family, Mr Craven's 
brother, who lived in a different area of the Bank, quickly 
developed symptoms and passed the disease on to his wife. 
Cholera spread to other members 'of the extended family killing 
a total of eight people in little over a week. In the view of 
the Leeds Times, the ways in which one case in a locality was 
followed by others and cholera spread through families was 
sufficient to 'cast doubt on the non-contagionist view'.212 
When the epidemic subsided, the paper, which had earlier 
rejected contagionist theory said explicitly that the 
experience of the last two years 'points to contagion'.213
The newspapers' move towards a more contagionist stance 
was paralleled by a similar shift amongst medical men. As was
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the case nationally, local medical men were divided about 
cholera's mode of transmission and theories of disease 
causation in general.2X4 As the epidemic progressed, however, 
it was reported that the majority of local medical men began 
to argue that there were clear signs that cholera was, or 
could become, contagious. The severity of the epidemic, 
deaths amongst people who were not predisposed to cholera, the 
apparent futility of preventive measures and, above all, the 
disease's tendency to pass from person to person 'though they 
lived in different areas ... and ... under different 
circumstances' persuaded many 'medical men to change their 
opinions and believe that cholera [was] infectious'.215 
Mr Radcliffe, a Town Surgeon in the employ of the Leeds 
Guardians, openly admitted that observing the disease's spread 
convinced him that cholera was contagious.2X6 Other members 
of the profession were more cautious and argued that cholera 
was not as contagious as smallpox or scarlatina, but still 
expressed a belief in 'a certain degree of infectiousness'.2X7 
A number of arguments were advanced to explain how cholera 
could be communicated from person to person. A report in one 
newspaper argued the disease became contagious when 'fear 
[was] a predisposing cause'.218 Mr William Thorp, Secretary 
to the Geological and Polytechnic Society of the West Riding, 
sounding rather like John Snow, asserted that cholera was most 
likely to be communicated from person to person where the 
healthy washed patients' clothes or bedding, if they touched 
the corpses of the dead, or if cholera faecal matter entered 
the stomach of a healthy person.219
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Few medical men denied that miasmas were responsible for 
the generation and spread of cholera, but according to the 
press, fewer still were prepared to deny that the disease 
could become contagious under certain circumstances. However, 
none of the controversial measures from 1832 and based on 
contagionism (compulsory isolation of the sick in cholera 
hospitals, sanitary cordons and immediate burial of the dead) 
were adopted by the joint sanitary committee or the Guardians 
in 1849. Although some victims were treated in hospital, this 
was due to difficulties in recruiting staff for home nursing 
rather than a belief in the need for isolation. It should be 
stressed that certain Guardians probably shared the view that 
cholera could be communicated from person to person. In 1847, 
they concluded that fever was spread by human agency, 
describing how the disease had been introduced to Leeds by 
Irish immigrants and had subsequently 'extended to the English 
Poor'.220 This view may well have been reinforced by advice 
they received in 1849 from Mr Austin, Secretary to the Poor 
Law Board. In January, Austin wrote to the Guardians, 
instructing them to ensure that their medical officers 
inspected tramps and vagrants entering the town 'to prevent as 
far as possible the introduction and spread of cholera and 
other dangerous disorders'.221 Whilst the Guardians did not 
become embroiled in the debates over cholera's cause and mode 
of transmission, they did adapt their preventive strategy to 
incorporate a number of precautions which were consistent with 
the view that cholera could be spread by the sick and their 
possessions. As the Intelligencer put it, 'the infectious 
nature of the malady [was] generally entertained and acted
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upon1.222 The Guardians did their utmost to ensure that 
cholera patients who received ’in-door* relief were kept 
separate from people using the house of refuge and they helped 
with the early interment of the dead.223 Also, they took what 
in 1849 was the highly unusual step of burning beds, bedding, 
clothes and other ’infected1 possessions belonging to 
impoverished cholera victims.224 The fact that 640 
replacement beds (nearly one bed to every two deaths), as well 
as numerous blankets and counterpanes were issued on the rates 
by the end of September suggests that this precaution was 
amongst the Guardians' highest priorities. Similar measures 
were eventually adopted in Hunslet at the order of the 
Secretary to the Guardians who also questioned 'those who 
attribute cholera solely to miasma’.225
2.3.5 THE WORKING CLASS.
Although self-help featured in the working class response 
to the epidemic, it did not always manifest itself as the 
authorities hoped. Whilst many people complied with some of 
the advice issued by the authorities and co-operated with 
specific official preventive measures, others did not. The 
reasons for this were many and varied. However, an 
examination of attitudes and behaviour shows that two related 
factors: (i) past experience of epidemics in general and 
memories of 1832 in particular; and (ii) a widespread belief 
in contagionism, played a major role in determining working 
class responses.
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In 1845 Smith of Deanston had asserted that only with 
great perseverance, middle class visitors to the working class 
districts of central Leeds would gain their confidence of the 
poor.226 During 1849, Sutherland found that this was not 
necessarily the case. In many instances, he reported, lay and 
medical visitation had not had the desired effect. Although 
there are no records of working class hostility to visitors, 
there is evidence which suggests that the advice they and 
other officials issued was ignored or rejected. Sutherland 
claimed that a significant number of cholera deaths were due 
to ’the neglect of the people themselves’.227 On numerous 
occasions, he stated, people simply ignored official 
instructions about premonitory diarrhoea, failed to call the 
Medical Officers, denied they were ill to Medical Officers, or 
refused to take prescribed medicines. Such behaviour, along 
with a disregard for sobriety and cleanliness, argued a local 
newspaper, was only to be expected from the ’apathetic poor’, 
who constituted ’a very numerous body’.228 Sutherland and the 
Mercury were not alone in such views. In some middle class 
quarters it was said that the poor were not remedying sanitary 
deficiencies in and around their homes. Referring to the poor 
in Hunslet, Mr Bormond, a Temperance Domestic Missionary, said 
that he ’had never conversed with people so ignorant of the 
simple laws of health ... nor less disposed to be 
instructed’.229 Whilst it was felt that some sections of the 
working class were ignorant, indifferent and uncooperative, 
they were also accused of abusing the Guardians’ (and 
ultimately the rate-payers') generosity. For example, the 
Hunslet Guardians initiated legal proceedings action against a
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man who had claimed twice for his parents' funeral 
expenses.230
A variety of factors suggest that the people who 
criticized working class were somewhat harsh in their 
judgement. Cases of fraud and abuse undoubtedly occurred and 
received widespread publicity, yet they were relatively few in 
number and can hardly be regarded as characteristic. With 
regard to Sutherland's complaints it should be pointed out 
that thousands did apply for medical aid. Indeed, the demand 
for treatment was such that the Guardians had to increase the 
amount of hospital space and employ more medical men, nurses 
and auxiliaries on several occasions. Another point which 
should not be overlooked is that for a variety of reasons, 
many people preferred alternative forms of treatment to those 
offered by the authorities. This was certainly the case in 
Hunslet where Mr Waterton's cholera powders were immensely 
popular. An attempt by the authorities to force Waterton to 
withdraw his offer of free treatment met with a storm of 
protest and prompted over three thousand people to sign a 
petition demanding that he be allowed to resume distribution 
of his powders.231
Elsewhere in the Borough, it seems that alternative 
treatments were sought by ever increasing numbers of people.
'Quacks', announced a local newspaper, 'are placarding about 
their chemicals, urging their infallibility, and the deceived 
and the ignorant ... are ready enough to believe them'.232 
Quacks were not the only people to enjoy increased trade as a
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result of the working class preference for alternative 
treatments, tobacconists benefited from the belief that 
smoking was a valuable specific against cholera.233
One can surmise that many treatments were rejected simply 
because experience showed that they did not work. Although 
the notion that people lacked faith in official advice is 
difficult to prove, there is clear evidence to show that the 
working class confidence in other aspects of the preventive 
machinery was minimal. This is not to say that there was open 
resistance to these official measures, rather that on several 
occasions it was ignored and alternative actions taken.
When mortality mounted in Hunslet at the beginning of 
September, people followed measures adopted in 1832 and lit 
bark fires.234 Other methods of prevention believed to have 
been effective in 1832 were revived. According to local 
rumour, none of the employees at Bower1s chemical works had 
contracted cholera during the first epidemic. This was 
remembered in 1849, when people congregated around Bower's and 
similar manufactories to inhale the acrid fumes in the belief 
that chemical emissions from the works would ensure immunity. 
It took the death of an employee at a local tannery to 
convince people that their efforts were in vain.235
Working class responses to the epidemic (and, one must 
presume, scepticism about official modes of prevention) were 
influenced by popular belief that cholera was contagious. The 
belief in contagionism was still pervasive nationally and had
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influenced popular responses to fever in 1847. During these 
epidemics, it was reported that large numbers of victims were 
left to die alone in their houses ’owing to the dread of 
fever' which meant that 'friends and neighbours would not go 
near them'.236 Despite official declarations at the beginning 
of the epidemic stressing that cholera could not be 
communicated from person to person, experience appears to have 
strengthened belief in contagionism. This was shown by 
attitudes and reactions to cholera patients. After recovering 
from cholera, a man who resided in the Bank district recalled 
how none of his friends or neighbours would visit him; 
elsewhere, blankets and other items discarded from the homes 
of the sick were left in the streets because people were 
afraid to touch them.237 According to Councillor Ellison who, 
along with four colleagues, made a detailed inspection of the 
town during the epidemic, people were not only frightened of 
coming into contact with cholera patients, they were also 
afraid of approaching or touching the corpses of victims. 
Throughout the epidemic, coffin makers reportedly plied 
themselves with drink before starting work believing that it 
would afford them a degree of protection.236 Popular 
contagionism had an adverse effect on trade. Retailers 
suffered because people were reluctant to mix with strangers, 
and commercial travellers from the town could not sell their 
goods because people were 'afraid of the cholera being carried 
with them'.239 The belief in contagionism also posed problems 
for the Guardians. Additional hospital facilities were needed 
as a direct result of 'the friends of the sick having declined 
to render that assistance which was required of them' through
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fear of contracting the disease.240 However, it should be 
noted that large crowds continued to gather at cricket 
matches, dog fights and religious services.241
2.3.6. LOCAL SANITARY ADMINISTRATION AFTER 1849
The authorities in Leeds acted with an unusual degree of 
flexibility during the 1849 cholera season, widening their 
preventive strategy to include a number of 'precautions 
suggested by the facts'.242 Although this pragmatic approach 
saw them adopt a number of measures which were not approved by 
the G.B.H., it should be stressed that these were implemented 
alongside rather than in place nationally recommended 
policies. As such, it seems correct to argue that although 
the miasmatic doctrine was questioned, it was not rejected. 
This point was illustrated by renewed and intense pressure for 
immediate sanitary improvements when the epidemic ceased. The 
1842 and 1848 Improvement Acts had rationalised sanitary 
administration and vested the Council with comprehensive 
powers for effecting large scale improvements.243 The 1848 
Act enabled the Council to start work on a comprehensive 
sewerage and system for the three heavily populated townships 
of Leeds, Hunslet and Holbeck. Yet all this, in Hennock's 
words, led to 'much talk [but] no action taken'.244 Whilst 
the G.B.H. believed that the level of cholera mortality in the 
summer of 1849 was due in part to the incompleteness of the 
Guardians' preventive measures, local opinion exonerated the 
Guardians and pinned the blame on the Council, recognising 
that it was the only body with the power to bring about
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lasting improvements.245 Witnessing the Council's efforts to 
assist the Guardians in implementing anti-cholera measures in 
the summer of 1849 provoked a sarcastic response from a the 
Intelligencer. 'Cholera', it declared, 'is doing its work as a 
benefactor', with the Town Council suddenly having ’a patient 
ear for woeful recitals of imperfect sewers and pestilential 
deposits'.246 Increasingly, public opinion crystalised around 
the view that temporary cleansing measures were futile in the 
face of Leeds' massive sanitary problems. ’Unless effective 
sanitary measures be adopted', warned one report, the town 
would continue to be 'subject to periodic visits of cholera, 
typhus and other forms of the plague.'247
Whereas recent epidemics of fever and scarlatina had 
failed to break the resolve of economist Councillors, the 
shocking effects of the 1849 cholera epidemic produced a 
remarkable about turn. At the beginning of October the 
Council admitted that the absence of sewers had made a major 
contribution to the intensity of the epidemic and voted to 
reverse its earlier decision to halt the sewerage scheme.248 
Predictably, news of the decision was welcomed by 
reformers.249 That it was cholera that had persuaded the 
Council's change of heart was widely recognised. One local 
newspaper went so far as to refer to 'The Boon of Cholera', 
arguing that the epidemic had taught the Council and public a 
fearful lesson which had 'borne its fruits'.250 Work on the 
new sewerage scheme began in earnest in the spring of 1850 and 
five years later some sixteen miles of sewers had been 
laid.251
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PART 2 CONTINUED
2.4. BRADFORD
2.4.1. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE EPIDEMIC
Although reports that cholera was affecting Hull in the 
autumn of 1848 were viewed with concern by the local 
authorities in Bradford, the disease did not manifest itself 
in the town until the summer of 1849.1 The first scare of the 
year occurred in the second week of June, after medical men 
reported two fatal cases.2 With the absence of further cases 
during the following fortnight, public and official scepticism 
about their diagnosis mounted. Even when an inquest found 
that the two deaths were due to 'Asiatic' cholera, the local 
Guardians were not fully convinced and decided that there was 
still no need to put preventive measures into effect.3 Hopes 
that the town might escape the epidemic, as it had in 1832, 
were dashed in late July with the news that further cases had 
been confirmed. A week later, the public was informed that a 
total of 'twenty five cases of death by cholera' had occurred 
in the Bradford Moor, New Leeds and Wapping areas of the 
town.4 Even this news failed to move one of the local 
Guardians who informed his colleagues that 'there had no doubt 
been a great deal of dysentery, as there always was at this 
time of year'.5 His claim that 'we have got the name cholera 
introduced into this country and we will never get rid of it' , 
illustrates lay doubts as to the nature of the disease and 
medical expertise.6
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Effectively, the debate over whether or not cholera was 
present ceased at the end of July, when it was apparent to the 
majority of Bradfordians that an epidemic had established 
itself and was beginning to spread. By 23 August a total of 
71 lives had been claimed and the disease was said to be 
'carrying death into every district of the Borough’.7 Two 
weeks and 127 deaths later, a local newspaper reported that 
’deaths had been more numerous than at any other stage' .8 As 
had been the case in Leeds and Hull, the situation in Bradford 
worsened during the second week of September, when a record 
number of deaths, sixty two in all, was reported. After this, 
while there was a temporary rise in the number of new cases, 
the number of deaths fell. By the beginning of October the 
epidemic had gone into a rapid decline and with the news in 
mid-October that diarrhoea and dysentery were once again the 
prime causes of mortality, normality returned.9
2.4.2. THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE, 1848.
By the fifth decade of the nineteenth century Bradford, 
more than any other town in the West Riding, could lay claim 
to being the classic town of the industrial revolution.10 Yet 
Thompson has asserted that in the 1840s Bradford was still 
small enough for people of all social classes to have 'a 
shared if unequal experience of environmental deprivation’, a 
fact which helped to facilitate the emergence of a rare 
consensus that sanitary reform was imperative.X1
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One of the main obstacles to reform and improvement had 
been the archaic and chaotic system of local government.12 
Acknowledging that sanitary improvements were necessary proved 
to be easier than deciding how this goal should be pursued, 
either through extending the powers of the existing 
institutions of local government, or through replacing them 
with a new corporation. Historians who have examined the 
incorporation battle of 1846-47 agree that although it was 
fought on the issue of how sanitary reform should be achieved, 
much more was at stake.13 Essentially, the controversy boiled 
down to a bitter power struggle between two elite groups, the 
ascendant liberal bourgeoisie and the established Tory and 
Whig elite. Both factions attempted to win the support of 
working class rate-payers by playing on popular concern about 
sanitary conditions, the former arguing that improvements 
could not be achieved unless local government was reformed, 
and the latter blaming the aspiring bourgeoisie for creating 
public health problems and pointing out that incorporation 
would not necessarily mitigate sanitary evils.
After a protracted and at times vicious struggle, the 
liberal faction prevailed. In 1847, the Privy Council granted 
a Charter and Bradford became a municipal borough governed by 
a Mayor, fourteen aldermen and forty two councillors. 
Immediately, the Council elected a Sanitary Committee which 
took over the duties formerly carried out by the Commissioners 
and Board of Surveyors. Sub-committees for Scavenging, 
Causeways, Lamps and Street Watering were created; an
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Inspector of Meat and Nuisances, an Inspector of Scavengers 
and a Surveyor appointed; and, in 1848, a number of by-laws 
passed to augment the Council's public health powers.
Bradford, like its immediate neighbour Leeds, was gripped 
by a serious fever epidemic in 1846-47 and this played a 
significant part in the restructuring of the Poor Law 
administration.14 The epidemic coincided with a severe trade 
depression and an influx of destitute paupers, many of them 
Irish, which added to the burden on rate-payers. It also 
highlighted the inadequacy of the Guardian's medical 
facilities, especially the shortage of fever accommodation.
One possible solution to this problem, suggested by Alfred 
Austin, Assistant Commissioner to the Poor Law Board, was the 
construction of a new Union workhouse. This proposal won the 
support of several prominent Guardians but was bitterly 
opposed by others. Opposition came primarily from those who 
represented the out-townships and felt that rate-payers in 
their districts were having to shoulder the financial burden 
for problems which arose largely in the Bradford township.
The row rumbled on into 1848 and was accompanied by a growing 
determination on the part of the out-townships to secede from 
the Union. Matters came to a head in the early autumn of 1848 
when a dispute arose over the cost of providing medical relief 
and culminated in the division of the Union. Towards the end 
of September 1848 two new Poor Law Unions were formed: the 
Bradford Union which comprised the Bradford township, and the 
North Brierly Union which comprised the sixteen out townships.
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While the fever epidemic was not the only factor which 
precipitated the split, its role in adding to the sense of 
crisis was, nevertheless, important. In very different ways, 
public health crises had contributed to serious political 
ructions in the period 1846-48 and, to a significant extent, 
to the re-structuring of local government in Bradford. 
Effectively, incorporation and the formation of the new 
Bradford Union provided the town with a new administration.
The implications for public health policy were great. For the 
first time, there was at least a possibility that the Council 
would begin to make inroads into major problems, whilst the 
Guardians now had the opportunity of developing their 
workhouse policy and improving their hitherto lamentable 
record in the field of medical relief.
Despite the fact that the threat of cholera immediately 
followed a fever epidemic in 1846-47, neither local rate­
payers nor the recently incorporated Council petitioned to 
have the Public Health Act applied to Bradford in the autumn 
of 1848. Moreover, although the town had a very high death 
rate, the G.B.H. did not seek to impose it either.
Consequently, the responsibility for attempting to prevent the 
epidemic through the application of the N.R.D.P.A. was placed 
with the new Board of Guardians. They began by issuing 
placards and handbills describing the range and extent of 
their powers.15 Relieving Officers were also instructed to 
insist upon cleanliness in the homes of applicants before 
permitting out-door relief, 'so as to counter the effect of 
cholera'.16 The Guardians wrote to the Council inviting it to
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form a joint Sanitary Committee, 'to carry out the objects of 
the General Board of Health'.17 For the purpose of 
administering medical relief, plans were made to divide the 
Union into separate medical districts.18 The only hitch in 
the preparatory arrangements involved a dispute between the 
Guardians and the Poor Law Board over how medical men should 
be paid. On the grounds of economy, the Guardians wanted to 
pay medical men a fixed salary while the Poor Law Board 
insisted they should be paid per case.19 The Board appear to 
have overruled the Guardians as when the epidemic commenced 
medical men were paid by case.20
News of cholera's arrival in Britain was viewed with 
concern by the Council. The Sanitary Committee held a special 
meeting 'in consequence of cholera at Hull', which discussed 
how it might use its powers to help avert the epidemic. The 
meeting resolved to enforce rigidly the rules governing 
conditions in lodging houses and to ensure that other sanitary 
regulations were not broken.21 At a later meeting it was 
decided to appoint a sub-Committee to assist the Guardians in 
the removal of nuisances.22 Whether or not Bradford was 
subject to extraordinary levels of cleansing activity during 
the months after the N.R.D.P.A. was adopted is not entirely 
clear. Although the Act empowered the Guardians to undertake 
cleansing projects and to prosecute individuals for violating 
the law, and the Town Council had the power to abate minor 
nuisances, reports of marked increases in cleansing did not 
appear until the summer of 1849.23
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2.4.3. THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE, 1849.
Despite the apparent lack of action, the Guardians 
continued to make plans for dealing with the impending 
epidemic. In February 1849 they addressed the question of how 
medical relief should be provided. Their earlier resolution 
to divide the town into separate medical districts was brought 
into force and discussions began about the possibility of 
providing hospital facilities. Where this should be located 
proved to be a tricky issue.24 The Council’s Sanitary 
Committee had already considered the possibility of erecting a 
permanent fever hospital in 1848.25 Whilst the Committee 
agreed this was desirable, and would be a great boon for poor 
families who could not provide ’the necessary care, 
cleanliness, ventilation, ... nursing and competent medical 
treatment’, it ruled against such a move for two reasons. 
Firstly, it felt that priority should be given to removing the 
preventable causes of disease; and, secondly, because such a 
project was beyond the Council's jurisdiction. As such, the 
matter was passed on for the Guardians to consider.26 The 
Guardians were in a more difficult position as the N.R.D.P.A. 
made them responsible for all medical precautions. They knew 
that a cholera hospital had been used in 1832 and was thought 
to have been instrumental in preventing a serious epidemic, 
yet as one of their Medical Officers pointed out, isolation 
accommodation had not prevented the spread of fever.27 After 
due deliberation, the Guardians rejected a proposal to equip 
and prepare the vagrant office for use as a cholera hospital, 
a decision Thompson has attributed to the authorities'
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unswerving belief in the miasmatic theory of disease 
causation.28
Reports of suspected cases of cholera in June prompted an 
immediate response when a joint Sanitary Committee, comprising 
Councillors and Guardians, was formed.29 Further action was 
not taken, however, until the end of July.30 Cholera’s spread 
then prompted the Guardians to hold an extraordinary meeting 
where precautionary measures were discussed.31 This decided 
that there was now sufficient reason to warrant a concerted 
attack on nuisances and with this in mind, resolutions were 
passed to appoint an Inspector of Nuisances, to order Medical 
and Relieving Officers to report all nuisances in their 
districts, and to distribute notices throughout the Union 
reminding the public of the powers the Guardians.32 It was 
also decided that a circular would be sent to all medical men 
in the Union requesting details of cases (premonitory and 
advanced) and, with the Watch Committee's approval, to ask the 
police to collect the reports and pass them on to the Union 
Clerk. The Sanitary Committee also resolved to meet daily to 
consider the reports and, if necessary, take further action.
The Guardians’ prior reluctance to implement 
comprehensive preventive measures was criticised by a number 
of people.33 Their reply was that the delay had been 
necessary so as not to create alarm amongst the public.34 
After the extraordinary meeting, however, cleansing and 
nuisance removal began in earnest. A deputation of 
Councillors and Guardians inspected those parts of East
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Bradford where cholera was rife. In New Leeds, where the 
majority of the early cases and deaths occurred, they 
discovered ’abominations and nuisances ... which baffle 
description1.35 By early August nuisance removal in New 
Leeds, nearby Bradford Moor and Wapping was in full swing. In 
addition to initiating cleansing measures and prosecuting 
people for infringing the N.R.D.P.A., the Sanitary Committee 
ordered that free chloride of lime should be given to the poor 
and took the unusual step of having stray dogs rounded up and 
destroyed.36
August saw the Guardians introduce a number of medical 
precautions designed to prevent premonitory diarrhoea from 
developing into Asiatic cholera. A dispensary was opened at 
New Leeds where the poor could obtain medicines, and Mr 
Applewick, a spirit merchant, was instructed to supply free 
spirits to 'indigent persons' with cholera or other symptoms 
on production of a certificate signed by a surgeon.37 
Similarly, surgeons were empowered to issue certificates which 
enabled 'necessitous persons attacked by cholera' to borrow 
blankets and sheets.38
Official efforts to contain the epidemic met with little 
success.39 The Guardians responded by making free medicines 
available through Sharp the Druggist of Westgate, and, 
ominously, by ordering a hearse and employing an additional 
coffin maker.40 Cholera's spread in August was not, however, 
blamed on the Guardians. Indeed, the Observer, edited by 
William Byles, a keen advocate of sanitary reform, believed
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that the Sanitary Committee was using its powers to the full.
In an editorial it stated that,
’The Board of Guardians continue to meet daily and are in 
union with the Sanitary Committee, exercising a 
praiseworthy zeal and energy in the hope of arresting the 
progress of this fearful visitation. Nuisances are 
everywhere disappearing as quickly as it is possible ... 
and no efforts are spared, either in the free 
distribution of medicine or the application medical aid 
to save the lives of those attacked'.41 
At this stage, the paper1s only grumble was that the powers 
the N.R.D.P.A. granted to the Guardians were inadequate.
After regaling its readers with lurid details of sanitary 
conditions in New Leeds, and describing how, armed only with 
the limited powers of the Act, the Guardians were fighting an 
uphill battle, the paper declared that 'the condition of New 
Leeds loudly calls for an Improvement Act'.42
Attitudes towards the Guardians changed abruptly around 
the end of the month when a sharp increase in the incidence of 
cholera prompted members of the public and the local press to 
scrutinise the system of medical relief. Just one week after 
he had issued his vote of confidence in the Guardians, the 
editor of the Bradford Observer began to voice serious 
doubts.43 Initially, reservations were expressed about the 
way in way in which treatment was provided. Under the
the poor could obtain free medicines from the temporary 
Dispensary in New Leeds and from a chemist in the town centre. 
Obtaining the services of a medical man, however, was much
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more difficult. Contrary to the advice of the G.B.H., the 
Guardians had not set up the necessary machinery for medical 
officers to follow up applications. The effects of this were 
twofold. On the one hand it meant that people who required 
treatment rather than medicines could only obtain the services 
of a medical man through normal Poor Law procedures. On the 
other hand, it left the Guardians without a means of 
monitoring applicants’ symptoms, of warning other family 
members of the need for prompt treatment of bowel complaints 
or of checking sanitary conditions. These shortcomings were 
recognised by one member of the public, who complained that 
many people were not receiving treatment because the Union 
Medical Officers were overworked, and urged that in view of 
the epidemic's severity, ’The Guardians should pass an order 
as would enable those who are seized with cholera ... to 
procure the readiest and best help ... without routine 
application to a Relieving Officer'.44 The Observer took a 
similar stance, arguing that with the exception of providing 
free medicines and publishing the names and addresses of 
doctors in private practice, the Guardians had done little to 
provide treatment for the poor or to ease the pressure on 
their own Medical Officers.
In fairness to the Guardians it should be pointed out 
that when the epidemic intensified at the end of August, they 
did consider adopting 'additional precautionary measures'.45 
A proposal that the number of medical staff should be 
increased was rejected, only after Medical Officers informed 
the meeting that they were able to cope.46 Nonetheless the
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joint Sanitary Committee did appoint a number of nurses to 
attend 'necessitous families' at the beginning of September.47
This did little to deflect criticism of official actions, 
which concentrated on the weakness of medical precautions. In 
the first week in September, the Observer reported that 
’deaths have been more numerous in the previous week that at 
any other stage', and pointed out that the problems people 
faced in procuring medical treatment had not been overcome.48 
However, in mid-September, to counter what was fast becoming a 
crisis situation, the Guardians took a number of steps. They 
appointed nine extra medical men and all medical men in the 
Borough were requested to attend cholera cases for a fee of 
six shillings and sixpence per case.49 An attempt to recruit 
more nurses, however, was unsuccessful as reports that several 
nurses had died deterred potential applicants.50
The growing sense of crisis also led to greater urgency 
being attached to nuisance removal and cleansing operations. 
The Guardians believed that this was being hindered by local 
magistrates, not because they were reluctant to fine 
offenders, but because they were taking too long to do so. A 
deputation from the joint Sanitary Committee obtained promises 
from magistrates that they would speed up summonses.51 
Additionally, extra staff were appointed to assist with 
sanitary operations in order that every house where cholera 
was reported could be cleansed and purified, further supplies 
of chloride of lime were made available to the public, and
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members of the Sanitary Committee were sent to assess 
preventive arrangements in nearby Leeds.52
Throughout the epidemic the Council and the Guardians 
worked well together. The latter concentrated their efforts 
specifically on those houses, streets or districts worst 
affected by cholera, and the Council undertaking nuisance 
removal throughout the town, usually in response to notices 
signed by local people.53 Like the Guardians, the Council 
appears to have redoubled its nuisance removal programme in 
September.54 As had been the case previously, the division of 
labour between the agencies was maintained. The Council dealt 
with the public’s complaint's about general nuisances such as 
pig styes, dunghills and middens, and the Guardians continued 
to concentrate their efforts wherever cholera prevailed.55 
Within a fortnight of the Guardians employing extra medical 
men and, with the Council, increasing sanitary cleansing 
activities, cholera began to decline. By the middle of the 
month the epidemic was over and sanitary and medical 
precautions were scaled down.56
2.4.4 and 2.4.5. MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASS RESPONSES.
A shortage of appropriate evidence means it has not been 
possible to characterise separately middle and working class 
responses to cholera in Bradford.57 Nevertheless, close 
scrutiny of the available sources has revealed a number of 
interesting reactions.
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The epidemic revealed a degree of ambiguity in middle 
class attitudes to the poor. There was certainly a feeling 
that working class indifference to domestic hygiene and other 
'moral shortcomings' contributed to the conditions in which 
cholera thrived. This led to typical attempts to reform the 
behaviour of the poor. For example, the Guardians ruled that 
from September 1848, relieving officers should not allow 
people to receive outdoor relief unless their homes were in a 
state of cleanliness.58 The blame for insanitary conditions 
was not pinned solely on the poor. Several millowners were 
also admonished for neglecting sanitary conditions in and 
around their premises.59 Moreover, as indicated above, there 
was widespread recognition that worthwhile environmental 
improvements could not be achieved through self-help measures. 
This view appears to have been shared by those who, in the 
summer of 1849, signed memoranda demanding that the Council 
took immediate action to remove nuisances across the 
borough.60
Once the epidemic was confirmed, criticism of the 
working class shifted on to what was seen as their neglect of 
medical precautions. Medical officers alleged that their work 
had been impeded by the 'ignorance ... stupidity ... neglect 
and even dishonesty of the poorer classes' and complained of 
the difficulty they had encountered in persuading people to 
comply with their directions.61 Partly this was because the 
system operated through the Poor Law, although many people 
were also deterred by the fees sought by private 
practitioners.62 However, no attempt was made to excuse those
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(few) people who were not suffering from cholera yet had 
claimed free blankets and brandy from the Guardians.63
Although some middle class opinion expressed concern for 
the poor and supported the Observer1s campaign for sanitary 
reform, voluntary action on the scale seen in other towns was 
absent. Indeed, other than through making donations on the 
Day of Humiliation and offering advice on prevention and cure 
through the newspapers, the only public attempt to assist the 
poor came from Messrs. Holmes and Allen, millowners of New 
Leeds, who appointed a surgeon to attend cases amongst their 
employees.64
There does not appear to have been a particularly strong 
belief in contagionism amongst people of any class in 
Bradford. Although the Guardians reported that they were 
having difficulty in recruiting people to nurse the sick and 
that £5 to buy alcohol had ’to be given to the assistants of 
the Sexton to provide the means of preserving themselves from 
contagion', there were no reports of the public taking 
precautions which were consistent with contagionism.62 This 
was confirmed by the willingness of people to buy the beds of 
cholera victims from a Union employee and, more especially, 
the fact that thousands factory hands joined together to go on 
factory excursions throughout September.66 The latter 
prompted the Observer to say that, 'Cholera is not the only 
epidemic prevalent just now. There is a social epidemic of a 
very different and much more agreeable character ... the 
factory excursions which have become so common'.67
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2.4.6. SANITARY REFORM AFTER 1849.
The first British cholera epidemic is said to have had a 
greater impact than the later ones quite simply because it was 
the first. On a national basis this is correct, however, 
locally many towns, Bradford among them, had their first 
visitation in 1849.68 In these circumstances, cholera still 
lived up its reputation as a shock disease. That cholera's 
decline coincided with the introduction of more comprehensive 
sanitary and medical precautions did not go unnoticed. The 
Observer justified its campaign and its detailed coverage of 
the epidemic, by arguing that its reports had 'awakened 
attention to the surrounding peril and prompted the more 
general employment of preventive remedies and measures'.69 As 
a result, the paper claimed, 'after a long period of painful 
anxiety ... we begin again to breathe freely'.
That cholera was most virulent in the filthiest districts 
of the town was plain to see and acted to reinforce the view 
that insanitary conditions were responsible not only for the 
epidemic, but for ill health in general.70 The logic of 
Chadwick's argument that disease caused poverty, was accepted 
in Bradford. The Observer asserted that, given the condition 
of New Leeds, it was, 'No wonder that the place was such a 
nursery of pauperism and disease'.71 Similarly, the Chairman 
of the Guardians declared that if the town were to purchase
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the Leys district ’and pull all the houses down it would be a 
saving to it in the end’.72
Long before the epidemic peaked, the limitations of the 
Guardians’ sanitary powers, rather than a reluctance to use 
them was identified as the main deficiency revealed by the 
epidemic. Hence the appearance of a report in the Observer 
stating that in New Leeds, ’The root of the evil remains after 
the powers of the Guardians have been exhausted’.73 It was 
argued that what the town needed was an Improvement Act which 
would empower the authorities to tackle long-standing and 
severe sanitary problems.74 Both the Council and the 
Guardians were in agreement.73
Acknowledging that incorporation had not been brought the 
hoped for benefits, the Council announced as early as June 
1849 that it intended to apply for additional powers under an 
Improvement Act in order that existing by-laws could be 
enforced and new ones framed.76 As part and parcel of the 
process, the Mayor, Titus Salt, announced that a committee was 
to be set to investigate the ’Moral Condition of Bradford’.77 
The report was delayed, but when it finally appeared in 1850, 
like similar reports, it shocked middle class opinion with 
graphic descriptions of the squalor and depravity. Its 
compilers, however, seemed to favour a solution to these 
problems based on moral regeneration rather than sanitary 
improvements.78 This idea came under attack from various 
quarters, including the Bradford Observer which stressed that 
decent sanitation was a precondition of moral regeneration.79
165
Although there was agreement about the need for sanitary 
improvements, the proposed Improvement Bill nevertheless 
sparked off a political controversy reminiscent of that which 
accompanied the application for incorporation. The Bill 
sought to strengthen the Council’s hand by transferring the 
duties of the Board of Surveyors and Improvement Commission 
and by empowering it to pave and drain streets, clear polluted 
waterways, organise improved refuse collection and sewerage 
disposal, regulate abattoirs and improve the supply of 
water.80 The Bill, drafted and promoted by leading Liberals, 
was opposed by Tories who believed it would lead to 
unnecessary expense and was motivated by Liberal greed for 
power. Conversely, a number of Liberals who sat on the Board 
of Surveyors also objected, believing it would strip away 
their power.81 In the event the Bill, though clearly 
sponsored by leading liberals, was presented to the Commons 
privately, thus denying the Council the opportunity to debate 
it. This further infuriated the Tories who retaliated by 
petitioning the G.B.H. to have the provisions of the Public 
Health Act applied to Bradford, despite their earlier having 
agreed with the Liberals that submitting to central control 
was undesirable.82 The shape and content of the Act, which 
became law in July 1850, was determined by Parliament and did 
not represent an outright victory for either side. Liberals 
were disappointed to find that the original Clauses relating 
to water and cemeteries had been struck out and a large part 
of the Public Health Act added. Tory hopes that the Bill
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would be completely replaced by the Public Health Act were 
also dashed.83
Whilst the 1849 cholera epidemic was central to both the 
creation of a climate of opinion favourable to reform in 
Bradford and the Council's decision to apply for an 
Improvement Act, there was a tendency for participants in the 
ensuing debates to lose sight of the sanitary issue as the 
application for the Improvement Act degenerated into a 
continuation of the power struggle between elite factions. 
Nevertheless, when the Act became law, it did mark a 
significant turning point. On the administrative front it 
established the Council as a L.B.H. and simultaneously 
disbanded the Board of Surveyors and Improvement Commission.84 
It also extended the Council's sphere of activities 
significantly.85 In addition to taking over those areas of 
work previously carried out by the Surveyors and Improvement 
Commission - which included the upkeep of highways and paving 
- the Local Board was given responsibility for drainage, 
street lighting, building regulations and the inspection of 
lodging houses and abattoirs.86 How vigorously these powers 
would be used without the stimulus of an epidemic crisis 
remained to be seen.
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2.5. SHEFFIELD.
2.5.1 THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE EPIDEMIC.
As was the case in most West Riding towns, cholera's 
arrival in Britain in 1848 was covered in great detail by the 
Sheffield newspapers.87 Public and official anxiety increased 
dramatically in early November, following reports that the 
disease had broken out. However, as the press was quick to 
point out, undue alarm was unwarranted as the cases were of 
'English' rather than 'Asiatic' cholera.
Sheffield's next cholera scare occurred in July 1849, 
following the death of a local businessman who had returned 
from London suffering from what medical men said were the 
unmistakable symptoms of the 'Asiatic' form.88 A further case 
was reported later in the month, when a local grinder 
contracted the disease, although public concern diminished 
when he recovered.89 The incidence of diarrhoea was higher 
than usual and there was acute awareness of epidemics in other 
towns, yet there were no further reports of cholera cases 
until the end of August. On 24 August 'a sudden outbreak [of 
diarrhoea] occurred over the whole town' and two days later, a 
medical man was summoned to treat William Fish, a silver 
plater of Philadelphia, who was thought by his family to be 
suffering from severe diarrhoea.90 The doctor found him in 'a 
state of perfect collapse', his body 'was cold and presented a 
blue aspect and all the other symptoms of Asiatic Cholera'.91 
Despite receiving prompt treatment, Fish died less than twenty
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four hours later. Sheffield differed from the other three 
towns in .that medical opinion that cholera was present was 
immediately accepted despite the fact that late August marked 
the peak of the annual diarrhoea season. When medical men 
diagnosed further cases a cholera epidemic was immediately 
declared.92
Although the disease affected a number of different 
districts during the first week of September, the number of 
fatal cases mounted only slowly. But in the week ending 15 
September cholera manifested itself, ’to an extent calculated 
to cause serious alarm’ in Attercliffe, and the total number 
of deaths rose to twenty.93 The three week period after this 
saw the Sheffield epidemic peak, but on a much smaller scale 
than in towns of a similar size. During this period, cases 
and deaths were reported in most parts of the Borough, yet 
were concentrated in the Attercliffe, Wicker and Park 
districts. The total number of deaths in the Sheffield Union 
district rose to 33 by 22 September and to 53 and 67 in 
successive weeks. A further six deaths were reported during 
the following week, bringing the total to 73.94 Only one more 
death occurred after this date and, by the middle of the 
month, the Sheffield Times was able to announce that epidemic 
cholera had completely disappeared and rejoiced that the town 
had escaped so lightly.95
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2.5.2 THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE, 1848.
Sheffield society at mid-century was still relatively 
homogeneous and was marked by close ties and empathy between 
the different classes. This helped to promote a radical 
political culture in which the interests of the working class 
was often to the fore, not least because of their 
participation in local politics. This was part cause and part 
effect of the growing influence of the radical Chartist 
Democrat Party which by the late 1840s dominated the Town 
Council and was also in the process of gaining control of the 
local Highway Board. From the mid-1840s the Council became 
increasingly progressive, championing the cause of workers in 
Britain and abroad. Because at this stage the Council lacked 
real power there is a temptation to dismiss its radicalism as 
gesture politics. This would be unfair, as it did strive to 
achieve practical reforms. Whilst public health was not the 
main concern of the Chartist Democrats, efforts were made to 
improve sanitary conditions. Following the passage of the 
first N.R.A. in 1846, the Council responded to popular opinion 
and formed its own Health Committee. Although the Sheffield 
Times reflected in 1849 that the Committee had been 
’vigorously promoting sanitary measures' since its inception, 
the leader of the Chartists, Isaac Ironside, backed by working 
men, found it necessary to found a local branch of the Health 
of Towns Association to speed reform. Ironside was successful 
in persuading the Council to undertake a comprehensive 
sanitary survey in 1848 to provide the basis for future 
improvements. The significance of this was to increase
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awareness of public health issues and help swing opinion 
behind reform. Thus when cholera threatened, the Guardians, 
who were themselves noted for having progressive and 
enlightened views, acted with the utmost vigour and were 
supported in this by the Council, the town's other sanitary 
agencies and the public at large.
Cholera's presence in Europe did not attract much 
attention in Sheffield until the beginning of 1848 when a 
local medical man, Mr Boultbee, wrote to the Health Committee 
informing them of the disease's progress across the continent. 
Boultbee warned that as the disease was following an identical 
route to the one travelled in 1830-31, Britain and, more 
especially, Sheffield, was unlikely to avoid the epidemic 
unless the local authorities and the public used 1 all the 
precautionary measures which past experience points out as 
essentially necessary for the maintenance of health'.96 
'Cleanliness, pure air, ... general health, temperance, 
avoiding all excesses, bodily and mental' were, he warned,
'the weapons we must all employ'. The Health Committee's 
decision to pass Boultbee's letter on for publication in a 
local newspaper indicates that they took the threat of cholera 
seriously and shared his belief that 'to be forewarned is to 
be forearmed'.
Specific measures to avert the epidemic were not 
initiated until cholera was first diagnosed in Britain in the 
autumn of 1848.97 Both of Sheffield's newspapers published 
the G.B.H.'s first and second Notifications, as well as
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detailed advice.98 The local authorities were reminded of the 
obligations and powers accruing to them under the N.R.D.P.A., 
and were urged to put cleansing operations into immediate 
effect and to make preparations for providing medical relief 
should the need arise. Responsibility for implementing the 
Act lay with the town's two Poor Law authorities, the 
Sheffield and Ecclesall Bierlow Boards of Guardians.99 By the 
beginning of November, both Boards had appointed Sanitary 
Committees which both promised to undertake 'vigorous 
operations', a move which met with the approval of the Health 
Committee.100
2 . 5.3. THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE, 1849
The disease failed to manifest itself in the town in 1848 
and concern waned until it spread again in the summer of 1849. 
Though there were occasional cholera scares, a mood of 
optimism prevailed in the town. This stemmed from the 
unprecedented amount of sanitary work being carried out by the 
local authorities. According to a local newspaper, whilst the 
public health in most large towns was deteriorating, it had 
'materially increased' in Sheffield as a direct result of the 
strict sanitary regulations introduced the previous 
November.101 Significantly, cholera's retreat in the winter 
had not led to a relaxation of activities. In the eight 
months after the Sheffield Guardians announced their intention 
to enforce the N.R.D.P.A., they served over one thousand 
notices demanding removal of nuisances and summonsed over one 
hundred offenders to appear before the magistrates. Steps
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were also taken to improve conditions in Sheffield’s lodging 
houses, to clean dams and waterways and the owners of new 
property were 'induced' to pave and drain their streets.102
Although ultimate legal responsibility lay with 
Sheffield's two Boards of Guardians, several other agencies 
were vested with public health powers.103 Indeed, the 
complex structure of local government had already been 
identified as a potential obstacle to improvements. In their 
Sanitary Report of 1848, Haywood and Lee warned of the need 
for cleansing, paving, drainage and other sanitary 
arrangements to be placed under the control of a single public 
body.104 Fears that the Guardians' cleansing and nuisance 
removal campaign would be hampered or obstructed by the other 
branches of local administration were unfounded. Indeed, the 
Health Committee, the Highway Boards and the Improvement 
Commissioners did their utmost to support and assist the two 
Boards of Guardians. The Health Committee resolved to use the 
powers accruing to it under local by-laws to help and the 
Improvement Commissioners pledged 'hearty co-operation' with 
the Guardians.1° 5
On the rare occasions when disputes or confusion did 
arise, they were resolved amicably.106 The authorities' 
willingness to work together in an attempt to avert the 
epidemic won praise from various sources. Well before cholera 
arrived, the Sheffield Times confirmed that all the town's 
sanitary agencies had 'assiduously applied themselves to the 
work of sanitary improvements’.107 The Governors of the
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Sheffield Public Dispensary were similarly impressed, speaking 
of the pleasure they derived from ’the sanitary inspection 
which the town is now undergoing’.108 The campaign also 
elicited the admiration of deputations from other towns.
After conducting a brief survey of the town, two Inspectors 
from Liverpool announced that Sheffield was the cleanest town 
they had visited.109
Steps were also taken to arrange a system of medical 
relief.110 Both the Sheffield and Ecclesall Bierlow Guardians 
sought advice and assistance from the Sheffield Medical 
Sanitary Association, which had been formed by local medical 
men early in 1848 to ’co-operate with ... the promotion of 
sanitary measures’.111 Before discussing the proposed system 
with the Guardians, the Medical Sanitary Association consulted 
Dr Laurie who had organised Glasgow’s medical arrangements 
when cholera broke out there late in 1848. Several of 
Laurie's ideas, along with those advocated by the G.B.H. were 
agreed to at a meeting held at the beginning of August.112 
Plans revolved around the early detection and treatment of 
diarrhoea cases. The Guardians decided that they would 
divide, (and if necessary sub-divide) each union district into 
separate medical areas, each of which would have its own 
Dispensary, medical officer, medical assistants and nurses.
Both Sanitary Committees acquired and prepared premises for 
use as diarrhoea hospitals and houses of refuge. It was also 
agreed that in the event of cholera breaking out, every effort 
would be made to redouble sanitary cleansing operations in the 
appropriate locality. At this stage it was felt that a system
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of house-to-house visitation would not be required.1X3 Steps 
were also taken to familiarise the public with the medical 
preventive system. Both newspapers published details of the 
scheme in August, and the two Boards of Guardians had printed 
thousands of handbills and posters explaining the various 
procedures to the public. To avoid alarm, the distribution of 
these was delayed pending cholera’s arrival.
Shortly after the Guardians' preparations were completed, 
epidemic diarrhoea was diagnosed and three days later the 
first cholera cases appeared on 27 August.1X4 At once the 
planned medical measures were put into effect.xxs Applicants 
reporting to dispensaries with premonitory symptoms were dosed 
with astringent medicine and given a supply to take home with 
them. If, as was often the case, they were applying on 
someone else's behalf, they were provided with medicine and 
instructed on its use. The name and address of each applicant 
or patient was taken and forwarded to the District Medical 
Officer who then visited each victim at home to check his or 
her condition. Further visits were made to reinforce the 
message that family and neighbours should seek early treatment 
for bowel complaints and to impress the need for sanitary and 
dietary vigilance. When the Medical Officer or one of his 
assistants discovered a case of cholera a different procedure 
was followed. If possible, the patient would be treated at 
home by one of the two town surgeons and his nurses. Other 
members of the family would be sent to the diarrhoea hospital 
or house of refuge, depending on their condition. A ’special 
visitor' was then sent into the infected locality to inspect
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sanitary conditions and advise of further cases as they 
arose.116 Following the recovery or death of a cholera 
patient, a team of workmen was sent to his or her house to 
conduct thorough cleansing before other residents were 
permitted to return. Despite being relatively complex, the 
scheme proved to be workable and, in the opinion of many 
contemporaries, successful.
When the epidemic intensified in September, the Guardians 
decided it was necessary to distribute leaflets on a house-to- 
house basis. The newspapers repeated the advice and, in an 
attempt to discourage complacency, included several warnings 
of the likely outcome of failure to comply. Several deaths, 
stated the Sheffield Times, had occurred because people had 
allowed ’the pestilence to penetrate their very vitals before 
seeking the succour that is so safely vouchsafed to all'.117 
Similarly, it was noted that the six cholera deaths which 
occurred in Attercliffe during the week ending 22 September, 
were all 'clearly traceable to an obstinate disregard of 
premonitory symptoms', as all the victims had 'been 
recommended to procure medicine but had refused'.118 
Propaganda of this nature also accompanied newspaper warnings 
about the need for public cooperation with other aspects of 
medical preventive arrangements. To illustrate that failure 
to use the house of refuge was not only unwise but positively 
dangerous, a local newspaper informed its readers of how, 
following the death of a man in his home at the Nursery, the 
other three occupants, who refused to leave, subsequently 
developed cholera and died.119 By contrast, the public was
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assured that compliance with official arrangements would be 
attended by the best possible results. Mr Lewis , a surgeon 
working at Attercliffe, noted how early application for 
treatment of diarrhoea had prevented many cases from 'running 
into the worst stage of the d i s e a s e 120 In a similar vein, 
the public was informed that after the death of a man in Dunn 
Street, his wife was taken to the house of refuge and their 
children, both of whom had premonitory symptoms, were sent to 
the diarrhoea hospital at Millsands, whilst 'effectual 
measures' were taken to disinfect the family home.3-21 'By 
this measure', it was asserted, 'the health of the wife was 
preserved, and the children quickly recovered'.
Whilst special emphasis was placed on the early treatment 
of diarrhoea, people were continually reminded that they could 
actually reduce the chances of developing premonitory 
diarrhoea by taking action to ensure that they did not 
predispose themselves to disease. On numerous occasions the 
Guardians, medical men and newspapers warned of the need for 
hygiene, moderate diet, cheerfulness and temperance. Typical 
of the advice issued on these matters was an address delivered 
by a local vicar to the people of Chapeltown in which it was 
declared that 'The cholera has four great friends, DIRT, 
DRUNKENNESS, SLOTHFULNESS and FEAR. It hath also four great 
enemies, PURE AIR, CLEANLINESS, SOBRIETY and COURAGE’.122 The 
vicar reiterated the advice issued by the G.B.H. and medical 
men that, 'a hard crust of bread and a glass of pure water 
will do you more good than bad meat, stale vegetables and 
unripe or overripe fruit'. Analysis of the incidence of
177
diarrhoea convinced medical men and other officials that over 
indulgence at weekends, and particularly excessive drinking, 
was responsible for the increased number of diarrhoea cases 
which occurred on Mondays and Tuesdays.123
The Guardians' emphasis on medical preventive measures, 
and particularly their efforts to arrest diarrhoea, did not 
lead to a relaxation of sanitary cleansing operations.
Despite the fact that there had been a concerted nuisance 
removal campaign since the previous November, and in some 
quarters Sheffield was considered to be a model of 
cleanliness, cholera's arrival saw the Guardians redouble 
their efforts. One such 'model' intervention was particularly 
noteworthy.
The news that premonitory diarrhoea was prevalent in 
Attercliffe and, more particularly, that cholera had claimed 
the lives of eight people, met with a speedy response.
Vigorous cleansing and nuisance removal commenced on 15 
September when, according to a local newspaper, Attercliffe 
was 'invaded ... by a cleansing army ... under the command of 
Mr Watkinson'.124 The army's 'artillery' consisted of two 
fire engines, its 'infantry' of a 'regiment of whitewashers' 
and twenty eight firemen. Its purpose was to 'storm the 
strongholds of filth and infection' in the hope of making 
Attercliffe 'cleaner and sweeter than at any time within 
living memory'. Under the direction of Mr Watkinson, Clerk to 
the Sheffield Guardians, the firemen hosed down premises where 
cholera cases had occurred or which were considered dangerous
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to the public health. Gangs of workmen were ordered to empty 
privies and middens, cleanse, disinfect and whitewash houses, 
and clean and disinfect yards, streets, drains and sewers. 
Simultaneously, the public was instructed or forced to remove 
a variety of nuisances ranging from bedclothes to pigs. The 
local press applauded what they considered to be the 
Guardians1 prompt and comprehensive sanitary measures which 
had seen ’nuclei of filth ... carried off or entirely 
dispersed’.125 Attercliffe’s water supply was also felt to be 
a problem.126 In an attempt to procure a cleaner and more 
abundant supply, the Council and the Guardians' Sanitary 
Committee wrote to the Water Company requesting it to furnish 
a supply for eight hours a day.12-7 Within two weeks 'good 
pump water' was laid on so villagers no longer had to 
supplement their supply with filthy water from local 
sources.128 Steps were also taken to stop the Canal Company 
from dredging the canal, a project which was thought to be 
adding to the insanitary atmosphere.129 There was, as will be 
discussed later, another interpretation of this 'success' 
story.
As already shown, the incidence of cholera and mortality 
was relatively low. Whether this was due to sanitary and 
medical measures is difficult to say, though the low incidence 
undoubtedly enabled measures to be concentrated. Nonetheless, 
the local authorities, and the Guardians in particular, 
received lavish praise and were more than willing to accept 
that their actions had averted the kind of crisis experienced 
in the town in 1832 and elsewhere in 1849. Both local
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newspapers praised the vigorous and comprehensive measures 
implemented by the Sheffield and Ecclesall Guardians.130 
Further local support and praise for the Guardians came from 
the Town Council. Isaac Ironside announced that under current 
arrangements the town was 'obtaining the benefits of the 
Public Health Act without the machinery of the Act itself'.131 
The Guardian's response to the epidemic also won the rapid 
approval of the G.B.H., which expressed 'great satisfaction' 
with the arrangements at the beginning of September.132 
Locally, medical men and Union officials were convinced that 
their system of prevention was working. Medical Officers in 
the Sheffield Union reported that prompt action with 1,582 
cases of diarrhoea had led to only one of these patients 
dying.133
News of this remarkable 'success' was quickly relayed to 
Poor Law Guardians in other towns by the G.B.H. and Dr Wilson 
Overend, Chairman of Sheffield Medical Sanitary Association, 
with the 'Sheffield Plan' soon being recommended to other 
local authorities. A communication from the G.B.H. informed 
the Guardians in Manchester that 'a thorough and efficient 
system of prevention' had been established in Sheffield and 
'had been rewarded by an extraordinary exemption from 
fatalities from cholera, notwithstanding the existence of a 
large amount of diarrhoea and predisposition to the 
disease1.134 Both the G.B.H. and the Manchester press urged 
the town's Guardians to adopt identical measures, with the 
latter pointing out that the 'Sheffield Plan' could be 
implemented 'without any additional large expenditure'.135
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Details of the 'Sheffield Plan' and reports of its success 
soon appeared in other newspapers, local and national. On the 
basis of evidence contained in a letter from Dr Overend, a 
Leeds newspaper announced that official medical arrangements 
in Sheffield were so effective that 'the poor and miserable' 
were better protected than the 'richer classes' who sought 
treatment from private practitioners.136 The Times stated 
that Sheffield's 'remarkable success' was attributable to the 
Guardian's medical scheme which made it impossible for a case 
of cholera to escape notice.137
Clearly, the perceived efficacy of preventive and medical 
measures in Sheffield was something of a boon for the 
beleaguered G.B.H. Ever since the N.R.D.P.A. had been brought 
into effect in the autumn of 1848, the Board's medical 
superintendents had been trying to persuade reluctant or 
sceptical local authorities to adopt its recommendations.138 
So far as the Board was concerned, the control of diarrhoea 
was paramount and could only be achieved thorough house-to- 
house visitation. The failure of many Boards of Guardians to 
instigate systems of visitation was considered to be 
particularly negligent.139 Indeed, the only reservation the 
G.B.H. had about the Sheffield scheme was that it departed 
from their system of medical aid in that visitation ensued 
after application to one of the local dispensaries. In the 
opinion of Sutherland, this modified form of medical 
inspection did not constitute a rigid system of visitation, as 
the poor could not be trusted to apply for medical aid on 
their accord.140 This mild reproach irritated one of
181
Sheffield's newspapers which saw it as carping about a model 
scheme.141
This criticism notwithstanding, Sutherland singled out 
several aspects of the 'Sheffield Plan' for praise. Firstly, 
he enthused over the way in which the Guardians worked closely 
with other public health agencies and the local medical 
profession prior to cholera's arrival. He also commended the 
way in which the scheme had been conceived after the Guardians 
and medical men had familiarised themselves with every piece 
of information on cholera, including the documents published 
by the Board and the 'results of experience elsewhere'.142 In 
this respect the Sheffield Guardians stood almost alone. A 
second feature was the way in which all of the principles of 
preventive medicine had been adopted. Elsewhere, local Boards 
made provision for either medical or sanitary precautions, in 
Sheffield both medical and sanitary measures had been 
implemented in a unified and complementary fashion. 
Consequently, Sutherland argued that the Guardians medical 
arrangements had nipped premonitory symptoms in the bud, 
whilst their sanitary operations attacked the disease at 
source, thus enabling the town's inhabitants to resist the 
epidemic influence.143 A further feature of the Guardians' 
response was their willingness to implement preventive 
measures without regard to expense. Whilst cost led to raised 
eyebrows in certain circles, none of the town's authorities, 
medical men or newspapers appear to have given a second 
thought to the financial implications of averting or
182
containing the epidemic.144
Overall, Sutherland described the Guardians’ efforts as a 
’perfect scheme’, and argued that it was rewarded by a 
considerable saving of life. According to Sutherland's own 
data, of the 5,319 cases of diarrhoea which occurred in 
Sheffield, only 76 passed into cholera and only 46 cholera 
fatalities had occurred.145 The low incidence of cholera 
relative to the high incidence of diarrhoea was regarded as 
incontrovertible proof of the success of medical relief. 
Moreover, according to Sutherland, the Guardians' longer term 
cleansing and nuisance removal programme had also been of 
great benefit as it had made a major contribution to the 
'comparative immunity which Sheffield enjoyed from developed 
cholera'.146
2.5.4 - 2.5.5. THE MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASSES.
It is worth recalling here that many historians share the 
view that mid-century Sheffield's social structure differed 
from that of other large manufacturing towns where pronounced 
class divisions existed.147 For example, Reid argued that the 
process by which the culture of masters and men separated out 
into a class of merchants and manufacturers and 'a working 
class consisting of skilled and proletarian groupings' was 
extremely gradual prior to I860.148 Given that class 
divisions were still relatively indistinct in the late 1840s, 
this section will discuss middle and working class responses 
together. However, it is worth bearing in mind Reid's
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qualification that tensions and conflicts ’could take place 
within and between classes’.149
From an official point of view, prevention or containment 
of the epidemic was contingent on public co-operation with 
prescribed measures and regulations. Throughout the epidemic 
period a constant flow of official ’advice’ in the form of 
newspaper articles, notices, posters and leaflets was given to 
the public. Because the labouring classes, who comprised the 
bulk of the population in Sheffield and other large industrial 
towns, were thought to be most vulnerable to cholera, requests 
for co-operation and compliance with official measures and 
directives were, implicitly or explicitly, addressed to them. 
Even though many preventive measures were interventionist, 
with disruption of family and community life, there is 
evidence of working class support for, and compliance with, 
such measures.
The supposed indifference of the poor to health was the 
principal reason for the G.B.H.’s insistence that Boards of 
Guardians should mount systems of house-to-house visitation.
In Sheffield, however, medical men and Poor Law officials, all 
of whom had a ’thorough knowledge of the habits of the 
people', decided to trust the public to apply for treatment 
voluntarily. 150 Although the local press and Sutherland 
cited instances of people ignoring calls, medical men appear 
to have been satisfied by the public’s response. Dr Overend 
reported that calls for voluntary application for medical aid 
were heeded.151 Dr Lewis, was more complimentary, stating
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that the work of the Sanitary Committee had been 'much 
forwarded by the readiness evinced by all parties attacked in 
making applications to the medical officers and 
dispensaries1.152 Published data reveals that in the 
Sheffield Union district alone, there were over 6,000 
voluntary applications for medical treatment.153
The testimony of local medical men and the number of 
voluntary applications strongly imply that in Sheffield's 
case, the G.B.H.'s fears and Sutherland's complaints were 
unfounded. Also, it should be pointed out that Sutherland was 
somewhat hasty in construing failure to apply for official 
treatment as a shortcoming of the Guardians' system of medical 
prevention or, more especially, as evidence of working class 
apathy. People chose not to apply for a variety of reasons. 
Treatments and cures were available from a number of sources, 
other than the Guardians. Indeed, estimates supplied by a 
local newspaper, reveal that almost a fifth of the fatal 
cholera cases recorded in the Sheffield and Ecclesall Union 
districts had been under the care of private practitioners.154 
Moreover, as was the case in other towns and cities, a range 
of treatments and cures was available from the alternative 
sector.155 Lastly, it is worth pointing out that some 
individuals chose not to seek medical treatment on religious 
grounds.156
The public's apparent willingness to place its trust in 
the Guardian's medical arrangements was one sign of the vastly 
improved relationship which existed between Sheffield's
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working class and local medical men. This point is further 
illustrated by examining working class attitudes to the most 
disruptive and potentially provocative element of the official 
system of relief; namely, their insistence on removing people 
from infected houses to either the house of refuge or the 
diarrhoea hospital.
Removal of cholera patients to hospital led to angry and 
often riotous popular reactions during the epidemic of 1831-
32, primarily because it played on working class fears about
the medical profession and dissection, not to mention the fact 
that the considerable disruption of family and community life 
added to the trauma of the epidemic.157 In 1849, one 
Attercliffe woman complained that on the day of her husband’s 
funeral, she, her daughter, son in law, and their four
children were ordered to leave the family home.158 Her
daughter and grandchildren were sent to the house of refuge, 
whilst she and her son in-law were instructed to make their 
own arrangements until the house had been cleansed. Another 
person spoke of his resentment at having to obtain a ticket 
from Mr Watkinson before being allowed to collect his children 
from the house of refuge.159
In these and similar cases, anger was not directed 
against the official medical procedures or Medical Officers as 
such, but at the insensitive way in which they were 
implemented by lay officials. Indeed, the poor appear to have 
recognised the need for extraordinary arrangements and to have 
been grateful to the town's medical fraternity for the way in
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which it worked towards arresting the epidemic.160 The 
inhabitants of Attercliffe joined with their local vicar in 
thanking official medical men for the 'most kind and exemplary 
way' in which they performed their duties throughout the 
epidemic period.161 Praise was also extended to the medical 
staff at the diarrhoea hospital and house of refuge. From the 
point of view of the medical authorities, the task of 
arresting the epidemic was much easier as a result of working 
class co-operation. The only complaint medical men voiced 
about the working class response was that 'the lower portion 
of the working classes' ignored repeated warnings about 
'carousing and dissipation' at weekends.162
Whereas opinion in Sheffield held that medical men had 
conducted themselves in a caring, sensitive and conscientious 
manner, there was widespread disquiet about the way in which 
official cleansing measures were carried out. People from a 
variety of social and occupational groups expressed anger 
about what they saw as the Guardians' over-zealous and 
misguided war against nuisances.163 In the case of the 
'attack' on nuisances in Attercliffe mentioned above, local 
people saw the cleansing team as behaving more like an army of 
occupation than a relief column.
Contrary to assurances that cleansing operations in 
Attercliffe would be concentrated on houses where cholera had 
been reported, the cleansing team made little attempt to 
discriminate between affected and unaffected properties.164 
Numerous complaints were also made about the way in which
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nuisances were designated. In many instances, beds, bed 
clothes, clothing and other possessions considered by their 
owners to be clean, were deemed dangerous and confiscated or 
burnt. Similarly, a number of privies were demolished by 
workmen despite the fact that the night-soil was removed at 
regular intervals by their owners. An assortment of other 
items, ranging from building materials to water barrels which 
their owners maintained were inoffensive, were destroyed or 
removed.
Anger mounted because it was felt that official cleansing 
operations were often counter-productive, undoing much of the 
self-help precautionary work undertaken by the residents 
themselves. Shortly after official cleansing began, a number 
of people complained that their houses and yards, which had 
previously been well scrubbed, whitewashed, and disinfected 
with chloride of lime, were left filthy and unwholesome by the 
authorities. Further complaints were made about the haphazard 
or incomplete way in which work was carried out. One 
Attercliffe resident described how workmen sent to clean her 
privy:
’left the yard in a very dirty state. The walls still 
remain down, and the ashplace is exposed to view .... If 
the ashplace were a nuisance before, it is much worse 
now, the drainage from it flowing down the passage for 
want of a retaining wall'.165 
Many official sanitary measures were criticized for being 
’unscientific’.166 Having been bombarded with sanitary advice 
from official sources over the previous year, many people in
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Attercliffe were astonished when officials and their staff 
undertook measures which seemed 'more likely to cause than 
check disease1.3-67 People were incensed when, having ordered 
workmen to destroy a trough said to contain the only source of 
clean water available to many villagers, Watkinson instructed 
firemen to draw stagnant and filthy water from the canal and a 
pond for cleansing. Similar reservations were expressed when 
the contents of privies and middensteads were left to stand in 
the streets for several days. This procedure, it was felt, 
'completely poisoned the atmosphere'.3-68
Such fears were quickly borne out as within days of the 
cleansing team's departure new cases of premonitory diarrhoea 
and then cholera reappeared. One man recalled that after his 
property had been hosed down with water from the canal, he 
felt ill and began to vomit; another that one of his tenants 
died of cholera after cleansing operatives had hosed his house 
with 'bad' water taken from Whitworth's pond.169 Similar 
complaints were made by other villagers, amongst them the 
Reverend Blackburn who stated that, 'After the fire engines 
came to the village, many deaths happened from cholera ...
They occurred principally in the line where the fire engines 
had been'.170
Given that many people in Sheffield believed that the 
actions of the cleansing team were actually helping to spread 
the disease, it is unsurprising that the team's presence in a 
particular area caused widespread fear and alarm. This 
situation was doubly worrying because as well as militating
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against public co-operation with cleansing operations, medical 
opinion held that fear could predispose people to cholera.
One woman was said to have died from cholera as a result of 
the 'terror occasioned by the watering brigade'.171 A similar 
case, in which a man died after he witnessed the authorities 
'turning out a number of persons from their houses in 
anticipation of cholera', was reported in the Nursery 
district.172
The conduct of officials, and especially Watkinson, was a 
source of particular anger and resentment. In his dealings 
with the general public he was said to have been strident, 
abusive and, on occasions, threatening.173 Throughout the 
cleansing campaign Watkinson ignored protests and rebuffed 
suggestions that he or the Guardians should provide any form 
of compensation. In encounters with Attercliffe's wealthier 
and more 'respectable' inhabitants, Watkinson was more 
diplomatic but no less intransigent. The Reverend Blackburn's 
request that hosing should be suspended because it was 
damaging property and helping to spread cholera was firmly 
dismissed.
Insensitivity towards the bereaved, lack of respect for 
the dead and official interference with funeral arrangements 
caused additional bitterness. Although the immediate 
interment of victims was no longer official policy, 
representatives of the Guardians caused something of a furore 
by calling at the home of John Kerry, whose two children died 
of cholera, with orders that the deceased were to be
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immediately ’fastened up' in coffins sent from the workhouse, 
and buried the following day.174 Although the men allowed 
Kerry to find a female to lay out his daughter, they ignored 
his pleas that the children should be buried in coffins he had 
ordered from an undertaker. ’A great commotion’ ensued in 
Attercliffe on the day of the funeral, as shocked villagers 
saw the hearse travel through the main street with both 
coffins ’projecting out of the windows’.175 This was 
considered to be even less respectful than what was usual 
practice of carrying coffins to the Vestry Office in an open 
cart. The dignity of the funeral was further marred when 
Kerry discovered that his children were to be buried in the 
cholera ground and not in the plot of ground he had ordered. 
Religious beliefs were also affronted on the Day of 
Humiliation, for whilst calls for prayer were ’strictly 
observed’ with public houses, shops and other businesses 
closed, Watkinson’s cleansing team continued to work, even 
during the Divine service.176
Many of the grievances held by the people of Attercliffe 
in 1849 were identical to those which led to conflict in towns 
and cities across Britain in 1831-32. Family life was 
disrupted, cleansing and nuisance removal were carried out 
arbitrarily, property and possessions were confiscated, 
damaged or stolen, the dead and bereaved were shown little 
respect, and, perhaps worst of all, it was widely believed 
that the cleansing team's attempts to arrest the epidemic were 
counter-productive. Yet, despite the anger and resentment 
public order was never seriously threatened; although
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Watkinson had found it necessary to request an escort for the 
fire engines after they were followed by a ’great concourse’ 
of angry people on their first working day in Attercliffe, and 
there were scenes of ’excitement’ and ’commotion' during the 
following week, physical resistance did not materialise.1'7'7 
This is not to say that the people of Attercliffe were 
passive. Throughout the cleansing campaign and, indeed, 
afterwards protests continued.
These took two forms. When the sanitary operations were 
in progress, cleansing operatives and.their supervisors were 
challenged directly by individuals, or indirectly through 
intermediaries, such as the Reverend Blackburn or Samuel 
Jackson.178 Concern and protests about the sanitary 
operations did not diminish after the cleansing team departed. 
Indeed, at the beginning of October, local people made a 
formal protest through a petition. This resulted in the 
presentation to the Council of a memorial signed by over five 
hundred rate-payers calling for an enquiry into the sanitary 
proceedings at Attercliffe.179 Public disquiet, coupled with 
the fact that several local dignitaries also expressed 
support, prompted the Council to bow to popular opinion and 
set up an enquiry. Evidence was heard from a large number of 
people, the vast majority of whom were highly critical of the 
cleansing team and of Watkinson’s high-handed methods. The 
Guardians declined an invitation to give evidence, arguing 
that the memorial should have been forwarded to the G.B.H. or 
the Poor Law Board and pointing out that neither they nor 
their employees was answerable to the Council.180
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The view that the public's dilatoriness, ignorance and 
immorality were largely to blame for the insanitary conditions 
in which they lived was widely espoused in middle class 
circles and was a recurrent theme in general sanitary 
propaganda.181 In the late summer of 1849 it became apparent 
that sections of Sheffield's middle class subscribed to this 
view, blaming the poor for predisposing themselves to attack 
or even, in some cases, cholera's appearance in the town.3-82
Of all the working class habits giving rise to concern in 
respectable circles, one - the practice of keeping animals, 
and especially pigs - was singled out for criticism. Nothing 
was more likely to produce filth and contribute to the 
likelihood of disease, wrote one citizen, than animals kept in
heavily populated districts of the town by people 'who could 
barely afford to keep the human members of the family'.183 In
the fraught circumstances of September 1849, the Guardians 
believed it imperative that the pig problem should be 
addressed. Consequently, Watkinson and his team were 
instructed to remove this nuisance. In Attercliffe cleansing 
operatives made people move pigs away from houses, demolished 
styes, carted away manure, and, on many occasions Watkinson 
threatened to fine people without notice for keeping pigs in 
their yards.184 These measures were enforced with equal 
rigour in other districts of Sheffield.185
Working class people saw these nuisances very 
differently. To them, keeping a pig made sound economic
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sense, because in addition to meat, pigs produced manure which 
could be sold. Also pigkeeping was perceived as a traditional 
'right1. Whereas protests about other aspects of the 
cleansing campaign had been made in conjunction with wealthier 
rate-payers, working people acted independently on this 
matter. In mid-October placards were distributed, condemning 
seizures or threats of seizure 'under the pretence of the 
Nuisance Removal Act1.186 Placarding was followed by a public 
meeting which was so well attended that hundreds of people 
were unable to gain entry. Those who attended condemned the 
Guardians in the strongest terms. Two factors, the 
infringement of customary rights and the Guardians' alleged 
disregard of legal technicalities were singled out for 
criticism.187 Attempts were made to persuade those present to 
march to the Workhouse and demand the immediate return of 
confiscated animals, when this failed the meeting voted to 
pass a motion denouncing 'dictatorial authority' and 
requesting a meeting with the Guardians at which the matter 
could be discussed. The Guardians subsequently agreed and a 
compromise was worked out. It was decided that because the 
'crisis' was over, no action would be taken against swine 
keepers unless a member of the public had made a complaint 
and, when this occurred, confiscation would only result after 
the correct legal procedures had been followed.188
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2.5.6. SANITARY REFORM AFTER 1849.
Sheffield's success in combating cholera is said to 
have taken the sting out of the sanitary question in the 
town.189 Ostensibly, there is evidence to support this.
Calls for immediate improvements and reforms were rarely heard 
during the epidemic, not least because people appear to have 
been satisfied with the way in which the authorities responded 
to the crisis. In the early 1850s a number of proposed 
improvements were shelved, most notably the joint Highway 
Board's drainage scheme.190 Even more importantly perhaps, a 
move to obtain an Improvement Bill was thwarted by an alliance 
of hostile rate-payers and councillors in December 1851. On 
closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that these 
developments, and particularly the opposition to the 
Improvement Bill should not be equated with indifference or 
hostility towards sanitary improvements, rather they reflected 
disagreements about how these should be achieved. The key to 
the rejection of the Improvement Bill, and ultimately to the 
stagnation of improvements in the late 1850s, lay in the deep 
rooted suspicion of centralisation.
Ironically perhaps, the idea of applying for an 
Improvement Act was first mooted by the Council as an 
alternative to adopting the Public Health Act; the latter 
course of action being rejected because despite containing 
'many excellent provisions' it required submission to the 
control of the G.B.H.191 The attractions of drafting and 
applying for an Improvement Act, which contained similar
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Clauses and provisions to the Public Health Act but would not 
threaten local autonomy, seemed obvious. The Council's 
decision was welcomed by a local newspaper which made its 
feelings about centralisation abundantly clear, urging central 
government,
'[To] trust sanatory measures to the municipalities, 
giving them all reasonable powers and facilities free 
from the interference of Central Boards and they may rely 
upon satisfactory progress'.192 
Early in 1851 an Improvement Bill was drafted by, amongst 
others, Isaac Ironside. It was designed to give the Council 
responsibilities currently held by the Highway Board and 
Improvement Commission, the rights to purchase the town's gas 
and water companies and to standardise liability for local 
taxation.193 Although the climate of opinion was still 
favourable to sanitary improvements it quickly became apparent 
that the Bill was less popular than supposed.
Whilst a local newspaper looked forward to 'the many 
advantages from the proposed Bill', this view was not shared 
by a number of councillors and a body of rate-payers.194 The 
main objection was the way in which it was thought to threaten 
the system of local government nurtured by Ironside and his 
Chartist-Democrat colleagues. Ironside, upon whom the ideas 
of the anti-centralist propagandist Joshua Toulmin Smith had 
made a profound impression, believed that ordinary people 
should be actively involved in political decision making at 
the local level.195 To achieve this he encouraged the 
creation of 'wardmotes' which Fraser described as 'a system of
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ward and township democratic self government’ resembling small 
local parliaments.196 As Ironside intended, wardmotes, along 
with vestry and public meetings, became an established device 
by which rate-payers were able to influence the agenda and 
direction of local politics.x97 As well as centralising power 
with the Council, the Bill would have increased the power of 
the police and Church Burgesses. Worse still, the 
standardization of local taxation would place the burden of 
paying for improvements squarely upon working men, while at 
the same time the abolition of the popular Highway Boards 
would effectively disenfranchise them.
The matter came to a head towards the end of 1851 when 
Ironside, who it should be remembered had been a member of the 
drafting committee, persuaded his colleagues to postpone the 
application pending a public meeting. At the meeting, held in 
December, and attended mainly by working men, it emerged that 
rate-payers were not opposed to the principle of sanitary 
reform, but to pursuing it in a way which would lead to 
increased centralisation, higher rates and 
disenfranchisement.X98 In defence of the Bill, Dr Hall 
countered that the meeting should vote for application because 
implementation would reduce sickness, a condition which 
pressed 'so heavily on the working classes'. Hall's argument 
failed to make any impression, with the meeting voting to 
postpone the application by a huge majority.
The decision to reject the Bill was a cause of regret in 
various circles. The Independent, argued that Sheffield was
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now ’deprived for an indefinite period of provisions of the 
highest importance to its health, cleanliness, and 
improvement'.3*99 The Council expressed a similar sentiment, 
resolving that it 'deeply regrets that the Burgesses have 
thought it expedient to postpone ... the Improvement Bill 
which ... promised to be a measure of great and lasting 
benefit to the Borough'.200 The failure to obtain an 
Improvement Act left the structure of Sheffield's sanitary 
administration intact, with responsibility for sanitary duties 
still divided between a variety of agencies. As such, 
sanitation was still dependent upon close cooperation and 
goodwill between the different bodies; this had worked before 
and during the crisis of 1849; would it work in the future 
without the stimulus of cholera?
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2.6. 1848-49 IN PERSPECTIVE
There were clear differences in the experience of the 1848-49 
cholera epidemic between the towns which are the focus of this 
study. Differences have been shown at all levels, from 
mortality, through local authority responses to class 
experiences. However, the four towns can be seen to represent 
a continuum, with Hull at one pole - with the highest 
mortality, least active authorities and strained class 
relations - and Sheffield at the other - with very low 
mortality, a 'model* local authority and class consensus and 
co-operation. Leeds and Bradford offer intermediate positions 
on these variables. Although it makes for a certain degree of 
anachronism, the first two themes addressed here will make use 
of our modern understanding of cholera as a bacterial 
infection spread via the faecal-oral route in contaminated 
water, to speculate about the factors likely to have 
influenced mortality.
2.6.1. CHRONOLOGY, URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND MEDICAL MEASURES
Knowledge of cholera's cause and mode of transmission has 
led historians to dismiss the idea that the temporary 
preventive measures enacted in 1849 would have been effective, 
as no one specifically recommended boiling water and dealing 
hygienically with patients and their wastes. However, this 
presentism must be rejected. The impact, material and 
psychological, of cleansing campaigns cannot be ignored. 
Removing nuisances, using chloride of lime and general
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cleaning (if carried out with uncontaminated water) could well 
have reduced the likelihood of infection. So too might 
individual actions resulting from general hygienic propaganda 
and the public’s epidemic consciousness.
In attempting to explain the different levels of 
mortality in the four towns, and more especially, why 
Sheffield escaped so lightly, two variables now seem likely to 
have been most important: (i) seasonal and climatic factors 
and (ii) the water supply. It was recognised then, as now, 
that cholera thrived in warm, sultry weather. There was a 
closely observed link between the season or weather pattern 
prevailing at the time of cholera's arrival and levels of 
mortality. The epidemics in Leeds, Bradford and Hull began in 
July. This meant that the disease was able to establish 
itself and spread in the hot summer of 1849. In these towns 
it followed the classic pattern, spreading gradually and 
persistently over a period of weeks before entering the 
explosive phase in late August and September. The late 
arrival of cholera in Sheffield, at the end of August (perhaps 
due to luck and the fact that the town was not on a major 
trade route), meant that weather conditions were much less 
favourable. It is interesting to note the Sheffield epidemic 
ended, without entering the explosive phase, at the same time 
as those in the other three towns when early and severe frosts 
affected the region.201
The knowledge that cholera is usually transmitted through 
water tainted by faeces containing cholera bacilli and that
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serious epidemics occur when supplies of drinking water become 
contaminated, throws light on the fact that the epidemics in 
Leeds, Hull and Bradford claimed middle as well as working 
class lives. Concern over water guality and shortages in each 
town had produced improvements in mains provision in the 
1840s. These very 'improvements1 probably played a major part 
in the spread of the disease. By 1849 Hull drew water for 
domestic and industrial purposes from the River Hull which 
also acted as the town’s main sewer. In the view of Gillett 
and MacMahon the town's dependence on river water was 'the 
sole cause of the 1849 epidemic'.202 Piped water was 
available to the majority of people in Leeds in 1849. Indeed, 
between 1842 and 1852, the number of houses supplied with 
company water increased from 3,000 to 23,000.203 Improvements 
in the quantity of water, however, were not accompanied by 
improvements in quality.204 The lack of filtering, coupled 
with the dangers from fractured sewers or drains, means that 
contaminated mains water may have been circulating in Leeds in 
1849. The situation in Bradford mirrored that in Leeds. The 
provision of mains water was extended throughout the 1840s and 
by 1849 approximately half the houses in Bradford had 
access.20S Those people who did not have piped water bought 
supplies from water carriers who resold piped company water. 
This goes some way to explaining why cholera affected areas 
like New Leeds which in 1849 were not connected to the mains 
supply.206
The situation in Sheffield was different because much of 
the mains water was drawn from springs on the uninhabited
201
hills to the west of the town and was reported to be of 'good 
quality'. Stand-pipes had replaced water carriers in most 
areas, although supplies were intermittent, especially in 
those areas inhabited by the poor.207 As such, many people 
had to store water and seek supplementary supplies from 
springs and other natural sources.20® Some local sources 
undoubtedly became contaminated as there were clusters of 
cases adjacent to waterways or where people drew supplies from 
ponds, yet well and spring water was less generally likely to 
be contaminated.209 Moreover, and of great significance, it 
was reported that many of the cholera cases which occurred 
amongst people who lived some way from the main waterways 
'have been amongst people whose occupations led them to spend 
much time by the river'.210 Other factors which were likely 
to have shaped the pattern of the epidemic locally were chance 
variables, such as, the number of infected people arriving in 
the town, where and how victims were nursed, and the fate of 
their wastes.
What would the impact of medical preventive measures and 
treatment have been? Again it is impossible to be definitive, 
but such measures should not be dismissed. Many 
contemporaries, while recognising that there was no specific 
cure, were convinced that victims could be helped 
significantly. It must be remembered that cholera had a case 
mortality of 30-40%, so the majority of sufferers always 
survived and hence many recoveries were associated with 
particular medical treatments. The practice of treating 
cholera patients at home while removing other members of the
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household to either the houses of refuge or diarrhoea 
hospitals was an innovation in 1849 and, if a contaminated 
local water supply was the main source of infection then 
removal would have reduced the risk of infection. These 
actions would also have reduced the chances of people coming 
into contact with contaminated clothing, bedclothes or 
privies.211
There was a widespread belief that the early treatment of 
premonitory symptoms with astringent medicines played a vital 
part in preventing diarrhoea developing into advanced or 
Asiatic cholera. However, the proposition that astringents or 
any other medicines used were effective as a means of treating 
cholera has not been treated seriously by historians who have 
tended to reject all nineteenth century therapies as 
ineffective.212 Only Finer has taken astringent medicines 
seriously, but even he only suggests that this was because 
they induced constipation and prevented fsufferers from using 
privies'.213 However, it is now possible to go further. Once 
in the intestine the cholera bacillus reverses or inhibits the 
process by which water and salts pass from the gut into the 
blood stream, leading to the characteristic watery diarrhoea. 
This loss of body fluids leads to severe dehydration and this 
was, and still is, the main cause of death in cholera. Thus, 
anything which would have slowed bowel movement, like 
astringents, would have reduced fluid loss and dehydration. A 
common substance whose absorption is unaffected by the 
bacillus is glucose, so anyone with a high sugar of
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carbohydrate diet would have been less debilitated and may 
explain the lower mortality of the middle class.
2.6.2 THE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT, 1848
Despite being rushed through Parliament, the Public 
Health Act, 1848, was of little assistance to local 
authorities wanting to take action to reduce the threat of 
cholera, and as events in Hull showed, it was of marginal 
assistance to local rate-payers. This was largely because the 
Act was designed to enable local authorities to undertake the 
long term sanitary improvements, not short term emergency 
measures. As far as countering the threat of cholera and 
other epidemics went, the single most important piece of 
legislation was undoubtedly the N.R.D.P.A. Historians have 
tended to overlook this Act, presumably because it did not 
signal major changes or advances in any aspect of public
health sanitary policy. Be this as it may, the Act was of the
utmost importance in 1848-49 because it provided the framework 
for immediate and ongoing preventive action at the local 
level. Two related features of the Act should be highlighted,
the first being the way in which it involved Boards of
Guardians in sanitary action, an area of work with which they 
are not normally associated. However, as Chadwick and others 
were quick to point out, the reason for placing the 
responsibility with the Guardians was straightforward. As 
elected representatives of the rate-payers, they more than the 
other branches of local government, had an interest in 
ensuring that the level of cholera mortality was kept to a
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minimum. The second significant feature of the N.R.D.P.A. 
was, as we have seen, that it required local Boards of 
Guardians to implement a range of medical precautions. This 
is often overlooked by historians who, perhaps not 
surprisingly given the G.B.H.’s and particularly Chadwick’s 
hostility towards curative medicine, have failed to recognise 
that great importance attached to medical measures during 
epidemics. The history of public health should not be seen 
solely through Chadwickian spectacles.
2.6.3 MIDDLE CLASS RESPONSES
When cholera returned in 1848-49 British society was no 
less polarised than in 1831-32. Consequently, cholera once 
again revealed class relationships and attitudes. As had been 
the case in 1831-32, a number of variables - including 
differences in past experience of epidemics, customs and 
conventions, available resources and expectations of each 
others behaviour - played important roles in shaping each 
classes’ perceptions and responses. As such, the ’two nations 
model’ has proved just as relevant to an understanding of 
social responses to the second epidemic as the first. In 
1848-49, official preventive action was a middle class 
prerogative, involving those groups and individuals who either 
controlled the various branches of local administration, or 
had access to the necessary resources, or possessed the 
expertise required to contribute to public health activities.
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The middle class response could be both passive or 
active. Either way, class structured expectations and 
identities. This is no where better seen than with regard to 
the medical profession, who some historians have put in a 
distinct middle class fraction because their social position 
did not depend upon wealth and because their professional 
orientation was towards service. Such views are presentist 
and represent a complete misunderstanding of the mid­
nineteenth century profession. This was more of a status than 
expert profession, and status depended upon income, 
connections and influence. Medical men, both to survive and 
prosper, made enormous efforts to build up practices amongst 
the local plutocracy, to insinuate themselves into local 
elites, especially through work for voluntary welfare 
institutions, and to develop cultural institutions such as 
local medical societies. To the working class, medical men as 
a group were indistinguishable from employers and landlords; 
indeed, in many ways they were worse, making a living from the 
misfortune of others and only serving the very poor through 
the workhouse. Though this is not to deny that individual 
medical men, many of whom were economically, if not socially, 
close to the working class were looked upon differently. But 
only as individuals, not as a social group. In this sense 
class is problematic; however, even more so would be the 
dissolution of class into numerous fractions and interest 
groups.
There were significant, if not totally unexpected, 
continuities between the 1831-32 and 1848-49 cholera seasons.
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However, there were notable differences in the official and 
wider middle class responses to the two epidemics and, more 
importantly, in the responses to the same epidemic in 
different places. These need to be highlighted and explained. 
One difference in the second epidemic was the type of 
preventive measures which local authorities implemented or 
were urged to implement. The switch to the miasmatic theory 
was such that many of the most intrusive precautions based on 
contagionism, which had been central to the system of 
prevention in 1831-32, were deemed unnecessary. However, the 
epidemic did prompt a revival of contagionism amongst medical 
men and the local authorities in Leeds.
Unlike the situation in 1831-32, fears that cholera would 
promote widespread social and political unrest do not appear 
to have played a part in shaping the official response in 
1848-49 despite the relative strength of Chartism. Similarly, 
the experience of cholera in 1831-32, and of other epidemics 
in subsequent years, had shown that the poor were most likely 
to fall prey to the disease. This contributed to a sense of 
relative security amongst the middle classes, whilst 
simultaneously reinforcing their view that the poor were 
largely to blame for their own ill health and that official 
action was required to protect the poor from themselves as 
much as the disease. In the changed context of 1848-49, 
therefore, the arguments for and against the implementation of 
preventive measures were identical to those used to support or 
oppose the longer term objectives of the sanitary movement. 
Action could be justified on the basis of moral, philanthropic
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or economic considerations and opposed by those who objected 
to expenditure which would benefit the 'undeserving' poor.214 
These factors were important in 1848-49 because the 
responsibility for preventive action at the local level was 
vested in existing agencies rather than especially created 
ones. This meant there was a less uniform response in 1848- 
49, because of the diversity of administrative arrangements 
and structures found in different towns. In turn, the 
character and actions of local agencies reflected the 
political power structures and social relations of each town.
This latter point is particularly important when 
considering the striking contrast between the official 
responses in Sheffield and Hull. In Sheffield the two Boards 
of Guardians, the Council and other sanitary agencies and 
local medical men worked closely together. Moreover, their 
efforts were generally supported by the all sections of the 
community. The contrast with Hull could not have been more 
stark. Here both sets of Guardians and the Town Council 
ignored repeated warnings about the need preventive action and 
displayed what was described as an 'utter indifference to the 
lives of the poor'. This attitude was not confined to local 
officials but was shared by some of the town's wealthier 
citizens and several vested interests. The main differences 
between the towns were not in administrative structures, but 
in class structures, class relations and political 
representation.
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Medical men played a vital part in the fight against 
cholera. Acting as independent practitioners, employees of 
the Guardians or through their own organisations, they 
undertook a range of duties. These included providing advice 
to the Guardians and public, identifying nuisances, helping to 
plan the system of medical care, acting as visitors and, of 
course, treating the sick. Medical men had already turned 
their attention towards an analysis of local health problems, 
developed an environmental view of disease and were projecting 
themselves as fierce social critics. For Inkster this role 
was a device which medical men believed would help them 
overcome their social marginality.215 Yet their concern about 
the health of the poor was genuine, not least because many had 
been born into artisan families and others came into close 
regular contact with the poor through religious and political 
activities and affiliations.
2.6.5 POPULAR RESPONSES
In 1831-32 the official preventive campaign was 
universally resented by all working class communities and 
actively resisted by many. This has been attributed to two 
factors: (i) the threat to working class subcultures posed by 
the assertion of the dominant middle class culture; and (ii) 
the preventive measures which played upon working class fears 
of the medical profession. In 1848-49, the official strategy 
of prevention was again highly interventionist, yet it did not 
provoke the same level of reaction. There are a number of 
reasons for this. Firstly, many of the preventive measures
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which had caused resentment and fear in 1831-32 were not used 
again; for example, the immediate interment of the dead and 
quarantines. Second, working class fears of body snatching 
had diminished. This, along with other changes, had produced 
improved relationships between medical men and the poor. 
Thirdly, intervention was no longer novel. Between 1832 and 
1848 public policy had developed in such a way that official 
intervention into several spheres of life was accepted, if not 
expected. With regard to sanitary and medical action in the 
West and East Ridings, it should be remembered that preventive 
campaigns had been mounted during the fever epidemics of 1846- 
47 and that these had been welcomed or tolerated by the 
working class. This last point is particularly interesting 
because it suggests that by 1848-49 the working class may 
actually have expected the local authorities to take action to 
avert the epidemic.
The above point must not, however, be pushed too far 
because working class people did not passively accept all 
preventive measures. Cooperation only materialised when the 
working classes approved of or agreed with specific preventive 
measures. In this context past experience of disease, beliefs 
in particular theories of disease causation, relationships 
with the authorities and notions of rights were crucial 
determinants of behaviour. Thus, whilst people might act on 
official instructions to modify their diet, seek immediate 
treatment for premonitory symptoms or carry out cleansing in 
and around their homes, compliance was not guaranteed. Where 
working class people or communities disapproved of official
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measures there were two sorts of response. First, official 
recommendations and directives could be ignored. Second, 
action could be taken to stop or reverse the offending 
measure. This happened in Leeds where hundreds of people 
signed a petition demanding that the authorities should 
overturn to ban Mr Waterson from distributing his 'cholera 
powders' to the poor, and in Hull where the belief amongst the 
working class that cholera was contagious led to successful 
demands for the authorities to close the cholera hospital.
Even in Sheffield, where there was a relatively high degree of 
class cooperation and consensus, working class people took 
determined steps to prevent what they believed was the 
unwarranted and unnecessary confiscation of animals, a measure 
which they believed infringed customary rights. A third 
course of action involved the working class taking 
precautionary steps which were consistent with their own 
understanding of disease and its relation to urban ecology.
For example, people in Leeds believed that cholera was 
contagious and acted accordingly, shunning victims, their 
families and possessions. Likewise, the belief that tar 
burning had been successful method of prevention in 1832 
prompted a revival of this practice and a belief in the 
efficacy of patent medicines prompted people to seek 
treatments from alternative practitioners. Other forms of 
response to the epidemic point to a popular understanding of 
the urban environment. This was certainly the case in 
Sheffield where there was widespread disquiet about a number 
of sanitary measures taken by the authorities because working
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and middle class people alike believed these were counter­
productive .
2.6.6. THE IMPACT OF THE 1848-49 EPIDEMIC ON SANITARY REFORM 
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
Was the cholera epidemic of 1848-49 an immediate boon to 
local sanitary reform?216 There are two general reasons for 
supposing that it might have been: firstly, it was far more 
destructive than the first epidemic and, secondly, the public 
health movement had already exercised considerable influence 
at national and local level. For reformers, the 'dread' 
cholera provided an ideal propaganda weapon for use in 
subsequent lobbying. The epidemic was certainly responsible 
for creating a climate of opinion which was favourable to 
reform and improvement in the three Yorkshire towns in which 
cholera was most destructive. That there appears to be a 
correlation between levels of mortality and subsequent 
sanitary progress is supported by the fact that major 
improvement schemes or administrative reforms did not 
materialise in Sheffield. As indicated above, however, what 
was at issue in Sheffield was not so much the desirability of 
sanitary improvements as the means of achieving them. That 
rate-payers voted to reject administrative reform reflected an 
unusual degree of confidence in the existing local authorities 
together with a wish to preserve rate-payer democracy. Public 
faith in the Highway Board was repaid in 1852 when it 
responded to rate-payers concerns about ill health by 
initiating work on a project to provide some of Sheffield's
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most insanitary and disease-ridden districts with drains and 
sewers.217
Cholera undoubtedly played a major part in facilitating 
the rationalisation of local government in Bradford and Hull. 
In both towns it was widely recognised that improvements would 
not materialise unless administrative reforms were made. 
However, although L.B.H.s were formed in both towns, there was 
no guarantee that the authorities would actually use the 
powers available to them. The situation in Leeds was 
different again, with the epidemic leading to the 
implementation of a specific improvement scheme rather than 
changes in sanitary administration. Whilst the implementation 
of the drainage project was interpreted as a mark of progress 
it was not necessarily symptomatic of a new found commitment 
to sanitary improvement on the part of Leeds Council.
In view of the fact that reform did not automatically 
lead to sanitary improvements, and specific measures might not 
translate into amelioration, there is clearly a question mark 
against any straightforward link between cholera and local 
sanitary reform. Also, to answer the question properly a 
longer perspective is needed. This can be obtained from 
investigating subsequent cholera epidemics.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION.
In 1853 cholera returned. Cases were reported in the 
late summer of 1853, mostly amongst passengers and crew from 
ships which had sailed from the infected ports of north 
eastern Europe. Sporadic cases were reported on board ships 
docked at Hull in August 1853, but the General Board of Health 
(G.B.H.) did not officially acknowledge the disease's presence 
until it was diagnosed amongst the local population of 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne in mid-September.1
Initially, the 1853-54 epidemic followed a similar 
chronological and geographical pattern to those of its two 
predecessors. It first established itself in epidemic form at 
an east coast port in the autumn and then spread into 
hinterland towns before being checked by cold weather only to 
re-emerge in spring the following year. In contrast to the 
two earlier epidemics, however, cholera did not continue to 
spread to any great extent in the summer of 1854. Indeed, for 
the most part, its ravages were confined to particular towns 
and the larger seaports, most notably, Liverpool and London. 
Mortality levels in these towns were as high as ever, but on a 
national level cholera claimed far fewer lives than in 1831-32 
or 1848-49. According to the Registrar General, the epidemic 
was responsible for 20,000 deaths in England, and 6,000 in 
Wales, less than half the total claimed in 1848-49.2 In 
Yorkshire, cholera's impact on mortality was minor. It 
claimed 81 lives in Leeds, 34 in Bradford and just 27 in Hull.
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Sheffield fared worse, a brief autumn visitation caused 141 
deaths, more than in 1849.
TABLE 3.1.
DISTRICTS OF HIGHEST CHOLERA MORTALITY 1854
District Deaths per10,000 popn.
Milton 91Towcester 67Thanet 65Merthyr Tidfyl 59Wisbech 49Gravesend 49London 43Cardiff 42Liverpool and West Derby 30
Bradford 1.8*Hull 3.0*Leeds 4.6*Sheffield 8.1*
National average 11.0
* Based on estimates of population from 1861 Census data. Source: Report on the Cholera Epidemic of 1866 in England, Suppl. to 29th Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages in England. 1868
The vast difference in mortality was not the only factor 
which distinguished the 1848-49 and 1853-54 cholera seasons in 
Yorkshire. During the former epidemic the official response 
to the crisis varied greatly at the local level, in 1853-54 
there was much greater uniformity in thought and action. More 
specifically, the local authorities in Leeds, Hull and 
Bradford modelled their action on the much vaunted 'Sheffield 
Plan'. Unlike 1848-49 when the majority of preventive 
measures were taken belatedly and often half heartedly, in 
1853 and 1854 every effort was made to prepare for the
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epidemic before it began and to remain vigilant until the 
threat subsided. Account was also taken of the need for 
complementary sanitary and medical precautions, and co­
operation between different sanitary agencies and local 
medical men. In effect, the 1853-54 epidemic met with the 
sort of official response at local level the which G.B.H. had 
wanted so desperately to see in 1849. The greater symmetry 
allows this epidemic to be discussed more thematically, though 
the experience of each town is again considered within each 
section.
3.2 PREPARATIONS - 1853
Within days of cholera being diagnosed at Newcastle, an 
Order in Council was issued giving the G.B.H. the task of 
overseeing the implementation of the Nuisance Removal and 
Disease Prevention Act (N.R.D.P.A.).3 The Board responded 
immediately, publishing and distributing its 'Directions and 
Regulations' to all local authorities.4 The precautions 
suggested by the Board were broadly the same as in 1848-49: 
local authorities were advised to mount an attack on nuisances 
and to prepare a system of medical relief based primarily on 
catching cholera in its incipient or premonitory stage. As 
had been the case in 1848-49, the public was instructed to 
avoid any form of behaviour which would predispose them to the 
disease, to exercise sanitary vigilance, and to seek immediate 
treatment for bowel complaints.5
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3.2.1 Hull
Nowhere was the response to the threat of cholera more 
vigorous or urgent than in Hull. In the two years since its 
inauguration the Local Board of Health (L.B.H.) had, despite 
considerable hostility and opposition, begun to address the 
town's public health problems. Although there were occasional 
complaints from some of the town's most committed sanitary 
reformers about the slow pace of progress, the Board was 
acknowledged to have done a great deal of valuable work.®
When cholera threatened in the late summer of 1853, the 
Board's speedy response won it further praise.
The port's vulnerability to ship borne infections was 
illustrated by the arrival in the Humber of several German 
vessels carrying suspected cholera cases in the August and 
September 1853.7 Initially, priority was given to checking 
the condition of immigrants and seamen arriving at the port. 
Local medical men questioned ships' captains about the health 
of passengers and crew members and about living conditions on 
vessels before allowing disembarkation.8 Simultaneously, a 
rigorous system of inspecting Boarding Houses, especially 
those used by European immigrants, was put into operation.9 
Whilst the possibility that cholera might be contagious does 
not appear to have been discussed explicitly, this type of 
precaution clearly demonstrated that the authorities believed 
that there was at least a strong possibility of transmission 
by human agency. As far as the G.B.H. was concerned, the 
inspection of lodging houses was desirable, only for
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surveillance reasons, not those cited by local officials. In 
a letter the G.B.H. stressed that,
’this measure should precede all others, being the only 
one by which a real and full knowledge of the state of 
unhealthy parts of the district (in which these houses 
are generally situated) can be maintained from day to day 
... without exciting alarm’.10 
The L.B.H.'s precautionary activities were not confined to 
checking immigrants, seamen and lodging houses. By the middle 
of September further steps had been taken. The Board and the 
Guardians had agreed to execute the N.R.D.P.A. together and 
had made arrangements for adopting a system of house-to-house 
visitation.11 On the sanitary front, routine nuisance removal 
operations were stepped up: chloride of lime was applied to 
drains, quicklime was poured into sewers, houses and 
courtyards were disinfected and whitewashed, and thousands of 
handbills containing advice for the poor and details of local 
by-laws were printed and distributed throughout the borough.12 
In the short term, the authorities’ response helped to create 
a sense of security amongst local people. Indeed, it was 
claimed subsequently that cholera had not found a resting 
place in Hull that autumn because the efforts of the L.B.H. 
had ensured that 'the rotten ditches, open drains and heaps of 
foul putridity essential to the diffusion of cholera had, to a 
great extent, disappeared'.13 Two local medical men, Drs Ayre 
and Cooper, both of whom were ardent proponents of sanitary 
reform, undertook a sanitary audit of the town and issued a 
joint statement expressing their satisfaction with the
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precautions and reassured the public that Hull was 'quite 
healthy'.14
Despite favourable reports about sanitary conditions and 
the response of the L.B.H., the threat of cholera in 1853 
became subsumed into the cut and thrust of local politics. 
Cholera1s arrival coincided with the promotion of an 
Improvement Bill in Hull, the intention of which was to extend 
significantly the powers and duties of the L.B.H. Although 
the Bill contained Clauses which would allow the Board to 
introduce stringent building and planning regulations, 
establish a municipal cemetery and update local Acts relating 
to sewerage, lighting and compulsory purchase, its primary 
objective was to provide the Board with the means to finance 
its work through borrowing by means of bonds and debentures.15 
Needless to say, the borrowing Clauses were condemned by 
'economists' and viewed with suspicion by many rate-payers.
The Bill was also unpopular with some working class people 
because it sought to end rate exemption on certain properties. 
As a result, opposition to the Bill was widespread, coming 
from an unlikely combination of rate-payers' associations, the 
Cemetery Company, night-soil contractors, builders, landlords, 
and the working class. Even the progressive Hull Advertiser 
recognised that the implications of the Bill were worrying. 
'Many worthy people’, an editorial stated, 'have been 
frightened into the terrors of civic bankruptcy [by the 
prospect] of seeing works undertaken on a scale to be 
permanently useful'.16 Predictably, the proposed Improvement
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Bill became the central issue on which the municipal elections 
of November 1853 were fought.
The renewed threat of cholera provided a timely fillip 
for the Bill’s proposers and supporters. Repeatedly they 
stressed that cholera had not established itself that autumn 
because of the sanitary work undertaken by the L.B.H. since 
its formation in 1851. This was significant because many of 
the people who were trying to block the Improvement Bill had 
also opposed the formation of the L.B.H. Had they been 
successful, argued an editorial in the Hull Advertiser, the 
town would now be 'in as deplorable a state as [cholera 
stricken] Newcastle1.17 As well as attributing the absence of 
cholera to the Board's recent work, Hull's sanitary lobby also 
argued that the L.B.H.'s hand needed to be strengthened 
further. The message to voters was unequivocal, to oppose the 
Bill was to invite cholera.18
In the event, the elections were a victory for the town's 
sanitary reformers who, despite continued and fierce 
resistance from 'the muck interest', pressed ahead, with their 
efforts finally rewarded in July 1854 when the Bill received 
Royal Assent.19 Although Parliament did amend or strike out 
some of the Bill's more controversial Clauses, its passage 
still represented a potential major step forward for the 
L.B.H..2°
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3.2.2 Bradford
Letters published by the local press reveal that 
cholera's arrival in Britain in 1853 was viewed with concern 
by the public in Bradford because sanitary conditions were not 
thought to have improved since 1849. Some of the Guardians 
continued to blame Irish immigrants for this, claiming that 
their homes 'were almost sure to invite the epidemic'.21 
However, the local sanitary lobby took a different view, 
holding that neglect by the Council was responsible for the 
proliferation of nuisances. Consequently it was warned of the 
need for 'immediate and very effective measures to prevent 
[cholera's] appearance in the Borough'.22
The threat, combined with public criticism, acted as a 
potent stimulus to the Council. In mid-September, the Mayor 
convened a meeting of Councillors, Guardians, medical men and 
other 'leading citizens' at which existing sanitary problems 
and the possibility of a new epidemic were discussed.23 The 
meeting decided that immediate action was necessary and votes 
were taken in favour of: (i) instituting an official enquiry 
into sanitary conditions; (ii) arranging for the Sanitary 
Committee and Guardians to form a 'Committee of Co-operation' 
which was to be informed of all cases of diarrhoea and cholera 
reported in the town; (iii) dividing the town into separate 
medical districts; and (iv) stepping up nuisance removal and 
sanitary cleansing operations. The need for improvements was 
evident to the Guardians, yet already some Councillors were 
complaining about the extra costs.24
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By the beginning of October, precautions were under way 
with each of the medical districts inspected by two medical 
men whose brief was to identify and report nuisances.25 The 
Council and Guardians agreed to work together to implement the 
N.R.D.P.A., and initiated cleansing operations throughout the 
town. Additionally, the Council elected to increase payments 
to its night-soil contractors to ensure that excrement was no 
longer allowed to accumulate in yards, courts and streets.25 
At the end of the month, the Council revealed that in just 
five weeks, its Sanitary Committee, acting with the Board of 
Guardians, had whitewashed over 1,000 filthy houses, cleaned 
156 passages and courts, and emptied and whitewashed 300 
privies. Moreover, upwards of 300 ’similar forms of 
nuisances' were said to be in the process of removal.27
This response did not fully appease the Council's 
critics. Indeed, it had been predicted in a local paper that 
the threat of cholera would promote an uncharacteristically 
vigorous response from the normally 'lackadaisical' Council, 
marked by 'important meetings' and temporary measures, only 
for this to subside when the threat of cholera diminished.28 
Members of the working class voiced more immediate concerns, 
complaining that if they reported nuisances in or around their 
homes they ran the risk of being evicted by their landlords.29
3.2.3 Leeds.
In Leeds, news of cholera's approach led to calls for the 
formation of a joint Sanitary Committee, comprising Guardians 
and Councillors, to implement the N.R.D.P.A..30 The
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Guardians, however, had already acted, forming their own 
Sanitary Committee which was to ’exercise and perform all the 
powers ... devolving upon [the] Board under ... the Nuisance 
Removal and Disease Prevention Act of 1848’.31 Although a 
joint Committee was not established, the Guardians did agree 
to co-operate with the Council to abate nuisances.32 Local 
medical men advised the Guardians on the best mode of medical 
relief; with the exception of printing and distributing Dr 
Chalice's ’Plain Directions for Poor People on How to Avoid 
Cholera', it was decided that medical precautions, such as 
house-to-house visitation, should not be undertaken unless 
diarrhoea became prevalent.33 The actions of the local 
authorities to 'ward off the great evil' won the praise of the 
local press.34 Interestingly, the doubts which emerged in the 
town over the miasmatic theory during the 1849 epidemic 
appeared to have been forgotten. The advice of local medical 
men tacitly endorsed the accepted doctrine and actions that 
as, 'Filth is the food of cholera, it becomes communities to 
take measures, through their public authorities or otherwise, 
for the removal of all known sources of disease'.35
3.2.4 Sheffield
Ironically, Sheffield was the only town where 
preparations and planning for the new epidemic threat did not 
go smoothly. The town's four main sanitary agencies, the two 
Boards of Guardians of the Sheffield and Ecclesall Unions, the 
Council and the Highway Board, along with the Medical Sanitary 
Association, met in September to discuss 'the best means of 
promoting the health and cleanliness of the Borough'.36 Those
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measures thought to have contributed to success in 1848-49 
were discussed, however, action did not follow immediately due 
to a dispute between the Guardians and the Council's Health 
Committee over who was legally responsible for nuisance 
removal.37 The Guardians mistakenly insisted that the Health 
Committee was responsible and although the Health Committee 
repeatedly pointed out that this was erroneous, the matter was 
not satisfactorily resolved for some months.38
Nonetheless a number of factors made for an optimistic 
assessment.39 Firstly, it was suggested that the recent 
revival in trade meant that people of 'low, depressing, 
regimen' were no longer common and hence the population would 
be less vulnerable to epidemic influences.40 Secondly, an 
inspection of the town by a leading surgeon, Mr Parker, 
revealed that public health was unusually good.4X Finally, it 
was felt that repeating the success of 1848-49 would not be 
too difficult, so long as the public co-operated with any 
measures the authorities or medical men adopted, and 
especially those designed to arrest premonitory symptoms.42
Such optimism, however, was not shared by everyone. Dr 
Hall, a highly respected member of the local medical 
community, expressed disquiet about the official response to 
the epidemic both in Sheffield and nationally. He argued that 
it would lead only to temporary, palliative measures and that 
these would be futile. 'All this has proved worse than useless 
before', he stated, 'and worse than useless it will prove 
again'.43 Hall, like other sanitary reformers, believed that
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cholera and other urban diseases could only be prevented by 
large scale, long terra sanitary engineering projects. This 
view was backed by the Sheffield and Rotherham Independent 
(S.R.I.) and the Sheffield Times.44
3.3 THE EPIDEMIC - 1854 
3.3.1 Leeds
The first recorded outbreak of cholera in England in 1854 
occurred in Leeds on 21 February amongst operatives at 
Wilkinson’s Flax Mill.45 By the second week of March there 
had been approximately forty cases and fifteen deaths.
Although those affected by the disease lived in different 
parts of the town, it was stressed that all the cases were 
traceable to this one Mill.46 Later in the month and 
throughout April the disease affected people who were 
unconnected with Wilkinson’s and the portents did not look 
good. However, cholera did not become established and an 
epidemic was not designated. In fact, by the beginning of 
May, the town was reported to be free of the disease.47 A 
number of false alarms occurred during the late summer cholera 
season following reports of imported cases, but again there 
was no epidemic.48 According to the Registrar General, 
cholera caused 48 deaths in Leeds itself in 1854 and a further 
33 in the out townships of Kirkstall, Hunslet, Holbeck and 
Bramley.49 Compared with the number of deaths which occurred 
during the 1849 epidemic, and even to diarrhoea in 1854 (228
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in Leeds and 168 in the out townships), these totals were 
small.
The vigorous sanitary cleansing and nuisance removal 
started in the previous year was stepped up further once 
cholera was actually diagnosed. Within days the town was in 
the grip of what is best described as a 'sanitary panic1 as 
the Guardians, Council, local medical men and senior officials 
from the G.B.H. became involved in a frantic effort to prevent 
its spread. Expert opinions were immediately sought as to the 
most likely sources of the danger, the best sanitary measures 
to take and on the provision of medical aid for the sick and 
vulnerable.
Attention focussed on Wilkinson's Mill and the Guardians' 
Sanitary Committee instructed its Medical Officers to conduct 
an inspection in the hope of identifying localized causes, 
only this they failed to do.50 Indeed, they seem to have been 
impressed by standard of sanitary and working conditions at 
the Mill and reported that, over a period of years, the owner 
had taken 'every precaution which intelligence and humanity 
could suggest ... to promote the health and comfort of the 
operatives'.51 Another sanitary inspection, instituted by the 
Mayor and carried out by two local medical men, also failed to 
identify causes, though it did point to a sizeable manure 
depot on the opposite bank of the river as a possible 
source.52 In the view of the Guardians, neither their own, 
nor the Mayor's investigation had produced conclusive
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evidence, consequently they contacted the G.B.H. in London and 
asked for assistance.53
The G.B.H. responded by sending one of its Medical 
Superintendents, Dr Henry Gavin.54 On his arrival, Gavin 
inspected the stricken Mill and sanitary conditions in some of 
the most unhealthy districts. At a public meeting, he 
informed the authorities that the Mill’s owners were not to 
blame for the outbreak, rather that several localized causes 
probably were. Amongst the most likely, Gavin argued, were:
(i) the foul state of the River Aire and other waterways near 
the Mill, (ii) the location of the Council's manure depot,
(iii) uncovered sewers and (iv) a host of other sanitary 
'nuisances’ which either individually or together 'gave off 
poisonous and destructive emanations'.55 As was typical of 
sanitary thinking, Gavin pointed to a number of possible 
causes, rather than a single sufficient one. Another 
superintendent, William Lee, made a follow up investigation 
and, like Gavin, conceded that there was nothing exceptional 
about the outbreak of cholera as 'localizing causes [were] 
abundant and sufficient'.56 Lee did not take issue with Gavin 
or the local medical men who had cited the miasmatic 
influences of the river and manure depot as possible causes, 
but he was critical of the owner of the Mill. Lee suggested 
that the Mill's ventilation and supply of drinking water were 
deficient. The latter, he argued, was likely to have a 
purgative effect on the Mill's one and a half thousand strong 
work force and was thus a likely pre-disposing cause. Lee 
reserved his strongest criticism for the Mill's drainage
240
system, which merely discharged raw sewage into an already 
badly polluted river. This, he asserted, was a particularly 
dangerous practice as water was pumped from the river straight 
back into the Mill and used unfiltered in manufacturing 
processes.57 In a letter to the press, the millowner refuted 
Lee1s allegations, pointing out that he had taken numerous 
steps to promote the ’health, comfort and convenience1 of his 
employees. Most notably, he had spent over £1,000 on the 
installation of water closets, perhaps the very amenity that 
helped to circulate the disease.
The four official surveys were just one part of the 
cholera inspired sanitary activity seen in Leeds in the spring 
of 1854. Whilst various officials were still pontificating 
over the cause of the outbreak, the local authorities, and 
particularly the Guardians, were taking steps to prevent 
further spread. Their first and most dramatic precaution 
involved the closure of Wilkinson’s Mill for a week so that 
the premises could be thoroughly cleansed.58 By any standards 
this was a highly interventionist and possibly courageous 
measure, the wisdom of which was questioned by a writer in the 
Lancet who, thinking of poor diet as a predisposing cause, 
believed it would ’add to the calamity for the many hundreds 
of operatives employed there’.59
By the time the Mill had been cleansed, the conclusions 
of the four investigations were known. Consequently, 
attention shifted from the Mill itself to other localised 
causes, most notably the manure depot on the opposite bank of
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the River Aire. Because the Council owned and ran the 
facility, the responsibility for removing and cleansing it 
fell to its own, appropriately named, Nuisances Committee.60 
In the middle of March work on its removal began.61 This was 
followed by a decision to close the depot permanently and 
relocate it at Brotherton some twenty miles downstream.62
Whilst the Guardians and the Council were jointly 
responsible for cleansing and nuisance removal operations, the 
Guardians clearly took the lead. By the time the Council 
suggested forming a joint Sanitary Committee towards the end 
of March, the Guardians1 Sanitary Committee had been meeting 
daily for over two weeks, a fact which persuaded the Guardians 
that formal co-operation with the Council was unnecessary.63 
As was normally the case when the N.R.D.P.A. was in force, the 
provision of medical relief for the poor was the sole 
responsibility of the Guardians.64 Nonetheless they continued 
to conduct sanitary cleansing and nuisance removal operations 
in other parts of the town.65 In particular, energies were 
channelled into removing the ’swine colony' from the courts 
and alleys to the east of Briggate. As well as carrying out 
work themselves, the Guardians, along with the press and local 
medical men, pointed out that it was imperative that members 
of the public should assume responsibility for conditions in 
and around the home.66 To force this message home, the 
Sanitary Committee issued thousands of notices which explained 
the need for personal and domestic hygiene.67 Practical 
assistance for the poor was also provided by the Guardians in
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the form of unlimited, supplies of chloride of lime for 
disinfection and whitewashing.
Failure to comply with the various provisions of the 
N.R.D.P.A. was viewed seriously and legal proceedings were 
taken against offenders.68 When diarrhoea and cholera began 
to appear amongst people unconnected with the Mill, the 
Guardians showed that they were more than ready to use the 
magistrates' courts as a device for compulsion. Proceedings 
had been taken against 320 people who had failed to remove 
nuisances by the middle of April.69 Of this total, 264 were 
removed following court hearings, whilst the remainder were 
either awaiting removal or the magistrates' decision.70
Even though the town surgeons pronounced, at the 
beginning of March, that public health was generally very 
good, and the authorities were stressing that all the cases 
which had occurred were connected to Wilkinson's Mill, the 
Sanitary Committee clearly feared that the situation might 
deteriorate.71 Consequently, they took steps to ensure that 
if individuals did develop symptoms, the disease could be 
treated in its premonitory stage. In the autumn of 1853 the 
Guardians and local medical men had discussed how this would 
be achieved and the agreed measures were duly implemented. 
Arguably the most important was the opening of twenty four 
hour dispensaries, where the poor could receive free medical 
aid and treatment for diarrhoea.72 It was also decided that 
the three townships and union districts of Leeds, Hunslet and 
Holbeck should form one medical district under the
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superintendence of a temporary Medical Officer.73 George 
Wilson, senior Medical Officer at the Infirmary, was appointed 
to this post and an unspecified number of people were also 
employed to assist with nursing and sanitary duties. The 
whole system of medical care was, as the G.B.H. had urged, 
designed to catch and treat the early or premonitory stages 
and thus concentrated on the home treatment of patients. 
Because cholera was not generally prevalent, the Guardians did 
not provide hospital facilities or a house of recovery.
Cholera had completely disappeared by the beginning of 
May and the incidence of diarrhoea was no longer a source of 
undue concern. This prompted the Guardians to discontinue 
their medical services, though both they and the Council 
remained 'on alert'. The Council, for example, took the 
unusual step of voting to add a further £500 to the Nuisance 
Committee's budget so that the Committee could maintain its 
increased workload.74 Throughout the summer months the local 
newspapers monitored cholera's progresss throughout the 
country and urged the public to remain watchful.75 Although 
the Guardians terminated most aspects of their system of 
medical relief in May, they continued to enforce the 
N.R.D.P.A. and instructed all the town's medical men to attend 
all cases of diarrhoea promptly and to defray the cost of 
treatment.76
Cholera's appearance in Leeds and, more especially, the 
consequent redoubling of cleansing operations, saw scrutiny of 
sanitary arrangements intensify. A L.B.H. had still to be
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instituted, hence co-operation, formal or otherwise, between 
the various agencies contrasted with normal administrative 
arrangements. The Council's energetic response to the crisis 
was said to be at odds with the paltry amount of sanitary work 
it did under normal circumstances.77 It was suggested also 
that the Council and its Nuisances Committee had wasted 
valuable time prior to the outbreak, and had ignored the old 
adage that 'prevention is better than cure'. Dr Gavin of the 
G.B.H. was no less critical, pointing out that not only had 
the Council neglected the implementation of both long and 
short term improvements, but it was also responsible for 
creating some of the most dangerous nuisances in Leeds.78
3.3.2. Bradford
Although the Registrar-General stated that 34 cholera 
deaths occurred in Bradford in 1854, local evidence suggests 
that the number was lower. In most instances confusion and 
controversy surrounded deaths, for example, in mid-August the 
Bradford Observer informed its readers that it had received 
details of two deaths, yet had subsequently been informed that 
in both cases cholera had not in fact been the cause.79 
Precisely when or where the deaths recorded by the Registrar 
General occurred is uncertain because at no time in 1854 did 
the local press report cases or deaths as part of an ongoing 
outbreak. The only estimate of cholera mortality came at the 
end of October when it was reported that the disease had 
claimed a total of 11 lives that year.80 Nevertheless, with 
cholera stalking the country, the traditional late summer 
diarrhoea season was perceived and acted on as much more than
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an accepted annual hazard. Diarrhoea was automatically 
equated with the premonitory stage of cholera and its presence 
spurred the local authorities into implementing a number of 
measures.81
The Council, as the L.B.H., distributed thousands of 
handbills reminding the public of the needs for hygiene and 
avoidance of behaviour or diet likely to predispose to the 
disease. They also invited the Guardians to cooperate with 
preventive measures.82 As was the case elsewhere, medical 
measures were designed to prevent diarrhoea or premonitory 
symptoms developing further. With this objective in mind, all 
Bradford’s Guardians were empowered to authorise poor people 
with diarrhoea to secure the prompt attendance of union 
Medical Officers and to obtain free medicines.83 In addition 
the Guardians’ Sanitary Committee adopted a limited form of 
house-to-house visiting. Union Medical Officers made daily 
calls to areas inhabited by the poor, where they provided the 
usual advice on personal and domestic hygiene, diet and the 
need for immediate treatment of bowel complaints. They also 
used visiting as an opportunity to identify nuisances and 
report them to the Guardians' Sanitary Committee, who then 
relayed the information to the Council's Sanitary Committee.84 
There is no record of the Guardians opening a house of refuge 
or diarrhoea hospital, but then there was no call for either.
Although the medical precautions were not implemented 
until the start of the diarrhoea season, the sanitary work 
started in 1853 was sustained in 1854. Throughout the year
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the Sanitary Committee had been busily engaged in identifying 
a wide range of nuisances including blocked drains, foul 
privies and pig styes.85 In addition to persuading landlords 
and tenants to remove hundreds of nuisances, the Committee's 
own cleansing team was unusually active. At the end of the 
year the Sanitary Committee of Bradford L.B.H. was able to 
report that 'work on the suppression of nuisances has 
progressed steadily during the year, more especially as the 
Committee has never lost sight of the probability that cholera 
might visit again1. This indicates that the authorities had 
heeded the warning in the Observer in August 1854, which said 
that even though cholera was not present in Bradford itself, 
’everyone should behave as if it is1.86
TABLE 3.2. NUISANCE REMOVAL AND CLEANSING WORK OF THE
BRADFORD COUNCIL SANITARY COMMITTEE, 1853-56.
Activity. 1853-54 1854-55 1855-56
Drains cleansed. 250 225 202
Nuisances removed on notice. 248 23 0
Pig styes removed. 88 8 0
Houses whitewashed. 93 0 0
Source: Bradford Council Sanitary Committee, Minutes, 1853-56
The reappearance of cholera was another opportunity for 
reformers to criticise local authorities for their alleged 
neglect of sanitary improvements. Critics also predicted that
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epidemic-inspired actions would be short-lived, declining as 
the threat of an epidemic passed. In the event, such 
forecasts were accurate as shown in TABLE 3.2. The decline in 
sanitary activity after 1854 led to further criticism of the 
Council. As will be discussed later, reservations were not 
just expressed about the amount of work undertaken, but also 
about which groups were benefiting from it.
3.3.3. Hull
In several respects the situation in Hull in 1853-1854 
mirrored that in Bradford. After a frantic burst of sanitary 
activity in the autumn of 1853, the L.B.H. remained active, 
continuing to remove nuisances and monitoring the health of 
the town. Although an outbreak of cholera at nearby 
Cleethorpes and the subsequent appearance of imported cases in 
the late summer of 1854 put the authorities on alert, few 
medical measures were adopted. The only cholera scare prior 
to August 1854 originated in the most unlikely of places when 
the Swedish authorities asked the G.B.H. about the extent to 
which Hull and the other Humber ports were 'infected with 
cholera'.87
The next cholera scare was taken far more seriously. At 
the end of August the local Registrar wrote to the Sanitary 
Committee informing it that Mary Wolfitt, ’a gentlewoman of 
North Street' had died of cholera shortly after returning from 
Cleethorpes.88 Alarmed by this, the Sanitary Committee, 
acting in conjunction with the local Guardians, took immediate 
action, appointing a committee to ensure that details of local
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by-laws and the G.B.H.'s warnings should be posted at every 
street corner and in every shop.89 Specific measures, such as 
the division of the town into separate medical districts for 
the purpose of visitation were discussed, though at this stage 
considered unnecessary. Amongst the reasons for this were 
that the Sanitary Committee were still undertaking the 
inspection of ships, their crews and lodging houses and that 
operations begun in 1853 had not been relaxed.90 The move 
from quarantines to inspection was a significant one. It 
showed growing medical confidence in the ability to recognise 
the disease, and the influence of anticontagionism and 
contingent contagionism. This latter position was also 
demonstrated by the Chairman of the Sanitary Committee and 
several other local medical men when, having completed a 
survey of sanitary conditions, confidently concluded that the 
town had ’never been healthier than at present’.91
In mid-September a further scare occurred following the 
publication of a letter in the Times from Dr Ayre asserting 
that cholera was present in the town.92 Other local medical 
men took issue, arguing that only a handful of imported cases 
and several cases of aggravated diarrhoea had occurred and 
that true cholera had yet to establish itself. Ayre's letter 
and his desire to issue a notice to the effect that cholera 
was present were, they argued, 'calculated to cause alarm' 
which would predispose people to attack.93 It is clear from 
the response to cholera in 1854 that contemporaries perceived 
imported cases differently from local ones. Imported cases 
were undoubtedly seen as less of a threat than local ones, as
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they did not indicate that the cholera poison was present in 
the atmosphere. In other words, the disease was regarded as 
safer in individuals than communities or the environment. 
Mortality levels in 1853-54 could not have contrasted more 
sharply with those in the 1848-49 and contemporary observers 
correlated this with the much higher levels of cleansing and 
monitoring. In other words, that sanitary measures had 
worked.
3.3.4. Sheffield
Of the four towns examined by this study, Sheffield was 
the only one where the incidence of cholera was greater in 
1854 than in 1849. Isolated or doubtful cases were reported 
early in 1854, with the first case of the epidemic proper at 
the beginning of September 1854, almost five years to the day 
after the previous outbreak.94 Again, therefore, the disease 
arrived towards the end of the 'cholera season'. Unlike 
1849, when it was uncertain how the disease reached Sheffield, 
in 1854 there was absolutely no doubt over the origin of the 
epidemic: it was imported by holiday makers and daytrippers 
returning from the east coast resort of Cleethorpes.
Cholera's appearance in Cleethorpes at the end of August 
brought the traditional late summer holiday season to an 
abrupt end as panic broke out amongst visitors desperate to 
escape the stricken resort.95 Of the nine hundred or so 
Sheffielders reported to have been in Cleethorpes when cholera 
broke out, just two succumbed to the disease while still on 
holiday.96 The first case in Sheffield itself was that of the
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keeper of Brunswick Chapel, who developed symptoms on arrival 
home.97 Within days further cases were reported amongst other 
visitors. The disease spread fairly swiftly with cases in 
Attercliffe, Darnall, the Ponds and the Park.98 It was 
believed that the incidence of the disease was heightened by 
the prevalence of diarrhoea in the town. At the end of 
September the epidemic typically began to wane, with a marked 
abatement in the incidence of new cases followed by a gradual 
decrease in the number of fatalities.99 According to the 
Registrar General's figures, the 1854 cholera epidemic claimed 
the lives of 126 people in the Sheffield Union, and a further 
15 in Ecclesall Bierlow.
As noted above, preparations, which had begun in the 
autumn of 1853, were soured by the dispute between the 
Guardians and Council. However, this did not prevent nuisance 
removal operations being stepped up or plans being drawn up 
for the provision of medical aid; indeed, throughout the first 
eight months of 1854, the local authorities remained active, 
using the powers available to them to undertake short and some 
longer term improvements.100 Mindful that 'the dreadful 
scourge' was once again threatening, the Highway Board argued 
that temporary or palliative measures would be ineffectual 
unless augmented by lasting improvements; consequently, it 
resolved to pursue its drainage scheme with greater vigour 
than in previous years.10x
When cholera arrived the Health Committee claimed that 
the Sheffield and Ecclesall Guardians, along with the Highway
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Board, were 'taking effective measures to prevent the 
generation and spread of contagious diseases'.102 Elsewhere, 
serious reservations were expressed and several experienced 
medical men were reported to have 'great apprehensions ... of 
a very severe attack'.103 Such pessimistic opinions were not 
intended as criticisms of the Guardians or Highway Board, they 
were based on the belief that, despite repeated warnings about 
diet and personal and domestic hygiene, many poor and working 
people were in a state predisposing them to the disease. 
Another worrying factor was a prolonged drought which had 
reduced water levels in local rivers to such an extent that 
many were already serious nuisances; the Sheffield Times 
stated that, 'They are little better than deposits of 
putrescent filth'.104
As had been case in 1849, the amount of preventive action 
intensified when cholera arrived.105 The Board of Guardians, 
the Health Committee, and Highway Boards formed a joint 
Sanitary Committee, yet whilst nuisance removal and cleansing 
operations went ahead, the authorities were unable to 
implement them with the same vigour or on the same scale as in 
1849.106 This was not due to official complacency or inertia, 
but to the effects of the drought. During the former epidemic 
fire engines had been used extensively to hose down stricken 
or vulnerable houses, courts and streets. In 1854 the 
scarcity of water made this impossible.107 The shortage of 
clean water was so severe that the public were advised that 
supplementary supplies for whatever purpose should be drawn 
from wells rather than Sheffield's sewage contaminated rivers
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and streams.108 Clearly, the authorities regarded the rivers 
and river water as major nuisances, with a 'high medical 
authority' warning that visiting neighbourhoods close to some 
of Sheffield's waterways was 'sufficient of itself to cause 
cholera'.109 The drought and resulting shortage of water 
worsened throughout September and by the middle of October had 
become so critical that the Water Company was forced to limit 
the supply to just one day a week.110 The effect of the water 
shortage is uncertain. It may have been a blessing in 
disguise, because had the authorities or the public used 
sewage polluted water for cleansing operations the risk of 
further spreading cholera would have increased markedly.
Whereas the drought put a brake on sanitary cleansing and 
nuisance removal operations, the Guardians were able to 
implement their chosen system of medical relief.111 As 
before, the authorities concentrated their efforts on catching 
cholera in its incipient and supposedly treatable stage and, 
failing this, to institute the home treatment and care of 
cholera patients. Several twenty four hour dispensaries were 
opened where medical men could be consulted and supply of 
medicine obtained without charge.112 The poor were informed 
of this facility and the Guardian's decision to provide free 
chloride of lime for disinfection, through the distribution of 
handbills and display of posters.113 Given that cholera's 
arrival coincided with the traditional diarrhoea season (and a 
particularly bad one at that, producing 334 deaths), it was 
perhaps predictable that the poor would make full use of the 
dispensaries. Whilst there are no systematic records of the
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total number of people who applied for free medical aid, the 
fact that 355 cases of diarrhoea were treated at the public 
dispensary alone during the first fortnight of September, 
suggests that the poor responded to the provision of free 
medical aid.114
Reviving the precedent set in 1849, the Sanitary 
Committee appointed a number of house-to-house visitors to 
check on the progress of diarrhoea cases, to provide further 
medicines if necessary, and advise on matters of diet, hygiene 
and domestic cleanliness. That just three people were 
appointed suggests that, as had been the case in 1849, 
visitation was only adopted on a limited scale and targeted at 
those people and areas believed to be most at risk.115
When visitors, medical men or the public reported cases 
of advanced cholera, the Sanitary Committee again followed 
tried and tested procedures. Without exception, cholera 
patients were treated at home by a specially recruited team of 
female nurses.116 So that healthy people could escape 
epidemic influences, the Sanitary Committee re-opened premises 
in Rock Street as a house of refuge.117
There was little criticism of the authorities’ immediate 
response to the epidemic. However, there was an undercurrent 
of opinion about the likely temporary nature of the response. 
Fears that cooperation between the various sanitary agencies 
and the increased level of sanitary activity would cease when 
cholera disappeared proved to be well founded. As soon as the
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epidemic ended the joint Sanitary Committee was dissolved and 
sanitary duties reverted to the different agencies, with the 
Guardians again trying to shift the responsibility for 
executing the N.R.D.P.A. to the Council.118 Although they 
failed, there is no evidence to show that they had used the 
Act to effect improvements of any description. For its part, 
the Council reacted to the passing of the epidemic by promptly 
voting to reduce the size of the Health Committee 'on account 
of its duties being so light’.119
3.4. MIDDLE CLASS AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION.
The official response to cholera in the four towns in 
1853-54 was undoubtedly marked by much greater uniformity in 
thought and action than in 1848-49. Another significant 
difference was the absence of wider middle class action, 
official or philanthropic, or of individual intitiative. This 
can be explained in part by the low incidence of cholera in 
1853-54. This was certainly a factor in Hull where the 
response in 1853-54 was similar to that seen in Sheffield in 
1848-49. However, this was for different reasons and 
certainly cannot be explained by any change in class 
relations. Rather it is best understaood in terms of changes 
within the middle class whereby 'reformers' now enjoyed 
greater power. This was due to the impact of the earlier 
epidemic on several levels. Firstly it accelerated the 
adoption of the N.R.D.P.A., the formation of a L.B.H. and the 
passage of an Improvement Act. Secondly, the reputation of
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the port and trade had suffered; thus, the provision of a few 
nuisance removal carts and general cleansing now seemed a 
relatively small price to pay to avoid another 'catastrophe'. 
Lastly, the psychological impact of the earlier epidemic 
should not be forgotten. In a matter of months one in every 
two hundred people had been lost, it was an experience the 
town's rulers did not want repeated.
Across all four towns the most significant factor in 
producing a more uniform response was the growing 
institutionalisation of public health at the local level.
This, and the recent experience of an epidemic, created the 
expectation that local authorities should, could and would 
act. A further change was the growing involvement and 
influence of medical men in sanitary measures, which at the 
local level was ahead of what was happening in Whitehall. 
Indeed, the medical profession became the chief middle class 
ideologues in matters of health and disease, so it is on this 
group that this section concentrates.
When cholera first appeared in Britain in 1831, medical 
men had little knowledge of its cause or how it spread and 
even less about how to cure it. Twenty years on matters had 
changed. Most medical men now agreed that cholera was a 
specific disease, yet there remained differences at all levels 
of the profession, from the London hierarchy down to the 
provincial practitioner, about its cause, mode of propagation 
and particularly its treatment. This was confirmed in a Lancet 
editorial in 1853 which noted:
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All is darkness and confusion, vague theory and vague 
speculation ... What is cholera? Is it a fungus, an 
insect a miasma, an electrical disturbance, a deficiency 
of ozone, a morbid off scouring from the intestinal 
canal? We know nothing, we are at sea in a whirlpool of 
conjecture’.120 
Observations about these uncertainties were not confined to 
the medical press. In the industrial towns of the West Riding 
there was a widespread awareness that the medical profession 
had yet to make a significant breakthrough in its 
understanding of the disease. In a blunt editorial in 
September 1854, the S.R.I. informed its readers that:
’There is no disputing, our medical authorities are no 
more sure than they were when cholera first appeared on 
our shores. They have settled upon no theory, but only 
that all theories are false: they confess their 
inability, or at least they are split into parties, each 
denouncing the others as accelerating the patients 
death’.121
However, in 1853-54, there were fewer of the old exchanges 
between miasmatists and contagionists.122 At a time when Snow 
argued that 'the commercial interest and influence 
preponderates over every other’, few medical men were willing 
to declare themselves outright contagionists.123 The 
contagionist position was undoubtedly weakened because of its 
associated quarantine system. By the 1850s, contagionism's 
unpopularity amongst medical men, officials and public health 
reformers was also because this it seemed a denial of the need 
for sanitary reform. 'The communicability of cholera', stated
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the British Medical Journal (B.M.J.), ’is a doctrine opposed 
by those who see most clearly the importance of sanitary 
reforms’.124
Moreover, as Snow found when he published details of his 
water-borne theory, there was another dimension to this issue. 
Suggesting a single or specific cause for cholera, be it 
contagionism or anything else, was enough to incur the wrath 
of miasmatist and sanitarian thinkers who advanced a multi- 
factorial model of multiple causation. In fact most of those 
who believed that cholera was contagious thought it only 
became so when individuals or communities were subject to 
predisposing causes, i.e. contingent contagionism. In terms 
of a practicable and acceptable system of prevention, this 
brought them into line with the orthodox miasmatist position 
which held that the main thrust of prevention should involve 
an attack on a number of fronts, especially poor sanitary 
conditions, environmental hazards, and particular forms of 
behaviour.
Given that the medical profession might perhaps have felt 
compromised or undermined by its lack of progress since 1831, 
it is interesting to explore the roles it assigned to itself 
in 1853-54. Many medical men saw the new epidemic as an 
opportunity for the profession to resume its research into 
cholera with the ultimate goal of being able to prevent or 
cure it. So that ’the true laws of cholera' could be deduced, 
an editorial in the B.M.J. urged doctors to adopt a systematic 
approach to treating the disease and gather much needed
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information on such matters as the ratio of diarrhoea to 
cholera cases, the duration of attacks and, most importantly, 
the degree to which different medicines and treatments were 
effective.125 Finding a cure for cholera was arguably the 
profession's main priority. Some believed that this could 
only be achieved through a process of elimination whereby 
effective treatments could be identified and ineffective ones 
discarded. Following Chadwick's somewhat ignominious 
departure from the G.B.H. in the summer of 1854, itself partly 
attributable to the Board's failure to arrest the epidemic, 
his successor, Sir Benjamin Hall, appointed an Advisory 
Medical Council to pursue a systematic approach at the 
national level.126 More generally, medical men were urged to 
assist the G.B.H. in any way possible 'so that the most 
successful means of combating cholera might be achieved'.12"7
Whilst research into the etiology and pathology of 
cholera was felt to be imperative, it did not yield any 
pathbreaking information. Neither were what new insights did 
emerge of practical use to a public faced with the immediate 
prospect of the disease breaking out in its midst.
Recognising this, an editorial in the B.M.J. in 1853, argued 
that the duty of the profession was,
'To go onward to alleviate, by the kindness of our art, 
and the consolations of our presence, the visitations of 
pestilence in the haunts of dirt, famine and disease'.128 
Such views were welcomed by the Mayor of Leeds who had little 
doubt that medical men had much to offer; he stated that those 
individuals with medical, sanitary, or dietic powers 'stood in
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the relation of fathers to a large class of individuals ... 
who were likely to be visited by the cholera’.129 Even though 
medical men were unable to point to sure methods of prevention 
or cure, the medical press requested them to assist local 
authorities in a number of ways: (i) advising local 
authorities on the best modes of cleansing; (ii) appealing for 
funds for the relief of destitution and distress; (iii) 
instigating and assisting with systems of house-to-house 
visitation; and (iv) establishing Houses of Refuge.130
As indicated earlier, medical men in Leeds, Bradford,
Hull and Sheffield helped in all these ways, sometimes with 
and sometimes without official sanction. The Leeds Guardians 
had hundreds of copies of Dr Chalice’s pamphlet, Plain 
Directions for Poor People: How to Avoid Cholera, distributed 
throughout the town in the autumn of 1853.131 Dr Hall of 
Sheffield wrote to national and local newspapers setting out 
details of the measures the public could take to protect 
themselves.132 Hall also published his preventive advice in 
the form of a leaflet, the first edition of which sold out 
immediately. So that the poor could benefit from this advice, 
the Sheffield Guardians asked him to publish a second edition 
'in a cheap form’.133 Hall and other orthodox medical men 
offered standard advice and endorsed cleansing operations and 
systems of medical relief based on the prompt treatment of 
premonitory symptoms.134 Similarly, there was a consensus 
about the need for individuals, especially members of the 
working class, to pay strict attention to personal and 
domestic hygiene, and diet. Their recommendations were
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normative, reinforcing middle class views of the ’Great 
Unwashed' and typical of the wider rhetoric which called for 
the reform of working class morals and behaviour. By lending 
their authority to preventive measures, it seems that medical 
men were able to overcome their differences and act much more 
as a unified professional group in 1853-54.
On other issues, however, the profession remained 
divided. Serious differences of opinion arose above all over 
methods of treatment. Empirical observations made in past 
epidemics convinced the majority of medical men that it was 
possible to treat cholera effectively, particularly if the 
disease was caught in its early stages.135 During the two 
previous epidemics, four categories of medicine - astringents, 
alteratives, stimulants and eliminants - had been prescribed 
by medical men. By 1853-54 there was, despite vociferous 
opposition, a growing feeling that astringents, which arrested 
bowel actions, were the preferred treatment. This was 
certainly borne out by the retrospective findings of the 
Treatment Committee of the Medical Council published in 
1855.136 The Committee reported that, according to data it 
had received from various medical men working in diarrhoea 
hospitals, the general percentage of deaths following each of 
the four major forms of treatment was as in TABLE 3.3 
The Committee concluded as to the 'decided advantage in the 
alterative principle ... and still more superior advantage in 
the astringent principle as applied through chalk and 
opium.'13’7 Nonetheless, central medical authorities even then
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would not officially endorse astringents, because they said 
the statistics were fvery limited’.
TABLE 3.3
TREATMENT. PERCENTAGE OF DEATHS.
ELIMINANTS 72%
STIMULANTS 54%
ALTERATIVES 36%
ASTRINGENTS 20%
Source: PP 1854-55 [1901] Vol XLV Report From The TreatmentCommittee Of The Medical Council, p. 15.
This rather cautious response was consistent with the 
statements and advice issued by the medical establishment 
prior to, or during, the epidemic itself. The G.B.H. was 
somewhat restrained on the question of sanctioning astringents 
throughout 1853-54. Although it advised people with 
premonitory symptoms to apply 'for medicine to stop looseness 
of the bowels’ and stressed that medicines should not be taken 
unless prescribed by a medical man, it also emphasized that 
’no single remedy is appropriate or safe for all people 
suffering from diarrhoea’.13s Similarly, the Royal College of 
Physicians, whilst advising people to seek immediate treatment 
for diarrhoea from a qualified medical man, did not stipulate 
which form of treatment should be administered.139 In one 
sense this was to be expected as contemporary therapeutics 
tended to treat the person rather than the disease.
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On the question of which medicines should be avoided, the 
profession was more confident. Eliminative treatments were 
discredited well before the Treatment Committee condemned them 
in 1855 as they were said to hasten the process by which 
cholera passed from its premonitory to its advanced and most 
lethal stage.140 This verdict was welcomed in the Lancet as 
giving
’the final blow to that most irrational and fanciful of 
blunders ... seeking to arrest a disease of which the 
most fatal symptom is colliquative diarrhoea, by the 
administration of agents having the effect of increasing 
that diarrhoea'.141 
The situation amongst medical men in Yorkshire mirrored that 
nationally. On the basis of the advice they issued and the 
action they took, it is abundantly clear that medical men in 
Leeds, Bradford, Sheffield and Hull attached the greatest 
importance to catching cholera in its 'treatable1 premonitory 
stage.142 Although there are no records of the types of 
medicine given at official dispensaries in Yorkshire in 1853- 
54, it seems reasonably safe to assume that astringents were 
once again made widely available, especially given the 
publicity and acclaim surrounding their place in the 
'Sheffield Plan'. An important point, which historians have 
hitherto overloked, is that the role of medical men in public 
health was not limited to monitoring or advising on 
environmental matters, clinical work was an equally important 
part of local sanitary programmes, especially during 
epidemics.
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Whatever the emerging national consensus, there were 
still local enthusiasts. The renewed threat provided Dr Ayre 
of Hull with another opportunity to promote his much vaunted 
calomel cure. Ayre had treated cholera patients with calomel 
(a purgative) in 1832 and in 1849, and was convinced of its 
value.143 However, other medical men in Hull had expressed 
grave doubts about this and the figures he used to support his 
claims.144 In what became a very acrimonious and divisive 
public debate, the calomel treatment was condemned by several 
prominent practitioners and Ayre himself accused of 
dishonesty. These criticisms notwithstanding, Ayre's method 
of treatment had its supporters in Hull and elsewhere.145 In 
1854, it was Ayre who had declared the disease present in the 
town and was subsequently accused of false reporting to boost 
his product.3-46 After concerted criticism, Ayre still 
maintained that he had seen 'four cases of distinct cholera' 
but conceded that he had been wrong to describe these as an 
'outbreak', rather disingenuously he said it had been an 
'appearance'.147
The importance accorded to treatment provided an 
opportunity for alternative practitioners and systems to 
advance their claims. Homoeopaths and hydropaths, whose 
clients were mainly drawn from the middle class, saw cholera's 
return as more than an opportunity for short term profits, 
they also sought to win support for their entire systems of 
medicine. In pursuing this objective, they adopted their 
familiar two-pronged approach, seeking to discredit orthodox
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medicine and putting the case for the superiority of their own 
systems, methods and practices.
Homoeopaths and hydropaths appear to have made a 
conscious and determined effort to put their arguments to as 
wide a cross section of the public as possible. In addition 
to advertising their services, they published details of their 
systems and treatments in newspapers, pamphlets and specialist 
journals. When cholera arrived in Sheffield, a local 
newspaper gave details of the various hydropathic precautions 
cholera patients could take before the arrival of a medical 
man.148 A number of works such as Cholera and its 
Homoeopathic Treatment, Directions for the use of Homoeopathic 
Medicine in Asiatic Cholera and The Prevention and Cure of 
Cholera were available from homoeopathic bookshops, 
dispensaries and chemists throughout Yorkshire.149 
Worryingly, from the point of view of orthodox medical men, 
local officials in Sheffield appeared to endorse homoeopathy 
when they requested Samuel Eadon, a well known medical man, to 
produce a pamphlet on homoeopathic treatments for cholera.150
Much of the cholera related literature published by 
homoeopaths and hydropaths in 1853-54 (and later in the 
decade), drew attention to the failure of orthodox medicine to 
provide effective forms of treatment for cholera. This was 
the case with Eadon’s pamphlet in which he pointed out that 
'In Newcastle, the people were treated according to the 
Allopathic methods; with what results, the bills of mortality 
now show’.151 Another homoeopath criticised orthodox medical
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men for filling newspapers with confused and often 
contradictory advice. This practice, he stated, left the 
public bewildered and 'the anxious practitioner in a sea of 
doubts'.3-52 Unsurprisingly, he went on to recommend the use 
of homoeopathic medicines in cases of 'this destructive and 
panic engendering malady'. Although most homoeopathic 
treatments were based on the principle of simile, many 
homoeopaths advocated the use of medicines which contained 
small amounts (or combinations) of arsenicum, camphor, cuprom 
and veratum rather than purgatives.153 To support their 
claims, homoeopaths used either comparative statistics or case 
histories. Whichever device they chose, their conclusions 
were the same; all agreed with Dr Horner of Hull who stated 
that 'the homoeopathic [treatment] is ... immeasurably 
superior to the old system in Asiatic Cholera'.154
Homoeopaths and hydropaths offered advice not only on 
treatment, but on prevention. Samuel Eadon, for example, 
expressed the view that cholera was generated in and spread by 
miasmas and argued the case for sanitary improvements.155 
Like many orthodox medical men, homoeopaths believed that 
exposure to predisposing causes played an important part in 
determining who contracted cholera and issued warnings to the 
public to that effect.156 Similarly, many held that 
premonitory diarrhoea was the first stage of cholera and, like 
regular practitioners, stressed the need for prompt treatment 
of suspicious bowel complaints.157 Homoeopathic and 
hydropathic practitioners, though rivals in many ways, found 
common cause in attacking orthodox medicine with its leeching,
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bleeding, cupping and administering large dosages of 
medicine.158
It is probably anachronistic to suggest that 
uncertanities about etiology and pathology mattered that much 
to medical men at mid-century, when practice was mainly about 
diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. There was then a measure 
of consensus on clinical activity which could be, though not 
always was, carried over into preventive and containment 
programmes. It was this medicalisation of sanitary policy, 
together with more limited mortality, significantly reduced 
the opportunities for voluntary and philanthropic action by 
the middle class in the four towns.
3.5 THE WORKING CLASS
The working class in the four towns felt the impact of 
the 1853-54 cholera crisis mainly through increased publicity 
and cleansing activities by sanitary agencies, not with the 
disease itself. Coming so quickly after the 1849 epidemic and 
so long anticipated, there was more time and opportunity for 
the working class to consider their own response. The 
evidence on this casts doubt on the orthodox middle class view 
that the 'Great Unwashed' was apathetic about, and indifferent 
to, matters of public health.159 This can be illustrated by 
considering the attitudes and actions of the working class in 
relation to (i) their bodily health, and (ii) sanitary reform.
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The dominant popular model of the body in the mid- 
nineteenth century was derived from humoralism, whereby in 
health the different parts of the body were in harmony, while 
in disease there was disequilibrium. One's susceptibility to 
disease and imbalance depended on one's 'constitution', an
amalgam of heredity and vitality, which could be modified by
diet, lifestyle and one's morality. Popular remedies for 
disease concentrated on either building up the strength of the
'constitution', or stimulating the body in various ways to
restore balance by producing demonstrable effects, such as 
vomiting, purging and sweating. In recent years historians 
have documented various popular responses to illness and the 
promotion of individual health.160 There is now a consensus 
that the working class actively sought to protect and preserve 
their health by using both preventive and curative medicines. 
However, in many cases these were not sought from orthodox 
medical men but from the alternative sector which prospered 
throughout the nineteenth century, especially in the 
manufacturing districts of northern England.161
This non-orthodox medical community was not a homogeneous 
group, but a variety of individuals, branches and medical 
systems. It included, self medication, wisewomen, herbalists, 
chemists and druggists, bonesetters, vendors of patent 
medicines and, as discussed above, homoeopaths and hydropaths. 
From the point of view of regular medical men, anyone who 
professed or practised alternative medicine of any description 
was deemed a 'quack', regardless of his (or occasionally her) 
qualifications or social standing.162 The reasons for the
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hostility of the orthodox branch of the profession to the 
alternative sector were many and varied. Underpinning this 
animosity, however, were two factors - the very real and 
formidable threats alternative medicine posed to the income of 
doctors, and the desire to promote the social status of 
orthodox practitioners.
Regular medical men had no choice other than to compete 
for business with all providers of medical care. The level of 
competition in the market for medical treatment was intense.
As early as 1834, well before the heyday of patent medicines, 
James Morrison was reported to be selling well in excess of a 
million boxes of his pills to the public each year.3-63 At the 
local level, competition was no less keen. Medical men in 
Sheffield in the 1850s, for example, faced competition from 
over ninety chemists and druggists.164 Similarly, in Leeds in 
the 1850s an average of twelve hundred people each year, 
probably artisans and middle class, were reported to have 
sought treatment from the town’s homoeopathic dispensary.165 
Adding to the insecurity amongst orthodox medical men was the 
knowledge that the services and treatments provided by the 
alternative sector were sought by people of all social 
classes. Although the cost of attending hydropathic 
establishments such as those run by Professor and Mrs. Melling 
in Sheffield and Dr Macleod in Ben-Rhydding was beyond the 
means of all but the most wealthy sections of society, 
artisans from Leeds and Sheffield were reported to be regular 
customers at similar establishments in Harrogate.166 
Likewise, whilst homoeopathy was especially popular amongst
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the fashionable classes, one of the main reasons it flourished 
in manufacturing towns was said to be that it was cheaper than 
regular 'allopathic' treatments.167 At the straightforwardly 
commercial end of the market, chemists and druggists traded 
with middle as well as working class customers. This point 
was made in 1854 by George Wilson, the Leeds medical man who 
had been in charge of medical relief during the cholera 
outbreak, when he observed that, 'many of the middle classes 
go to the druggist first, and only send for the surgeon when a 
certificate ... of death seems likely to be wanted for the 
registrar'.168
Cholera certainly provided patent medicine vendors with 
an opportunity to market their products and increase their 
profits. As soon as the disease was diagnosed in Newcastle in 
the autumn of 1853, adverts for a wide range of patent 
medicines and specific anti-cholera remedies began to appear 
in local newspapers in Yorkshire. Throughout the 1853-54 
cholera season adverts for products such as Reinhardt's anti­
cholera mixture were common.169 Ironically, patent medicine 
vendors took advantage of one of the few aspects of cholera's 
treatment over which orthodox medicine was in agreement - the 
need for the prompt treatment of 'premonitory' diarrhoea. 
Products which were normally advertised for the treatment of 
ordinary diarrhoea were suddenly represented as being 
effective in cases of premonitory diarrhoea and cholera. For 
example, it was claimed that Cutting's diarrhoea powders were 
'an invaluable specific [which] had been so beneficial to 
thousands during the fearful spread of cholera in 1849'.170
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The market for medicines, pills and other nostrums was 
not yet dominated by the larger patent medicine companies. 
Local chemists, druggists and shopkeepers frequently 
advertised their own remedies in newspapers and other local 
publications. For example, Mr Naylor, a Leeds grocer, offered 
his Astringent Preventive for sale in the Leeds Times, 
promising a gratuitous supply for the poor.1'73' In common with 
patent medicine vendors, chemists portrayed their mixtures and 
concoctions as certain cures with supporting testimonials from 
local people. In 1854, Ridal's Sheffield Drug and Patent 
Medicine Establishment advertised a 'Never Failing Cure For 
Cholera', with Mr Heathcote of Pitt Street saying he had been 
'cured by Ridal's ... of a most severe attack of cholera'.172
Herbal and botanical cures for diarrhoea and cholera 
were not advertised as extensively as patent medicines, 
perhaps because the most popular herb, Lobelia, was an emetic. 
However, the Hull Advertiser, for example, published a letter 
from a herbalist which included a full recipe for 'a cure for 
cholera, diarrhoea and flux'.173 The mixture was made up of a 
variety of powdered ingredients: angelica, bisort, tormentil, 
marsh mallow, cranesbill, ginger, cinnamon, flag root, myrrh 
and cayenne - and was to be 'served in a cup often'. As with 
most other remedies, special emphasis was placed on its value 
to the working classes.
The low incidence of cholera in 1853-54 means it is 
impossible to gauge the extent of working class patronage of
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alternative practitioners. However, frequent complaints about 
the working class preference for quack remedies in 1849 (this 
despite free treatment by orthodox medical men) and the 
availability of a wide range of alternative treatments and 
remedies in 1853-54, suggests that the demand would have been 
as great as ever. The main point here is that although 
working class people may have ignored calls to seek official 
medical care, this should not be seen as a mark of 
indifference to health, but as a preference for their own or 
alternative remedies.
Unsurprisingly, the poor did not subscribe to the view 
that they were to blame for the insanitary conditions of the 
towns. 'From below1 a number of factors associated with 
industrialisation were held to be responsible for urban 
squalor and the working class saw themselves as the victims 
rather than creators of insanitary conditions and disease. 
Industrial pollution was believed by the working class to be a 
major cause of misery. In 1849 a Chartists writer had argued 
that,
'Morbific agencies of the most baneful and widely 
diffused description are suffered to exist, unchecked in 
the great hives of industry: and the consequence is that 
the people drop like rotten sheep..'.174 
When cholera threatened in 1854 a working class newspaper in 
Sheffield published a number of letters from its readers in 
which complaints were made about the way in which impregnated 
air from mill ponds was likely to act as a source of the 
disease. The paper agreed that factory owners who lived in
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’beautifully healthy mansions on the neighbouring hills’ were 
to blame for the water and air pollution which, it claimed, 
inflicted ’misery, lassitude and sickness’ on the poor.175 
Factory owners, it was suggested, should,
'... enter the humble dwellings that cluster their 
borders and they will feel ... that an immense amount of 
responsibility rests upon them for allowing such life 
destroying places to remain1.
There was another dimension to this argument. The working 
class felt that the process of industrialisation had also 
deprived them of customary rights to clean water, a commodity 
which was ’vital for comfort and public health'.176 Water 
shortages and pollution made washing and bathing difficult for 
most people. Reporters in the Sheffield Free Press found it 
incredible that the artisan class should be described as the 
’the Great Unwashed' and, on behalf of the poor, demanded 
that, 'we should very much like to know how they are [to be] 
washed’.177
Despite environmental pollution and the absence of 
amenities there is evidence that the working class made 
considerable effort to keep their homes, yards streets and 
neighbourhoods clean. Clearly, self-help initiatives such as 
those seen in 1849 and traditional bouts of cleaning at 
certain times of the year, were not a realistic solution to 
the problems posed by inadequate refuse collection, unpaved 
streets, and the lack of sewers and drains which made the 
urban environment so hazardous. In 1849 the editor of the 
Chartist Northern Star argued that sewerage, flushing,
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drainage and other sanitary safeguards were ’beyond the power 
of the individual’.178 This, along with middle class 
moralising, was still a great source of frustration and 
resentment in 1853-54, and prompted a working man from 
Bradford to protest that,
’... we pay our rates, we pay our rents and we have 
families we love, but if cholera comes ... and one of 
dies, the papers will say - 'One death of cholera is 
reported to have taken place ... the victim resided in a 
low and filthy neighbourhood’. We are dissatisfied but 
cannot help ourselves’.179 
Criticism of official complacency with regard to permanent 
improvements was widespread in 1853-54, coming from people of 
all classes. Adding insult to injury amongst the poor in 
Bradford and Sheffield was the belief that when improvements 
were made, they were concentrated in areas inhabited by the 
better off.180 From a working class perspective, the 
attitudes and behaviour of industrialists, landlords and local 
authorities were symptomatic of the new social relationships 
which accompanied industrialisation. The argument that social 
obligations were no longer being met by those in power came to 
the fore in Hull in 1849, and resurfaced in the other towns in 
1853-54. One Bradford worker, who was critical of landlords 
and the local authorities, complained bitterly that,
'... so long as this mammon worshipping spirit ... is 
allowed to predominate over moral duty, so long shall we 
have the misery, disease and penury which is at present 
in our land’.181
274
In Leeds, allegations that the Council was failing to meet its 
sanitary responsibilities prompted residents of the town’s 
notoriously unhealthy East Ward to take action, with over 
1,500 of the 'Great Unwashed' signing a memorial demanding 
immediate sanitary measures.182
There is clear evidence of working class people and 
communities taking a variety of steps to protect themselves 
from cholera in 1854 in particular. Some of these, such as 
attempts to clean the home and attendance at official 
dispensaries, were welcomed by the authorities, others, such 
as the use of alternative medical systems or popular remedies 
and the revival of traditional preventive measures, were 
usually condemned. The range of precautions taken by the 
working class, and the reasons for their implementation, are 
interesting because they suggest that the poor did not see 
environmental conditions as the sole determinant of health. 
Moreover, when the working class turned to an analysis of the 
relationship between insanitary conditions and ill health, it 
sometimes reached very different conclusions from those of 
middle class reformers.
Although official advice about regimen and lifestyle was 
commonplace when cholera threatened, officials undoubtedly 
attached far greater importance to the necessity for the 
working class to look to bodily, domestic and neighbourhood 
cleanliness. Whilst it cannot be disputed that environmental 
conditions were a matter of great concern to working people, 
there is evidence to suggest that their view of the causes of
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disease was not as one dimensional as that of middle class 
sanitarians. Indeed, some appear to have thought that 
environmental conditions were just one of several determinants 
of ill-health; others went further, completely reversing 
sanitarian analysis by arguing that poverty caused disease. 
Such a formulation had clear economic and political 
implications which were seized upon by Chartists and other 
radicals. For example, in 1849, a Chartist Councillor in 
Sheffield attacked all the ’croaking about cholera1 arguing 
that 'more of the population die of starvation..'.183 He went 
on to declare his belief that the fuss surrounding cholera was 
designed to divert the attention of the working class 'away 
from affairs of much more importance', which were the 
struggles for better wages and better food. A Leeds Chartist 
in 1849 had been more expansive, setting out a number of ways 
in which the health of the poor could be improved.184 
Foremost amongst these were improved wages which would allow 
the working class: (i) to buy the necessary quantity of high 
quality food to enable them and to prolong their lives and 
keep their bodies in 'health and vigour'; (ii) to afford 
roomier, more comfortable and healthier housing; (iii) to 
purchase better clothing and other 'comforts’; and (iv) to 
allow women to stay at home so they could 'keep things as 
clean ... and healthy ... as possible'. Additionally, he 
demanded that fatigue, which was so damaging to the health of 
the working class, should be eliminated through a reduction in 
working hours. 'These are the things we want', he declared, 
and they could be achieved by 'the annihilation of all class
276
and hereditary government, and the establishment of a thorough 
democracy’.
The view that wages and living and working conditions 
were important determinants of health resurfaced in 1853-54.
It has already been noted that in Sheffield there was a 
feeling that a serious epidemic was unlikely. Significantly, 
this was not due to improved sanitary conditions but to the 
improvement in trade which had ensured that 'the means of 
living are enjoyed to an unusual extent’.185 However, this 
cut little ice with a radical journalist who, in response to 
official advice calling for the working class to shun 
overcrowding, avoid fatigue and modify their diets, challenged 
the G.B.H.,
'[To] issue another notification telling the class I 
belong to where they are to get roomier houses, and how 
they are to continue to eat frequently and to abstain 
from fatiguing themselves'.186 
The way in which sections of the working class saw the 
solution to health problems in political terms is highly 
significant because it helps to throw light on an issue which 
has puzzled historians, namely, why the working class failed 
to support the public health movement or agitate for sanitary 
improvements.187 On the basis of the arguments of Chartists 
and radicals at the local level in Yorkshire, it appears that 
political representation was seen as the key to improving the 
lot of the working class. With increased political power, the 
argument went, progress could be made towards improving wages, 
living and working conditions. It is interesting to note here
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that when working men were able to exert influence through 
local politics, as was the case in Sheffield in the mid-1850s, 
this was used to improve environmental conditions in areas 
inhabited by the poor.
3.6. 1853-54 IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE.
3.6.1 MORTALITY
The most obvious difference between the cholera years of 
1848-49 and 1853-54 was in levels of mortality. Cholera's 
demographic impact upon Leeds, Hull, Sheffield and Bradford in 
the autumn of 1853 was minimal. Even in 1854 it claimed only 
two to three hundred lives across the four towns, with a 
negligible effect on overall levels of mortality.188 
Sheffield was the only town where mortality was comparable to 
1848-49. It is worth noting that in the 'epidemic' year of 
1854, diarrhoea caused three times as many deaths as cholera 
in Sheffield, four times as many in Leeds and Hull, and, 
remarkably, almost ten times as many deaths in Bradford.189 
Despite the fact that nationally and in Yorkshire, diarrhoea 
claimed many more lives than cholera, it aroused little 
concern amongst contemporaries and attracted still less 
comment. Whilst this corroborates Wohl's claim that cholera's 
social impact bore little relation to its statistical 
importance, it raises a fundamental question for the historian 
about contemporary perceptions of mortality crises. If an 
epidemic was perceived or defined solely on the basis of 
morbidity or mortality, then 1853 and 1854 (like most years in
278
the nineteenth century) would have been remembered as 
diarrhoea rather than cholera years. That this was not the 
case confirms the claim that epidemics should be discussed as 
social rather than biological events.
3.6.2 RESPONSES
What set 1853 and 1854 apart from other years in the 
early 1850s in Yorkshire was not so much the presence of an 
exotic disease, as that the occurrence of cholera inspired 
sanitary activity. In both these years there were 
extraordinary political and social responses. Most obviously, 
1853 and 1854 were distinguished by bursts of public activity 
orchestrated L.B.H.s, medical men and by the G.B.H. Taken a 
step further, it can also be argued that the unusual level of 
official public health activity contributed to the development 
amongst the public of what can be described as an 1 epidemic 
consciousness'. This gave rise to particular forms of 
behaviour and revealed certain attitudes which were either 
absent, hidden or unusual in other years. As such, the 
popular reactions and attitudes which came to light in 1853- 
54, and 1848-49 for that matter, were as much a response to 
the effects and implications of official sanitary and medical 
measures at to cholera per se. From this perspective, it is 
again clear that the crisis of cholera is best understood as a 
socio-political crisis, and cholera epidemics more 
appropriately defined as socio-political phenomena.
The official response to the threat of cholera at the 
local level in the autumn of 1853 demonstrates that the
279
various authorities responsible for executing the N.R.D.P.A. 
were intent on ensuring that the ’mistakes' of 1848-49 were 
not repeated. A major difference was the near uniformity in 
the timing and nature of action in the four towns. It seems 
that the advice of the G.B.H. was followed, right down to the 
specific detail of the 'Sheffield Plan'. Of course, the 
experience of 1849 and the provision of the Public Health Act 
had produced, if not uniform structures, then at least clearer 
definitions of responsibilities. Thus, the uniformity of 
action came from administrative as much as from medical and 
sanitary agreements.
3.6.3. THE EPIDEMIC OF 1853-54 AND SANITARY REFORM.
Ostensibly, the official response to the threat of 
cholera in 1853-54 supports the view that the cholera was the 
sanitary reformers' best friend at the local level. The 
absence of epidemic cholera in 1853-54 was certainly a source 
of satisfaction to the local authorities in each of the four 
towns. However, the vigorous implementation of sanitary and 
medical precautions did little to reassure the reformers, who 
were highly critical of what was widely seen as the official 
neglect of sanitary improvements between 1849 and 1853.
Indeed, it was frequently argued that temporary measures of 
the type seen in 1853-54 were of little use in terms of 
producing lasting improvements in the public health.
Moreover, the thesis that cholera was the sanitary reformers' 
best friend is less than convincing when considered in the 
light of official responses to the end of the epidemic threat
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and longer term sanitary policy in the decade 1855-65. In 
this context a number of variables need to be considered as 
well as, and in comparison to, the impact of cholera.
3.6.3.1 LEEDS
As soon as the threat of cholera diminished, cooperation 
between the local authorities ended and the sanitary cleansing 
campaign came to abrupt end. Although the Council continued 
with drainage and other improvement projects after 1854, 
studies of its record have not been favourable. Barber argued 
that four aspects of municipal policy caused dissatisfaction, 
namely: (i) the refusal to accept responsibility for disposal 
of human and domestic waste until 1859; (ii) the decision to 
augment the water supply by drawing water from the River 
Wharfe after 1854 despite warnings about pollution; (iii) the 
failure to force builders to comply with the planning and 
building regulations laid down by the 1842 Improvement Act; 
and (iv) the fact that the sewerage system, which was perhaps 
the Council's most notable achievement, had little impact 
because many landlords declined to connect their premises to 
mains sewers.19 °
There was a marked contrast between the Council's record 
and that of the Guardians. According to Toft, the latter 
pioneered public health measures in Leeds throughout the 
middle decades of the century.191 As indicated above, the 
Guardians assumed responsibility for medical measures and 
assisted the Council with cleansing operations when the 
N.R.D.P.A.s were in force in 1848-49 and 1853-54. Under the
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terms of the new Nuisance Removal Act, 1855, however, the 
responsibility for nuisance removal and sanitary cleansing was 
transferred to the Council which was far from zealous in this 
work and tended to leave the responsibility for cleansing and 
refuse collection to individual citizens. Despite having 
their powers stripped away, the Guardians 'persisted in 
regarding the prevention of disease as an integral part of 
their work1 and thus became 'the most energetic body in 
sanitary work in the town'.192
Commendable as the Guardians' efforts were, they were not 
the answer to Leeds' massive environmental deficiencies and 
the related problems of ill health and disease. Disquiet 
about the situation was such that the town was subject to 
inspections by officers of the Medical Department of the Privy 
Council in 1858 and 1865.193 The second of these, which was 
conducted by Dr Hunter, coincided with the next threat of 
cholera, but was prompted by the high rate of mortality caused 
by fever and diarrhoea in the early 1860s. Hunter found that, 
'Leeds in August, 1865, presented a surprising sight, bringing 
to remembrance the condition of many English towns of twenty 
years ago'.194 He pinned the blame for this on the Council's 
neglect and incompetence. His assessment of the Guardians was 
quite different; he praised their cleansing and nuisance 
removal work, but pointed out that 'all this activity is 
unlawful and is founded on the fiction of the Disease 
Prevention Act being in force'.
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Although the Council attempted to deflect Hunter’s 
criticism, his report was welcomed by many people in Leeds and 
sections of the local press. The Leeds Mercury, reported that 
Hunter1s work corroborated its own and other independent 
researches which had blamed the Council; 'instead of 
vindicating their past neglect', it argued, 'they should 
strive to efface its deploring effects'.195 The Council 
responded to mounting pressure for remedial action in 1865 by 
drafting another Improvement Bill which contained Clauses 
which would increase its sanitary powers and enable it to 
appoint a Medical Officer of Health. The Bill became law 
early in 1866. According to Toft the passage of the Act and 
appointment of a Medical Officer of Health meant that, 'the 
year 1866 marked a watershed in Leeds' sanitary history'.196 
That 1865-66 were also cholera years was simple coincidence.
3.6.3.2. BRADFORD.
Cholera's retreat in 1854 was marked by an immediate 
decline in the amount of sanitary and nuisance removal work 
undertaken by the Council as the L.B.H. The available 
evidence confirms that throughout the period 1855-1865 
cleansing, nuisance removal and related work was not one of 
the Board's greatest priorities.197 This reduction in 
sanitary work was justified on the grounds of the diminished 
severity of epidemics.198
With regard to permanent improvements, Thompson has 
stated that there was 'much talk but little action'.199 There 
were, however, a number of important developments towards the
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end of the 1850s, yet there is no evidence to indicate this 
was due to any concern about public health in general, let 
alone cholera. The main improvements were street widening and 
paving schemes in the town centre, inspired by concerns about 
amenity and trade. The urgency attached to this work, and the 
fact that its main beneficiaries were small businessmen, 
proved to be somewhat controversial, with an alliance of Tory 
millowners and working class rate-payers arguing that priority 
should be given to constructing a comprehensive sewerage 
system, a measure which should benefit people of all social 
classes.200 Work on a sewerage scheme did not begin until 
1859 and then was only started after flood water reversed the 
flow of the existing drains and sewers and caused thousands of 
pounds worth of damage to shops, warehouses and stock in the 
town centre.201 As was the case in Leeds, the construction of 
new sewers and water supplies did not produce immediate 
benefits because property owners did not link their premises 
to the mains system. Similarly, although attempts to improve 
the water supply were made after the company was municipalised 
in 1855, progress in improving quantity and quality was 
painfully slow due to a combination of factors including 
technical problems, the priority given to industrial customers 
and the tapping of suspect sources in times of shortage.202
The priority attached to the street improvements and the 
reasons for the implementation of the drainage scheme and the 
inadequacy of the water supply suggest that the Council used 
its powers to further the economic interests of the social 
grouping which comprised its greatest part - the middle class.
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This point is further illustrated by the Council’s reluctance 
to tackle another serious environmental problem, the smoke 
nuisance. Although the 1850 Improvement Act empowered the 
Council to reduce smoke pollution, little was done on this 
front. Councillors cited two reasons: firstly, smoke helped 
to preserve the public health by cleaning the air of the 
impurities which caused epidemic diseases; and secondly, that 
forcing manufacturers to control factory emissions would have 
pernicious economic consequences. In Thompson's view the 
effect of the Council’s public health policy, which was based 
upon the economic needs and interests of local businesses, was 
that, 'the poor were to benefit less than any other group from 
environmental improvements in Bradford.’203
3.6.3.3. SHEFFIELD
In 1854 members of the Sheffield Highway Board had 
expressed similar views to Dr Hall and members of the public, 
arguing that temporary cleansing measures would only help to 
combat cholera if they were implemented in conjunction with 
permanent improvements.204 Thus, even though cooperation 
between the different sanitary agencies ended late in 1854, 
the Highway Board, under the direction of Isaac Ironside, 
pressed ahead with the construction of a system of deep 
drains. The scheme stood as testimony to Ironside, both 
practically and as one of the clearest manifestations of 
'rate-payer democracy'. Not surprisingly, the Board 
concentrated its work on those districts where ’the poorest 
rate-payers suffer from disease' and thus confirmed that the 
main intention of the drainage scheme was to provide 'all
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classes with the same sanatory advantages1.205 The Board 
completed 2,640 yards of drains in 1854 and a further 3,444 
yards in 1855.206 However, work was stopped when it emerged 
in the late 1850s that the Board did not have the legal 
jurisdiction for the work.207
Effectively, the revelation that the Highway Board had 
been acting illegally marked the end of major sanitary work 
for some years, because none of the other agencies had 
appropriate powers or were interested.208 In 1858, a 
specially appointed committee reported to the Council that 
sanitary conditions were deteriorating and could not be 
improved unless the hand of the Council was strengthened by 
the adoption of the Public Health Act, or an Improvement 
Act.209 Again, the problem was seen to be the structure of 
local government which had to be reformed before sanitary 
reform could be effected. The Council decided to prepare a 
Bill which would ’materially improve the sanitary condition of 
the borough and promote .. the comfort and convenience of the 
inhabitants, particularly the working class1.210 The 
Improvement Bill, 1858 closely resembled its predecessor and 
aimed to rationalise Sheffield’s sanitary administration by 
transferring the powers held by Highway Boards and Improvement 
Commission to the Council. Simultaneously it intended to 
extend the Council's sphere of activities by providing it with 
wide ranging powers. These included the power to undertake 
cleansing, control smoke pollution, provide new drains and 
sewers and devise and enforce building and planning 
regulations.211
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The proposed Act polarised opinion. As had been the case 
in 1851, the debates sparked by the Bill were not over the 
desirability of improving sanitary conditions and the public 
health so much as which agency - the Council or Highway Boards 
- should be responsible. According to Fraser the events of 
1858 'occasioned a fundamental conflict between rate-payer 
democracy and the municipal leviathan'.212 Once again, 
therefore, the central plank in the opposition's case was the 
issue of township autonomy. Both sides in the argument 
appealed for the support of the working classes; supporters 
arguing that the Bill's main intention was to ensure 'that the 
abodes of the poor may be freed from those causes of disease 
from which the middle classes have escaped', whilst opponents 
claimed that it would increase local taxation and deprive 
working men of representation and participation in local 
politics.213 The Bill became the main issue on which the 
municipal elections of 1858 were fought. Opponents fielded 
candidates in every ward and secured an overwhelming victory; 
the new Council immediately abandoned the Bill.
Rejection of the Bill meant that the void in sanitary 
arrangements remained. Moreover, the propaganda of opponents 
made a deep and lasting impression on working class rate­
payers, such that it was commented in 1861 that many working 
men, 'systematically oppose sanitary reform for fear of extra 
taxation'.214 Against this backdrop, there were few sanitary 
projects undertaken, a fact that was confirmed explicitly by 
the Council itself in 1860 when it was said that it was not
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expedient 1 at the present time to consider ... improving the 
sanitary condition of the borough’.215
From the end of 1850s criticism of local public health 
arrangements mounted. In 1859 the Registrar General drew 
attention to the high rate of mortality in Sheffield and 
ascribed it to 'defective sanitary arrangements’.216 In 1860 
a local medical man, Dr Saunders, endorsed Harriet Martineau's 
unfavourable assessment of sanitary conditions and local 
administration published in the popular periodical Once A 
Week.217 Further adverse comment came from The Builder, which 
criticised the way in which sanitary functions were divided 
between the different authorities and argued that Sheffield in 
the early 1860s was as ’devoid of the decencies of 
civilisation as it was in the Dark Ages’.218
In 1864 growing concerns about sanitary conditions again 
reached a head and prompted the Council to appoint a Committee 
to investigate the possibility of adopting the 1858 Local 
Government Act.219 Once again determined opposition was 
anticipated. However, the hand of reformers was strengthened 
by the burst of Dale Dyke Dam in March 1864. Only days before 
the disaster - which claimed the lives of 240 people - the 
Council had requested the unpopular water company to improve 
supplies.220 Following the burst, pressure for an improved 
supply and municipal ownership of the water works grew 
considerably. Crucially, this could not be achieved unless 
the Council bought the Company out. Fraser has argued that to 
some extent the water question diverted attention away from
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the sanitary issue.221 The situation can, however, be 
interpreted differently for two reasons: firstly, the flood 
led to enormous sanitary problems which underlined the need 
for the Council to have greater powers; and secondly, because 
it was recognised that an improved water supply was essential 
to sanitary improvements. In July 1864 the Council finally 
voted to adopt the Local Government Act and, in September, met 
for the first time as the L.B.H.222 Again, that this happened 
the year before a new cholera scare was coincidence.
3.6.3.4. HULL
The threat of cholera undoubtedly helped reformers to 
secure the passage of the Hull Improvement Act in 1854 which 
increased the powers of the L.B.H.223 Although it was to be 
eleven years before cholera threatened again, the L.B.H. used 
its powers to make steady if unspectacular progress on a 
number of fronts. Through the Act, the L.B.H. began an 
ambitious programme of improvements which saw, amongst other 
things, the resumption of work on the Eastern District deep 
drainage (sewerage) scheme, the reorganisation of night-soil 
and refuse collection, and the start of work on street 
improvements.224 The expense of this work led to disquiet in 
various quarters, with property owners, for example, objecting 
to having to pay around a third of the cost of street 
improvements.225 This matter was eventually resolved in 1857 
when the Council bowed to pressure to finance the work from 
the rates alone.226 More serious difficulties were 
encountered with the drainage scheme where the L.B.H. faced 
two related problems. Firstly, Hull’s topography - the town
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occupied a flat, low lying sight on the banks of a tidal river 
- which made effective drainage extremely difficult. In many 
areas there was a ’fall' of only four feet per mile which 
meant that flushing was vital if ebb tides were not to reverse 
the flow. This represented a formidable technical problem and 
throughout the 1850s professional and lay opinion was divided 
over whether or not a 'pumped’ or 'gravitational system' 
should be built.227 The former was thought to be the more 
effective, though most expensive solution. This led to the 
second problem, rate-payer opposition to excessive municipal 
expenditure. In 1853 rate-payers had been horrified to learn 
that the Council intended to construct a pumping station for 
the Eastern District scheme at a cost of over £160,000 and 
they immediately formed the 'Anti-Deep Drainage League'. 
Although they failed in this objective, they succeeded in 
forcing the L.B.H. to abandon the idea of pumping. Concern 
about the cost of the scheme continued and, in 1855, even the 
editor of the pro-improvement Hull Advertiser urged financial 
prudence on the Board, explaining that although rate-payers 
approved of the scheme, all works 'should be entered into ... 
with a view of the ability of people to pay for them'.228
The Eastern District scheme was completed in 1859 and in 
1863 the L.B.H. initiated work on the Western District scheme. 
Again, however, it was decided to construct a gravitational 
system. In a sense, this was a cause of some surprise because 
the gravitational system in the Eastern District was thought 
to have many deficiencies.229 It seems it was more important
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for schemes to be politically acceptable than technically 
efficient.
Clearly, rate-payer activity played a significant part in 
checking some of the L.B.H.'s more ambitious projects.
However, work in other areas went ahead with fewer 
difficulties. Building and planning regulations were 
gradually tightened up such that by 1866 all new streets had 
to be levelled, sewered and paved. According to Beckett, this 
had the widest implications as it ensured that the practice of 
building first and fitting drainage and other amenities later 
was reversed.230 The definition of ’nuisances’ and the scope 
of the Nuisance Inspectors work was gradually extended. 
Similarly, the inspection and regulation of Lodging Houses 
became more rigourous with the result that many were forced to 
close because of the dangers they posed to health.231
By the 1860s, the town’s sanitary lobby seemed satisfied 
that, despite occasional controversies and without the 
stimulus of a cholera epidemic, the L.B.H. had done much to 
improve public health. One historian has noted that in its 
first decade, the Board had 'wonderfully changed the general 
aspect of Hull’.232 This view was supported in an editorial 
in the Hull Advertiser in 1863 where the L.B.H. was praised 
for its 'progressive energy and resolved determination to keep 
steadily in the path of enlightened progress’.233 The paper 
warned, however, against complacency, stating that if the 
health of the poor was to be improved the L.B.H., 'must 
continue its labours while there remains a nuisance to abate,
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or an improvement to carry out1. Distinctions had always been 
made between ’imported' and ’local' cases of cholera, but by 
the mid-1860s the health of the town, seems to have become a 
distinct issue from that of the health threat posed by the 
port, emigrants and trade. This was important in the 1865-66 
national epidemic, when cholera was increasingly identified as 
a port disease.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the early 1860s cholera yet again spread westwards out 
of India. Following trade routes and waterways, it reached 
the near east and western Mediterranean in 1865. With public 
and official attention in Britain fixed on more immediate 
concerns such as the rinderpest epidemic and the struggle for 
reform, cholera’s presence, whilst noted by the press, did not 
cause undue alarm.1 However, the Medical Department of the 
Privy Council feared that speedier shipping services might 
provide direct transfer to Britain, so in July 1865 copies of 
its 'General Memorandum on the Proceedings which are Advisable 
in Places attacked or threatened by Epidemic Disease', were 
sent, not to all towns, but only to ports, which were seen as 
the first line of defence.2 Not surprisingly, the Board of 
Health in Hull was one of the first to be contacted.
The Privy Council's concern was well founded, a month or 
so later an imported case was confirmed in Southampton, 
carried directly from Alexandria. The first official case 
amongst the local population occurred in September and quickly 
spread elsewhere.3 Four days later cholera was diagnosed on 
the south coast and struck at Theydon Bois, a village in 
Essex, where it killed nine people.4 Although there were 
sixty cases and thirty five deaths in Southampton and a 
smattering of fatalities in other parts of the country, the 
disease did not manifest itself in an epidemic form and had 
petered out by the middle of November.5
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During the winter and spring of 1866 cholera threatened 
again and by May had reached Hamburg and Rotterdam.6 This 
time there was greater anxiety.7 This was keenly felt in Hull 
where, at the beginning of May, a local newspaper predicted 
that a further visitation was now inevitable.8 Although the 
Chairman of the Sanitary Committee was able to point out that 
sanitary conditions were markedly better than in 1849 and 
1854, and that the town now had a supply of pure drinking 
water, it was widely recognised that the principal threat came 
from the hundreds of emigrants who arrived at Hull each week.9
As anticipated, the first confirmed cases occurred at 
seaports amongst foreign seamen and emigrants. Imported cases 
were reported again in Southampton and in Liverpool in May and 
June, and at Hull and Goole at the beginning of July; the 
disease then spread to the indigenous population.10 By mid- 
July, England was said to be ’infected in many different 
directions’.11 By the end of the year cholera had appeared in 
most parts of the country and had claimed the lives of 12,000 
people in England.12 The epidemic proved to be the least 
severe of the century, although several towns and cities, 
mainly ports, suffered badly; 6,000 lives were lost to the 
disease in London, 2,000 in Liverpool, and 500 in both Swansea 
and Neath.13 By comparison, Yorkshire escaped lightly. There 
were imported cases and small outbreaks, with the Registrar 
General’s reports showing only twenty deaths in Bradford, 
twenty two in Leeds (including Holbeck), fourteen in Sheffield 
and sixteen in Hull.14 Only Goole, a small port upstream from 
Hull on the Humber, suffered badly with 50 deaths and a
308
mortality of 31 per 10,000 population, the tenth worst in 
England.
Although cholera's contribution to levels of mortality 
was small, this did not prevent it from precipitating a public 
health crisis. As in 1853-54, the threat of cholera jolted 
the local authorities in Hull, Leeds, Sheffield and Bradford 
into immediate action. The general thrust of official 
preventive schemes in these (and other) towns closely 
resembled those in the two previous epidemics with priority 
given to pre-emptive nuisance removal, sanitary cleansing 
schemes and arrangements for medical treatment and relief. 
However, there were significant changes in emphasis and 
detail, developments which followed changes in medical 
thinking on cholera's cause and mode of transmission.
4.2. CHOLERA ETIOLOGY, 1854-1866
The Privy Council's 'General Memorandum’ issued in July 
1865 provided the first indication of a shift in official 
preventive policy. Two changes were particularly significant. 
Firstly, in addition to urging general sanitary cleansing and 
nuisance removal, the Memorandum stressed the need for 
'special precautions of cleanliness and disinfection ... with 
regard to infective discharges from the bodies of the sick'.15 
In cases of cholera, it warned, this was particularly vital 
with matters discharged from the intestinal canal, 'Cholera 
evacuations should be regarded as capable of communicating an
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infectious quality to ... night-soil, ... privies, drains or 
cesspools'.16 To destroy the infective quality of cholera 
dejecta, Local Boards were advised that all faecal matter 
should be disinfected before being thrown away. Where the 
disinfected faeces should be stored or disposed of was a 
matter of even greater importance with the Memorandum 
insisting that 'they must never be cast where they can run or 
soak into courses of drinking water'. The second change was 
the warning that all water supplies should be thoroughly 
examined to ensure that there were no leakages or infiltration 
from sewers, drains, privies or cesspools. When cholera, 
diarrhoea or typhoid fever were present, it warned, 'it is 
essential that no foul water should be drunk'.17
The Memorandum demonstrates for the first time the 
influence on official thinking of the ideas of John Snow and 
William Budd on the importance of the faecal-oral route and 
the role of contaminated water in the transmission of the 
disease.18 However, it would be incorrect to claim that there 
was a unanimous or complete change in official opinion on the 
questions of its cause and etiology. What they did show was 
that new ideas and practices were being added to the older 
preventive strategies, seemingly with no sense of any conflict 
or contradiction. In one sense this was unsurprising as an 
important feature of mid-century sanitary science was that it 
was a synthetic subject, characterised by multi-factorial 
theories of disease causation and all-embracing preventive 
measures.
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As early as 1849, William Budd's microscopical work led 
him to assert that cholera was ’a living organism of a 
distinct species, which was taken by the act of swallowing it, 
which multiplied in the intestine1.19 Budd’s findings 
accorded with those of John Snow, whose observations of 
cholera’s spread in London convinced him that the most likely 
vehicle for infection was a water supply contaminated by the 
excreta of cholera patients.20 Neither theory was subject to 
particular interest or scrutiny until 1854 when Snow succeeded 
in arresting a severe outbreak of cholera in Broad Street, 
Soho, by persuading the local authorities to lock the handle 
of a water pump. He followed this up by investigating the 
incidence of cholera in houses supplied by two different water 
companies. Snow’s and Budd’s theories prompted a revival of 
interest in the possibility that cholera was, in contemporary 
language, a 'contagious' disease. Snow proposed that the 
disease could be passed from person to person by way of 
ingestion of traces of faeces containing the cholera poison.21 
(N.B. There was not at this time any notion of ’germs’ being 
involved.) He contended that his model could explain, for 
example, why nurses and others who attended cholera patients 
were more likely to contract the disease than doctors. The 
latter, he argued, were far more likely to wash their hands 
than the former, a measure which considerably reduced the risk 
of direct ingestion. Snow’s claims were taken more seriously 
after 1854, though they still made little impact on dominant 
medical and sanitary opinion.22
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In the wake of the 1853-54 epidemic, the Medical 
Council's Committee for Scientific Enquiries investigated the 
water-borne theory amongst many others, yet was unwilling to 
support any single explanation. With regard to the Broad 
Street episode, the Council reported that,
'We do not find it established that the water was 
contaminated in the manner alleged ... nor is there ... 
evidence to show whether inhabitants of the districts 
drinking water from that well, suffered in proportion 
more than the inhabitants of the district who drank from 
other sources'.23 
The Committee was far more impressed by ideas put forward by 
one of its own members, the compiler of abstracts for the 
Registrar General, William Farr, whose elaborate calculations 
of the correlation between height above sea level and the 
incidence of cholera led him to contend that elevation was the 
crucial factor in determining the severity of outbreaks.24 
According to Farr, there was a direct relationship between the 
amount of organic matter in the air, earth and water and the 
level or concentration of cholera 'poison' in the atmosphere, 
which increased at lower levels. Farr's theory was especially 
persuasive because it explained why the disease was so severe 
in low lying districts and in ports.
Following publication of Snow's, now famous, On the mode 
of Communication of Cholera in 1855, his theory was commented 
upon in the medical press. Although certain journals were 
less sceptical than the Medical Council, views were mixed.
Some reviews, like that in the Lancet, moved towards a
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qualified acceptance of parts of Snow's theory.25 Others 
differed; the reviewer in the Medico-Chirurgical Review 
asserted that all Snow had achieved was to render 'the 
transmission of cholera by water an hypothesis worthy of 
inquiry'.26 Morris has noted that the initial impact of 
Snow's theory 'has disappointed many historians who find that 
he made no sweeping conversions of the profession and received 
little attention in medical textbooks'.27 F.B. Smith 
certainly regarded the Medical Council's dismissal of Snow and 
support for Farr as a lost opportunity, arguing that it 
'inaugurated years of worthless speculation about the relation 
between the concentration of water in soil, water tables and 
the incidence of cholera'.28 Snow's inability to identify the 
cholera poison in victims' stools or drinking water has been 
cited as the main reason for the rejection of his theory.29 
However, many of these comments are decidedly Whiggish.
Recent studies have shown that assessments of the acceptance 
and diffusion of advances or innovations in medicine must take 
cognizance of the context of reception and diffusion, social 
as well as medical.30 The expectation that Snow's theory 
could have posed a direct and immediate challenge to miasmatic 
orthodoxy - even if he had been able to identify the cholera 
'poison' - is unrealistic.
Until recently, historians have tended to discuss the 
reception and impact of Snow's theory in absolute terms, 
speaking of 'acceptance' or 'rejection'. In the light of the 
cool response to Snow in the mid-1850s and the continuing 
dominance of the miasmatic theory in the 1860s, this has
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produced pessimistic accounts and led to the notion of 
outright rejection. An approach which examines the response 
to Snow’s theory contextually and abandons the search for 
absolutes, reveals that the situation was more complex.
Working from this perspective, two very significant 
developments come to light. Firstly, sections of the medical 
establishment gradually became more amenable to the ideas 
embodied in Snow's water-borne thesis and to the existence of 
specific contagia more generally. Secondly, the parameters of 
the miasmatic doctrine were adapted 'to accommodate the 
structures of Snow's innovations'.31 Before exploring these 
developments in greater detail, it is necessary to outline why 
Snow's theory was coolly received in the mid-1850s.
In the main, opposition to Snow centred around the fact 
that his theory was highly specific. In arguing that cholera 
could only be contracted through ingestion of material 
contaminated by the faeces of cholera victims and usually 
diffused through drinking water, Snow was advancing what was 
essentially a single cause explanation.3:2 This ran against 
the orthodox miasmatic notion of multiple or aggregate 
causation which, according to an editorial in the B.M.J. in 
1853, was 'the common opinion'.33 Snow's belief that the 
cholera poison was spread through drinking water and entered 
the body by way of the mouth was equally controversial as it 
went against the widely held view of transmission through the 
atmosphere and entry via the lungs. In 1855 a report in the 
Medico-Chirurgical Review summarised contemporary opinion by 
citing Snow's insistence 'that cholera is always communicated
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by means of water' [emphasis added] as a principal reason for 
rejecting his theory.34
The debates which accompanied Snow's promotion of the 
water-borne theory reveal that more was at stake than the 
validity of a particular theory or set of theories. In 
challenging miasmatic orthodoxy, Snow was questioning the 
theoretical rationale for sanitary improvement and reform. 
Sanitarian's disease models were 'inclusive' and held that all 
forms of filth and environmental pollution contributed to the 
generation of disease. It followed that the incidence of 
cholera and other diseases could only be reduced by 
comprehensive improvements. Snow, by contrast, excluded the 
role of general filth from his explanation by pointing to 
highly specific filth. Logically, therefore, he believed that 
future epidemics could be contained by the implementation of a 
limited and carefully targeted preventive strategy.35 This 
enabled Snow to be portrayed as an opponent of sanitary 
reform.36
Whether this was entirely fair is questionable. Whilst 
Snow did argue that cholera outbreaks could be averted by 
specific forms of preventive action - such as the disinfection 
of patients' stools, the thorough cleansing and destruction of 
their clothes and bedding and, above all, by ensuring that 
choleric discharges were not allowed to contaminate supplies 
of drinking water - he also advocated general sanitary 
improvements.37 What distinguished him from the majority of 
his contemporaries was the question of timing and his stress
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on water. For Snow, general sanitary measures should give way 
to specific measures when cholera was present. In a lecture 
he delivered to the Epidemiological Society shortly before his 
death in 1858, he argued that the absence of drainage and 
sewerage 'were injurious to health only by the contamination 
they caused to pumps, wells and other water supplies'. 
Similarly, he attacked certain sanitary 'improvements', such 
as the provision of water closets and the construction of 
drainage systems, on the grounds that they wasted water and, 
by adding to river pollution, increased the risk of drinking 
water becoming contaminated.38
The lukewarm response to Snow demonstrates why historians 
have tended to argue that the water-borne theory was firmly 
rejected. On closer inspection, however, it is apparent that 
despite widespread scepticism amongst the profession, Snow's 
theory was more influential than the above suggests. This 
point is illustrated by the way in which Snow helped to 
stimulate interest in water's role in facilitating the spread 
of cholera and other diseases. In the 1860s, Snow's ideas 
increasingly went with the grain of the emergent germ theories 
of diseases and interest in the agents and routes of disease 
transmission.39
The idea of a causal connection between polluted water 
and the incidence of disease was well established by the 1850s 
and did not originate with Snow.40 Concern over this issue 
had been sufficiently deep for Parliament to legislate in 1852 
to provide London with a purer supply; a measure which
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actually provided Snow with the opportunity to conduct his 
investigation into the incidence of cholera in areas supplied 
by different water companies in London.41 Snow's ideas gave 
impetus to the process by which water was integrated into 
miasmatic explanations of cholera's mode of diffusion.42
The Medical Council's Committee in 1854-55 did not rule 
out the possibility that polluted water had contributed to the 
severity of the epidemic. It was conceded that water from the 
Broad Street pump might have contributed to the severity of 
the Soho outbreak by virtue of 'the fact of its impure waters 
having participated in the atmospheric infection of the 
district'.43 As mentioned previously, the Committee approved 
William Farr's theory which stressed that elevation was the 
crucial factor. Farr, however, actually revised his own 
theory to accommodate Snow's ideas.44 He contended that where 
cholera was most fatal, the cholera poison (cholerine) 'is 
largely diffused through water, as well as through other 
channels'.45 Unlike Snow, however, Farr developed a 
miasmatist explanation of this phenomenon, arguing that 
polluted or contaminated water was most likely to spread the 
disease when it evaporated into the atmosphere from drains, 
ditches and rivers.
William Budd also developed a theory which incorporated 
the main strands of Snow's argument and was again less 
exclusive. Budd agreed that cholera discharges were infective 
and was certain that the disease could be contracted through 
ingestion of faecal matter. Moreover, by the late 1850s he
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was arguing that typhoid, was transmitted in an identical 
fashion.46 However, Budd differed from Snow in that he did 
not exclude the air-lung route of transmission. With regard 
to cholera, he maintained that patients’ discharges 
invariably contained the cholera poison and that this could be 
transmitted in several ways: direct ingestion; or after 
finding its way into drains and sewers from which it could 
'exhale into the air, or percolate into drinking water1.47 
Budd's ideas were more congenial to sanitarians, though his 
pursuit of the 'smallpox analogy' distanced him from (ultra) 
sanitarians.48 Certain characteristics commonly associated 
with smallpox (a disease which was widely accepted to be 
contagious) Budd associated with typhoid and cholera.49 Put 
simply, he argued that the excretions of typhoid and cholera 
patients were products of the disease and therefore contained 
the disease agent itself, in much the same way that the 
pustules of smallpox victims contained the smallpox poison.
After Snow's death in 1858, Budd continued to promote the 
idea that cholera, like typhoid, could be communicated from 
one individual to another. Additionally, he sought to resolve 
some of the confusion inherent in contemporary nomenclature.
In particular, he attempted to overcome the problems which 
arose from the habit of using words like 'infectious' and 
'contagious' interchangably by expanding the definition of 
'contagiousness' to include various modes of propagation.50 
On this basis a disease like cholera, which, according to 
Budd, could be transmitted directly or indirectly became 
'catching' or contagious.
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Pelling has argued that one of the main achievements of 
the 1850s was the narrowing down of ’Chadwick’s large 
indictment of all filth to one kind in particular: that 
produced by human beings'.51 The notion that a specific form 
of filth assisted the spread of diseases like cholera and 
typhoid, was assimilated into miasmatic doctrine with relative 
ease.52 Particularly influential in the 1860s was the German 
scientist, Max von Pettenkofer. While he shared Snow's and 
Budd's view that patients' evacuations contained the cholera 
poison, he argued that for the poison to produce the disease, 
it had to react with certain local accessory causes in the 
soil. This process, he argued, generated a miasma which, if 
inhaled, excited the disease in individuals. For Pettenkofer, 
the two ’indispensable conditions’ which influenced cholera’s 
propagation were 'human intercourse yielding the germ ... and 
the soil developing this germ into activity'.53 Because the 
production of cholera was dependent upon a reaction between 
the two, he held that cholera could be transmitted from one 
locality to another but not directly from one person to 
another, except via the soil.54 As such, he opposed the 
arguments of Snow and Budd that cholera was a communicable 
disease.
Between 1858 and 1866 a number of key figures in the 
medical establishment and several medical journals became more 
amenable to various strands of Snow's theory. Amongst the 
most important was John Simon, Medical Officer to the Privy 
Council. In the mid 1850s, Simon's strong belief in the
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atmospheric theory had led him to reject Snow.55 According to 
Lambert, Simon first 'moved towards acceptance of Snow's 
theories on the transmissibility of cholera in water fouled by 
the discharges of the sick’ in 1856.56 This ’conversion’ 
gained momentum following his acceptance of Budd’s claim that 
typhoid was spread by excrement-tainted water and, by 1860, he 
had publicly stated that cholera was transmitted in an 
identical manner.57 The advice offered in 1865-66 provides 
the clearest indication that Simon and his colleagues at the 
Medical Department accepted the major tenets of the water­
borne theory. In 1865 Simon supported Dr Netten Radcliffe’s 
claim that the Theydon Bois outbreak was attributable to human 
excrement having found its way into drinking water.58 It 
should be stressed that even Simon’s conversion to Snow was 
not total, for as Pelling has pointed out, he ’never entirely 
accepted the exclusiveness of Snow’s position’.59 Wider 
medical opinion also became less hostile. An editorial in the 
Lancet in 1866 said that, Snow’s work had demonstrated that 
water contaminated by the faeces of cholera victims ’could 
operate as a means of extending the spread of cholera’ and 
that his researches had been ’masterly’ and ’classical1.60 It 
went on to recommend that traditional methods of control be 
supplemented by the disinfection of victims' discharges and 
supervision of water supplies.61 Bill Luckin has argued that 
the majority of medical men were still sceptical about Snow's 
theory in 1866.62 Even so, there was not a single alternative 
theory, rather miasmatist ideas were all-embracing and subject 
of continual refinement and revision.63
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Much was written in the lay press about Snow’s work and 
particularly the Broad Street pump episode.64(See FIGURE 4.1) 
Whilst the Times declared that ’it is well known that the 
cholera poison comes from the ejecta and vomit of cholera 
patients' indicating a strong degree of support for Snow, 
other lay publications were more cautious.65 The Bradford 
Review, for example, took the miasmatist line that bad water 
merely provoked cholera.66
However, whilst there was a variety and diversity of 
theories, there was general agreement on actions. Simon's 
’new’ preventive measures did not contradict traditional 
sanitary practices, they augmented them. The main additional 
measure was the disinfection of cholera faeces and other 
contaminated materials. Many miasmatists endorsed this course 
of action, if for different reasons. During previous 
epidemics they had called for the removal of the preventable 
causes of the disease through sanitary cleansing and nuisance 
removal operations or, failing this, neutralising miasmas 
through disinfection and deodorization. By 1865-66, however, 
most miasmatists were convinced that whilst all filth still 
contributed to the generation and propagation of cholera, 
human excrement was the most dangerous form and the most 
likely to yield the disease and, particularly when it became 
airborne, to spread it. Removing or disinfecting human 
faeces, therefore, was seen as an extension of the sort of 
cleansing operation seen in 1848-49 and 1853-54.
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Disinfection and attempts to procure supplies of pure 
drinking water served to widen the focus of sanitary 
prevention. Ostensibly, the third addition to the official 
preventive strategy devised by Simon - the medical inspection 
of ships, foreign sailors and emigrants - did not. This 
measure was consistent with the view that cholera could be 
communicated from person to person, a stance which might have 
provoked miasmatists, traders and other interests had the 
authorities actually attempted to re-introduce quarantine, 
rather than just inspection. Although many emigrants affected 
by cholera travelled on overcrowded and insanitary ships, and 
this was considered 'a most favourable arrangement to the 
spread of cholera1, few medical men accepted that the disease 
was anything like smallpox.67 It was not people who were 
dangerous, it was their wastes and their environmental impact. 
Thus, if all seamen and emigrants were inspected prior to 
disembarkation and ’suspicious’ cases identified, isolated and 
hygienically managed, there would be no chance of cholera 
spreading. Understandably, these measures were taken very 
seriously in Britain’s third largest seaport in 1866 - Hull.
4.3. HULL
When the Medical Department of the Privy Council first 
wrote to the Local Board of Health (L.B.H.) in July 1865, it 
felt that the situation was not yet sufficiently worrying to 
warrant putting the N.R.D.P.A. into force. Instead, it 
circulated its ’General Memorandum’ and urged local
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authorities to take ’such measures as they think proper for 
the preservation of health’ under ordinary nuisance removal 
provision.68
The town experienced a brief cholera scare in September 
1865 following reports that a seaman from Russia was suffering 
from the disease. Although medical men subsequently diagnosed 
the case to be one of typhoid, this incident led to some 
action. The L.B.H. wrote to the Privy Council requesting it 
to put the N.R.D.P.A. into force so that extraordinary 
precautions could commence.69 The Privy Council declined, 
though after the outbreak in Southampton in August, it did 
send a Medical Inspector, Dr Hunter, to Hull inspect the 
lodging Houses frequented by foreign emigrants and seamen.70 
In the view of the local press and the L.B.H., it was 
imperative that special powers should be granted because of 
the emigrant problem, or argued the Herald, 'the introduction 
of the disease (was) almost inevitable’.71
The situation had serious implications for other towns. 
Concern mounted in Liverpool because the majority of emigrants 
who landed at Hull travelled across the Pennines to board 
trans-Atlantic ships. Fearing that cholera would accompany 
emigrants, the Mayor of Liverpool wrote to the Hull Board of 
Health in 1866 imploring them ’as far as possible ... to 
prevent the landing of German emigrants without the most 
careful examination so as to prevent the introduction of 
cholera from infected places on the continent’.72 With 
imported cases of cholera occurring at several British ports
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in April, demands for rigorous medical checks on emigrants 
increased.73 The Privy Council responded to what was 
increasingly seen as a crisis by issuing an Order in Council 
on 7 May to put the N.R.D.P.A. into force, though as noted 
early, this was only in British ports.74
The legislation required a number of precautions. When 
a ship arrived from an infected port, all passengers and crew 
members had to be inspected by qualified medical men and 
certified healthy before being granted permission to 
disembark. In the event of cholera cases being discovered the 
ship was to be placed under quarantine for a period of three 
days during which time contact with the shore was forbidden.
If fatalities had already occurred on the ship, the deceased 
were to be interred at sea and their clothes, bedding and 
personal effects destroyed or disinfected. Cholera patients, 
however, were to be brought ashore and treated in cholera 
hospitals provided and equipped by the local authorities. 
Patients were not permitted to leave hospital until certified 
healthy by a medical man.75
Hull's L.B.H. complied with the Order in Council 
immediately. Within days a number of medical men had been 
employed to undertake inspections and arrangements had been 
made to use premises at the Citadel Ground as a cholera 
hospital.76 On its own initiative, the Board took a number of 
additional precautionary steps. Mindful perhaps that even the 
most rigorous system could fail, two members of the Sanitary 
Committee and the Port Immigration Officer called upon the
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Passenger Superintendent of the North Eastern Railway Company 
to discuss how emigrants could be prevented from ’passage 
through the town’ and contact with local people.77 It was 
decided to land emigrants as close to the railway station as 
possible and accommodate them in tents in a confined area 
until numbers warranted the provision of a special train to 
Liverpool.
The nature of the response in Hull shows that there was a 
now widespread belief that cholera was a communicable disease; 
that the healthy could contract the disease through contact 
with cholera sufferers and items soiled by their excreta.78 
This view was shared by the local press who had joined with 
the L.B.H. in calling for the implementation of the N.R.D.P.A. 
and, after it had been put into force, continued to argue that 
the inspection of emigrants must remain the Board's highest 
priority in order to prevent cholera from putting down 'its 
first roots in the town’.79
Whilst inspection, isolation and the management of 
emigrants were the Board's main priorities, preventive action 
went ahead on the usual fronts. Nuisance removal, the 
disinfection of sewers, drains, privies, gullies and waterways 
and general sanitary cleansing operations were stepped up in a 
bid to ensure that if cholera did spread from emigrants or 
seamen to local people, it would not find conditions to its 
liking. That the L.B.H. appointed over sixty temporary 
cleansing operatives is a measure of its determination.80 
Arrangements were also made whereby if cholera did gain a
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foothold, a system of medical relief closely resembling that 
seen in 1854 could be put into operation. Again, this was to 
be geared towards the earliest possible detection and 
treatment of premonitory symptoms.
The precautions taken by the L.B.H., and especially the 
arrangements for dealing with imported cases, show that the 
great store was set by the 'new’ measures devised by Simon.
It might seem anomalous, therefore, that with the exception of 
disinfecting watercourses, sewers and drains, relatively 
little was said or done about Hull's water supply. This seems 
especially puzzling as there was now a broad consensus of 
opinion in the town that polluted water - 'a bad mixture of 
sewage and muddy salt water' as the Advertiser put it - had 
been responsible for the severity of the 1849 epidemic.81 The 
explanation for this was that concern was forestalled because 
of the new supply arrangements for domestic and industrial 
consumption, where water was now drawn from underground 
springs at nearby Springhead and pumped to the town.82 
Reports stated that the town now had 'possession of an 
abundance of water of the purest quality [so that people] need 
have no fear that the cholera will commit any serious 
ravages'.83
The L.B.H. was applauded locally for the manner in which
it responded to the threat of cholera in 1865-66, Hull was in
fact one of the few large ports to escape an epidemic.
However, and in sharp contrast to earlier years, central
government's handling of the crisis led to considerable
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disquiet in the town. The Privy Council was criticised 
repeatedly for delaying implementation of the N.R.D.P.A. until 
May 1866 and delaying extension to the whole country.84 This 
also led to a muddle whereby under the first Order in Council 
the L.B.H. was constituted the local authority with 
responsibility for the Act, but the second Order appeared to 
transfer responsibility for preventive measures to the town's 
two Boards of Guardians.83 Matters were further complicated 
because under the terms of the new Sanitary Act, 1866, the 
L.B.H. was constituted the nuisance authority and therefore 
seemed to share responsibility for sanitary and cleansing 
measures with the Guardians. As things stood it was unclear 
which agency should supervise the medical inspection of 
shipping and emigrants. Fearing that the manifold confusion 
would lead to the neglect of vital work, the L.B.H., Guardians 
and local press agreed to seek clarification.86 It seems that 
a satisfactory solution to these problems was not found as 
'jurisdictional confusion continued'.87 Fortunately for the 
people of Hull the absence of an epidemic meant certain 
features of the local arrangements were not tested.
The anti-cholera strategy in 1866 showed two interesting 
changes. First, there is clear evidence that for the first 
time since 1831, an appreciation that cholera was almost 
certain to make its first appearance at a seaport led the 
Privy Council to adopt a two-tier strategy of prevention in 
which ports were targeted for precautionary action before 
inland towns. The measures then recommended for adoption 
reveal the second change, namely, the belief that cholera was
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likely to be spread by human agency led to people and their 
wastes not the environment becoming the focus of sanitary 
policing. Although traditional sanitary preventive measures 
were implemented with great vigour, there is little doubt that 
the main thrust in Hull was an attempt to minimise the danger 
posed by foreign seamen and emigrants.
Prior to the administrative crisis of mid-August, the 
activities of the L.B.H. and the safety of the town’s water 
undoubtedly contributed to the creation of a mood of 
confidence in the town. Reports of cases at nearby Goole and 
even in Hull itself did not lead to undue alarm.88 The 
available evidence suggests that faith in the preventive 
measures adopted by the Board may well have been justified. 
Medical inspection of emigrants and efforts to keep them apart 
from townspeople certainly looked to have been successful. 
Indeed, details of those cases which occurred in Hull, 
supplied by the local registrar shows only one ’imported1 case 
was reported in the town itself and that others occurred 
amongst those visited by people who had been in close contact 
with sufferers in other parts of the country.89
The arrangements for coping with the threat posed by 
infected emigrants may have afforded the people of Hull a 
considerable degree of protection, however, as a means of 
preventing cholera’s entering Britain they may have been less 
successful. Reports from Liverpool in May 1866 showed cholera 
having broken out amongst emigrants who had travelled from 
Germany via Hull; medical inspection at the Humber port may
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not have been as successful as the segregation measures.90 
This news was viewed with deep concern across the Atlantic. 
Indeed, the mayor of New York wrote to his counterpart in Hull 
demanding to know what precautions had been taken there and if 
the town still enjoyed immunity.91
Having been introduced to Britain by emigrants, cholera 
spread to the indigenous population. Isolated cases were 
reported in various parts of the country at the end of June 
and in the West Riding at the beginning of July.92 Under the 
terms of the N.R.D.P.A. boards of health, town councils and 
Poor Law Guardians Were formally charged implementing 
preventive measures. For its part, the Privy Council, like 
the General Board of Health in 1848-49 and 1853-54, acted in 
an advisory capacity, informing local authorities of their 
responsibilities and making recommendations about how the 
provisions of the Act should be implemented.
4.4 LEEDS
Coming less than a year after the public health crisis of 
1865, the renewed threat of cholera in 1866 promised to reveal 
whether or not the Town Council had responded positively to 
the barrage of criticism levelled against it following the 
publication of Dr. Hunter’s Report. Whilst the passage of the 
Leeds Improvement Bill, 1866 certainly suggested that the 
Council had developed a commitment to public health, the new
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threat provided a timely opportunity to see if lessons really 
had been learnt.93
The appointment of Major Kirkby Robinson as Medical 
Officer of Health (M.O.H.) in the spring of 1866 was hoped by 
reformers to be signal a new attitude.94 He was to have an 
important bearing on the attempt to avert cholera as the 
Council was advised to take a number of precautions before the 
N.R.D.P.A. was put into force.95 In July 1866 the Guardians 
were somewhat surprised to learn that they, rather than the 
Council, were still responsible for the emergency measures.96 
Whilst the Council retained responsibility for ordinary 
nuisance removal operations, it fell to the Guardians to 
provide all forms of medical relief, treatment and facilities; 
to instigate house-to-house visitation; and to ensure the 
speedy burial of the dead.97 Immediately, they formed a 
special committee and met with the Council to discuss 
coordinated action.98 With regard to the latter, it was 
agreed that house-to-house visitors and other officers 
employed by the Guardians should identify nuisances and report 
them to the Council's Scavenging and Nuisance Committee. In a 
further gesture of mutual assistance, the M.O.H. volunteered 
his expertise to the Guardians.99
At the beginning of August the Guardians' Disease 
Prevention Committee began to put its preventive machinery 
into operation with apparently exemplary results. The town 
was divided into four medical districts, each of which was 
placed under the charge of a Medical Officer, aided by four
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specially recruited medical assistants.100 The latter were 
employed primarily for the purpose of conducting house-to- 
house visitation, which again involved identifying and 
reporting nuisances and issuing advice on matters of hygiene, 
diet and sanitation as well as checking the health of local 
people and prescribing medicines where necessary.101 The 
Guardians also decided to equip and use the Old Grantham 
Street Workhouse as a cholera hospital and to apply to the War 
Office for permission to use the Cavalry Barracks as a 
Sanatorium. Several nurses and nursing assistants were 
employed and steps were taken to procure additional premises 
in each medical district for additional accommodation if 
needed.102
Special emphasis was placed on house-to-house visitation 
which, in the view of the Leeds Mercury, was fthe only 
effectual mode of battling with cholera yet discovered1.103 
Visitation commenced on 6 August and was undertaken with 
immense vigour. Within three days, 800 houses had been 
visited, 59 cases of diarrhoea and five of choleric diarrhoea 
had been discovered, and many houses ordered to be 
whitewashed. As the M.O.H. had hoped, visitation also led to 
the identification and removal of a variety of nuisances. For 
example, in the three week period up to 25 August, the four 
medical officers ordered 861 houses to be cleansed and 
whitewashed, some by the owners, others by cleansing 
operatives. Between 1 August and 1 December, the Guardians' 
two sanitary inspectors reported a total of 1,538 nuisances: 
of these, 852 were removed or abated, 239 specially noticed
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(139 of these were subsequently removed), and 347 referred to 
the Council's Scavenging and Nuisance Committee.104 
Visitation had been conducted so comprehensively that by the 
week ending 1 September virtually every house in the Leeds 
Township had reportedly been inspected.
TABLE 4.1
HOUSE-TO-HOUSE VISITATION IN LEEDS 4 AUGUST - 1 SEPTEMBER 1866
WEEK ENDING HOUSES VISITED DIARRHOEA CASES DISCOVERED
11 AUGUST 5,469 227
18 AUGUST 4,541 132
25 AUGUST 3,472 226
1 SEPTEMBER 3,823 237
TOTAL 17,305 822
Source: Leeds Mercury, 16.8.1866;21.8.1866; 30.8.1866;
6.9.1866.
At the end of the year, the Guardians reflected that 
visitation, cleansing and nuisance removal had been conducted 
so thoroughly that 'a great amount of sickness has been 
averted which in all probability would have existed had it not 
been for the prompt and energetic steps taken..1.xos
As had been the case in both 1848-49 and 1853-54, there 
was no shortage of advice to the public, official and 
otherwise; house-to-house visitors, local newspapers and
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leaflets instructed on familiar themes: domestic cleanliness, 
personal hygiene, diet, temperance and the need to seek prompt 
treatment for diarrhoea. The Leeds Times, for example, urged 
'care and prudence' in diet and bodily and domestic hygiene; 
the Mercury offered guidance to the working class, whose 
neglect of domestic and personal hygiene, wholesome food and a 
sober lifestyle was 'proverbial'.106 More unusual hints on 
prevention were supplied by members of the public through the 
correspondence columns of local newspapers. For instance, 
'Carbon' wrote to the Mercury to implore nurses, medical men 
and others who attended cholera patients to wear charcoal 
respirators which would, he promised, 'absorb deleterious 
gases and render them harmless1.10'7 The Leeds Sanitary 
Association produced the novel suggestion that people should 
keep their feet dry.108
Dr Robinson had been particularly concerned about the 
sanitary dangers posed by 'swine colonies' in the town and, by 
the beginning of August, had issued over five hundred notices 
demanding that pigs and pigsties be removed from the vicinity 
of dwelling houses.109 This form of action provoked an angry 
response from pig-owners who were 'determined to defend their 
interests against the encroachment of sanitary science'.110 
Meetings were held across the town for the purpose of 
establishing a Working Men's Pig Protection Society, which 
aimed to prevent the confiscation of pigs which were kept in a 
'clean and wholesome state', or failing this, to pressurise 
the Council into compensating owners whose stock was removed. 
The practice of keeping pigs was defended in a letter
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published in the Mercury, which stated that pigs were a 
'positive benefit to the community1 as they were effective 
scavengers which 'set a good example'.111 Although the 
formation of the Pig Protection Society reflected deep anger 
about sanitary operations and provides an indication of how 
unused the public were to comprehensive cleansing, its effects 
appear to have been limited as styes were removed without 
hindrance.
The preventive system put into force in 1866 resembled 
that seen in 1853-54. Identical administrative arrangements 
were made and similar medical and sanitary precautions taken, 
but there were significant changes at the margin. The danger 
posed by polluted drinking water was recognised as one amongst 
many dangers. Dr Hunter had been highly critical of Leeds' 
drinking water in 1865 because it was still drawn from the 
River Wharfe and, despite filtration, was badly polluted by 
discharges from factories.112 Such worries prompted the 
Waterworks Committee to seek alternative sources, yet by 1866 
it had been possible to make hardly any changes.
Consequently, frequent warnings about the dangers of foul or 
tainted water were issued. The message was unequivocal, no- 
one should 'drink water which has not been boiled and 
filtered'.113 Equally blunt advice was offered about the 
necessity of disinfection. The Leeds Sanitary Association 
warned that,
'If anyone in the house has cholera, put chloride of lime
onto what comes from them every time they have a motion,
or if they throw up, then take it at once to the midden.
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Don’t keep it in the house at all - nothing will be more
likely to make the rest ill1.1X4 
It also insisted that clothes and bedding worn or soiled by 
cholera patients should be washed immediately. Further advice 
on the dangers posed by faeces and the need for disinfection 
was provided for local employers who were urged: (i) to ensure 
that privies and channels in factories and workplaces were 
kept clean and treated with disinfectants; (ii) to keep 
supplies of medicine on their premises; and (iii) to send home 
any employee who had persistent symptoms. Perhaps most 
important of all, employers were instructed to ensure that if 
anyone at work defaecated or vomited on the floor or 
elsewhere, the dejecta were to be covered in chloride of lime 
before removing it.
When cholera cases were diagnosed in late August, special 
arrangements were made to cleanse and disinfect the homes of 
the sick, whilst general sanitary measures went ahead 
uninterrupted in other districts. Great importance had been 
attached to cleansing the homes of the sick in previous 
epidemics, but in 1866 the Guardians’ medical inspectors had 
special instructions that 'excreta [had] to be immediately 
disinfected' and that privies, gullies, sewers into which 
infected faeces might have been deposited were to be 
thoroughly disinfected.1X5 Steps were also taken to prevent 
members of the public entering the homes of the sick until 
disinfection and whitewashing operations had been 
completed.1X6 Robinson also visited every house where cholera
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had been diagnosed to ensure that soiled bedding, linen and 
clothes was burnt.117
The handful of cholera cases and deaths in the summer of 
1866 meant that the measures for treating and caring for the 
sick were not used.118 Nevertheless, on the basis of the 
arrangements which had been made, it is quite apparent that 
there had been an important shift in policy and that patients 
would have been treated in cholera hospitals rather than at 
home. In 1848-49 and 1853-54 the G.B.H. had recommended that 
cholera cases be treated at home and that relatives and others 
be removed from epidemic influences. Thus, just as priority 
was to be given to removing cholera faeces from the 
environment, great importance was attached to removing cholera 
patients from the community. The Leeds Times argued that 
'there is no doubt about the wisdom of establishing cholera 
hospitals' because on the one hand, they promoted the 
patient's recovery and, on the other, they 'cut off contagion 
by isolating them from the uninfected portion of the 
community'.119 Whether or not the cholera hospital in Leeds 
was actually used is unclear; that healthy people were removed 
from infected houses to the Sanatorium House of Refuge 
suggests that it might have been.120
4.5 BRADFORD
As in the other towns the Bradford Guardians were 
notified in July 1866 of the Privy Council's decision to
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invoke the N.R.D.P.A. The Town Council and Guardians had 
already discussed in June cholera's approach and what strategy 
to follow.121 At the suggestion of the Mayor, they had 
already applied jointly to the War Office for permission to 
use the barracks on Bradford Moor as a Cholera Hospital.122 
In July, the Guardians received a visit from Mr Corbett of the 
Poor Law Board who explained how the Act should be put into 
force and outlined their responsibilities.123 Untypically, 
the Guardians decided to follow the Medical Department's 
advice to the letter, though as in Leeds new measures were not 
given any priority. At a specially convened meeting they 
voted: to divide the Union into seven districts for the 
purpose of visitation; to appoint a number of medical officers 
or Guardians to oversee and co-ordinate visitation in each 
district; and to employ a respected local medical man, Dr 
Macturk, as Medical Adviser.124 Two days later preparations 
were made for the erection of a temporary cholera hospital, 
the acquisition of premises suitable for use as a sanatorium, 
and the recruitment of nurses for both establishments. 
Additionally, a quantity of carbolic acid was bought for 
disinfection and notices posted in all the town's common 
lodging houses informing inmates of the need to consult a 
medical officer on the first sign of diarrhoea or other bowel 
complaints.
On hearing of the steps taken by the Guardians, the 
Council met to discuss their own duties as the L.B.H.125 The 
Mayor explained to his colleagues that although the Guardians 
were responsible for implementing the N.R.D.P.A., the Council
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was still obliged to carry out nuisance removal and general 
cleansing. Even though the meeting was informed that the 
public health in Bradford was ’never more satisfactory’, the 
Council, perhaps mindful that cholera had already been 
reported in nearby Batley and Dewsbury, voted to step up 
sanitary operations. Councillors, acting as district visitors 
for their respective wards, undertook a sanitary inspection of 
the town and reported nuisances to the Sanitary Committee.126 
Meanwhile, the Sanitary Committee authorised the Town Surveyor 
and his staff to take immediate action to disinfect all the 
waterways, grates, drains and ashpits in the Borough.127
The authorities’ willingness to act swiftly and 
comprehensively was welcomed by the local press. At the 
beginning of August, The Observer praised the vigorous 
cooperation between the two authorities which, it believed, 
was facilitating the speedy removal ’of nuisances and every 
visible cause of disease’, whilst the Bradford Review 
applauded their ’active stirring in preparation for the 
unwelcome visitor’.128 As usual when cholera threatened, the 
public was reminded of the need to support and follow official 
preventive efforts. Allowing for the fact that the 'absolute 
prevention and extirpation of cholera [required] order to be 
taken in India and Turkey', both Bradford's newspapers devoted 
space to detailing requirements of personal and domestic 
hygiene, sanitary vigilance, attention to diet, the needs for 
moderate and temperate habits, and early treatment of bowel 
complaints.129 The only mention of water supply was the
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familiar advice to shun foul or contaminated drinking which 
the Review told its readers was 'a promoter of cholera’.130
Most of the advice provided by the newspapers was pitched 
at the working class and again extolled the virtues of 
cleanliness and temperance. The Bradford Observer complained 
that the term ’cleanliness1 was interpreted too narrowly by 
the majority of Bradford’s.131 Moral cleanliness, it argued, 
was of equal importance to physical cleanliness, therefore, 
sobriety and moderation in all aspects of life were regarded 
as vital preventives. In this context, particular concern was 
expressed about the drinking habits of Bradford's operatives, 
with the Observer reminding the public that avoidance of 
excessive drinking at weekends had brought a salutary effect 
during the 1849 epidemic.132 Interestingly, middle class 
activities and traits were also attacked , irresponsible and 
avaricious landlords were the target of particular criticism. 
It was disgraceful, contended the Observer that in a town,
'with its copious streams brought to everyone’s door’, many 
poor people were 'condemned by their landlords to buy water by 
the bucket’ whilst ’others still depend on wells’.133 More 
unusually, the Observer noted a certain reluctance on the part 
of sections of the town's middle class to co-operate with 
medical visitors and sanitary inspectors. The paper warned 
that the group most likely to object to visitation - the lower 
middle class - were also likely to eschew calls for cleansing 
and sanitary vigilance in and around the home. There existed 
in Bradford, it claimed, 'a most dangerous class of wives - 
those who consider themselves ladies, but want the means - too
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proud to swill and clean, and too poor to keep servants to do 
these common but necessary things for them’.134
Pleas for sanitary vigilance took on an added urgency at 
the beginning of August when a case of cholera was diagnosed. 
On 4 August, Dr Bell reported that Mrs Cumming of Tetley Row 
was suffering from symptoms which were unmistakably those of 
Asiatic Cholera.135 The news prompted the Guardians to take 
additional precautions. On the sanitary side, the stricken 
house was disinfected repeatedly, visitation stepped up in the 
vicinity of Tetley Row and a variety of nuisances were 
reported to the Sanitary Committee.136 Special arrangements 
were also made, ’for the purpose of securing all proper 
attention for Mrs Cumming1.137
It might seem anomalous that at a time when there was a 
broad consensus in favour of the use of cholera hospitals, Mrs 
Cumming and subsequent cholera patients were treated at home. 
This was not due to local rejection of contagionist ideas, 
indeed, the reverse. The authorities could not find suitable 
hospital premises because of objections by residents near all 
the possible sites. The application to the War Office for use 
of the Barracks was unsuccessful and consequently, when the 
first case was reported Bradford was still without isolation 
facilities. At the beginning of August the Guardians were 
left with no alternative but to build temporary accommodation 
in the workhouse grounds.138 A temporary wooden shelter was 
erected although seemingly never used.139 All the cases which 
were notified to the Guardians, including five fatal ones at
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Warwick Street, were treated at home by Medical Officers and 
specially recruited nurses.140
Whilst the Guardians devoted much time to caring for the 
sick and cleansing infected houses, they were also busy in 
other areas. Visitation, which enabled them to keep a check 
on the incidence of diarrhoea, to prescribe medicines where 
necessary, to issue advice to the public and to identify 
nuisances, was conducted thoroughly throughout August and 
September. The Council’s Sanitary Committee was no less 
active, responding to complaints of nuisances from the public, 
the Guardians and their own visiting teams.
TABLE 4.2.
NUMBER OF NUISANCES REMOVED BY THE SANITARY COMMITTEE IN THE YEARS 1865, 1866 AND 1867.
NUISANCE/ACTIVITY. NUMBERS REMOVED IN YEARS ENDING
30.9.1865 30 .9.1866. 30.9.1867.
Drains cleaned or opened 128 232 242
Privies, Ashpits repaired/drained 42 207 451
Accumulations of filth removed 13 94 99
Pigsties removed 8 53 139
Houses Whitewashed 0 109 50
Source: Bradford, Reports of the Sanitary Committee of the Town Council for year ending 30.9.1865; 30.9.1866; 30.9.1867.
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Throughout the summer the Committee’s workload increased 
substantially as its employees tackled a variety of nuisances 
including accumulations of filth, pigsties, overflowing 
privies, open ditches and filthy houses.141 The increased 
level of sanitary activity in the summer of 1866 did not go 
unnoticed, nor did the fact that it was quickly scaled down 
when the threat passed (See TABLE 4.2.).142
4.6 SHEFFIELD
Cholera's return to Britain in the mid-1860s coincided 
with a period of rapid change in Sheffield's public health 
arrangements. With the adoption of the Local Government Act 
in 1864, the Highway Boards and Improvement Commission were 
abolished and their duties transferred to the Council, which 
was designated the L.B.H.143 This restructuring brought hopes 
of a significant improvement in the standard of the town's 
public health.144
In the two years after its inauguration, the L.B.H. 
embarked upon a modest programme of improvement, passing by­
laws to tighten up building and planning regulations in 1864, 
slaughterhouses in 1865 and nuisance removal in 1866.145 More 
importantly perhaps, an ambitious plan for the main drainage 
of the town was mooted in 1865 and approved by the Council a 
year later.146 Although the level of sanitary activity had 
increased markedly since 1864, concern about sanitary
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conditions began to mount once again in 1865 with the news 
that cholera was again spreading.
During the summer of 1865 the appearance of a number of 
reports in the local newspapers charting cholera's progress in 
the Middle East did not at first lead to particular concern. 
When the Privy Council contacted Sheffield Town Council in 
August to warn it that cholera was approaching, the majority 
of Councillors rejected calls for immediate action. Isaac 
Ironside, for example, scoffed at 'the most solemn and ancient 
Privy Council' because it took 'notice of the gossip of 
newspapers'.147 A later communication from the L.G.B., which 
warned that cholera was moving ever closer to Britain and 
urged the Council to take 'steps for the preservation of 
health', was taken far more seriously. Mindful of reports 
from Southampton, the Council voted to allow the Cleansing 
Committee an annual budget of £3,150 for carrying out the 
provisions of the N.R.D.P.A.148
Predictably, there was no shortage of advice for the 
Cleansing Committee on what to do. Two different courses of 
action were proposed, one involving the customary assault on 
the full range of nuisances and sanitary defects which 
blighted Sheffield, the other suggesting the implementation of 
more specific measures such as disinfection.149 Calls for the 
latter course of action were not based on any belief in the 
water-borne or similar theories of infection, so much as the 
view that there was insufficient time to effect the wholesale 
removal of nuisances. This argument took on added weight when
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a fatal case of cholera was reported in early October. The 
public, the local newspapers and medical men like Dr Hall 
continued to urge the Council to take advantage of the winter 
months to mount an attack on nuisances.150
Public and official anxiety appears to have faded during 
the winter of 1865-66. The following summer, however, it 
quickly re-surfaced after the local press published details of 
how the disease had gained a foothold at a number of British 
ports and was beginning to spread inland.151 Judging by the 
editorial comment, reports and letters in the local press, 
there was a widespread feeling that the authorities, and 
particularly the Council as the L.B.H., were not doing enough. 
The Sheffield Daily Telegraph, for example, attacked the 
Council’s recent sanitary record, declaring that it had failed 
to take advantage of the winter respite and despite cholera's 
approach and widespread public alarm was still ’not alive to 
the crisis’.152 The Sheffield Independent was slightly less 
critical, arguing that 'the Health Committee have shown some 
signs of activity ... but the activity is scarcely equal to 
the emergency’ .153
Whether or not the newspapers' criticism of the Council 
was justified is open to question. Within days of being 
accused of complacency the Council went some way towards 
silencing (or reassuring) its critics by explaining the 
various preventive measures already taken. Evidence drawn 
from the Council’s minutes and the newspapers themselves 
reveal that official preparations for the epidemic began well
344
before the Privy Council ordered local authorities to take 
action in July. In mid-May the Health Committee had resolved 
that Sheffield and Ecclesall Bierlow Guardians should be asked 
to assume responsibility for providing medical relief if 
cholera broke out.134 The Council subsequently approved this 
proposal and reached an agreement with the Guardians under 
which they would provide and equip hospital premises, set up 
dispensaries in various parts of the town and instruct their 
Medical Officers to attend and treat any cases of diarrhoea or 
cholera brought to their attention. All these measures and 
facilities were ready by the end of July.155
As well as making provision for treating the sick the 
local authorities stepped up their efforts on the cleansing 
front. In the same week that the newspapers mounted their 
attack on the local authorities, the Chairman of the Sheffield 
Guardians informed his colleagues that ’A great deal had been 
done recently to put the town in a healthy condition and the 
Town Council had effected a great improvement1.156 To 
illustrate this point, the Chairman, explained that the 
Council had permitted the Chief Sanitary Inspector to 'employ 
as many men as required for cleansing duties', and that in 
just two months these men, working alongside permanent Council 
employees, had cleaned all the town's rivers and goits, 
removed 5,000 tons of night-soil and a variety of other 
nuisances and had disinfected premises and streets with 
chloride of lime. In addition, the Guardians had also 
distributed handbills advising the poor on how to clean their 
homes and provided free lime for paupers. In the opinion of
345
the Chairman of the Guardians, the authorities ’had taken time 
by the forelock’ and implemented all the measures recommended 
by the Privy Council. Handbills and posters distributed by 
the authorities, along with articles in the newspapers, 
provided a stream of advice that was identical with that seen 
in 1854.
Hearing details of the various forms of preventive action 
taken by the Council and Guardians, helped to appease their 
critics. The Independent, for example, quickly changed tack, 
praising their efforts.157 Even the influential Dr Aveling, 
who had an axe to grind with the Council because of its 
failure to appoint a qualified medical man to the Health 
Committee, admitted that this had not prevented it from being 
’active in cleaning away nuisances and otherwise improving the 
sanitary condition of the town’.158 The only serious 
reservation expressed was due to the authorities' failure to 
mount a system of house-to-house visitation similar to that 
seen in 1849. As recently as 1865, Henry Jackson, a widely 
respected local medical man, had again extolled the virtues of 
the famed ’Sheffield Plan’ at the annual congress of the 
National Association for the Promotion of Social Science.159 
The Independent reminded its readers of the 'beneficial 
results' which had accrued from the 'Sheffield Plan of 
Visitation' in 1849 and went on to urge the Council to 
implement a similar scheme which, it insisted, was a far more 
effective way of communicating with the poor than distributing 
leaflets which were 'rarely read'.160
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That relatively little was written in the local 
newspapers about cholera and related issues between early 
August and mid-September suggests that the Council maintained 
its programme and the Guardians were ready to provide medical 
relief if and when required.161 In the event, the cholera 
hospitals and dispensaries were not used. A number of cases 
and fatalities occurred in the nearby villages of Grenoside, 
Chapeltown and Ecclesfield in the middle of September, yet 
only one case came to light in Sheffield itself.162 This 
involved the death on 19 September, after a short illness 
closely resembling cholera, of a man residing in Castle 
Street. Although reports of this and a similar case in 
another part of the town fuelled rumours of a cholera 
outbreak, the public was reassured that both deaths were 
attributable to aggravated diarrhoea.163 After this brief 
scare, cholera quickly disappeared from the news.164
Overall, the official response in 1865-66 closely 
resembled that seen in 1848-49 and 1853-54, with the 
authorities concentrating their efforts on pre-emptive 
nuisance removal, sanitary cleansing and medical aid. The 
impact of the various changes and developments in theories of 
disease causation and transmission which had taken place 
appears to have been minimal. On closer examination, however, 
it becomes apparent that the public and the authorities were 
aware of the new measures and in many cases responded 
accordingly.
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Warnings about the dangers of drinking foul water were 
issued from a variety of sources during the summer of 1866.
The Sheffield Daily Telegraph warned that when cholera 
threatened, even greater care than usual should be taken ’to 
guard against the pollution of drinking water' and explained 
to its readers that 'the [cholera] poison ... is thrown off in 
the faecal discharge' and is 'communicated most readily by 
water tainted by the smell from, or still worse by actual 
contact with sewage'.165 The Independent offered its readers 
similar advice, stressing that 'Bad water can cause cholera'. 
Dr Hall, whose advocacy of sanitary reform was based on 
miasmatic explanations of disease causation, pointed out that 
evidence from past epidemics convinced him that 'there is no 
more certain way of inviting attacks ... than by drinking 
impure water' and, like the two newspapers, he recommended 
that water should not be drunk unless it had been boiled for 
several minutes.166
Generally speaking, the purity of Sheffield's drinking 
water, which was piped directly from reservoirs on nearby 
moors, was not questioned.167 Nevertheless, local 
publications carried adverts for a variety of purification 
devices including filters and additives, most of which, it was 
claimed, would protect purchasers from ill health. Joseph 
Johnson promised that his 'Water Filter' removed all 'earthy, 
animal or vegetable matter, thus preventing the baneful 
effects which impure water directly tends to produce'.168 
Some traders were quick to realise that cholera could be 
exploited to boost trade. For example, one advert in the
348
newspapers declared authoritatively that ’IMPURE WATER CAUSES 
CHOLERA’ and went on to state that the impurities could only 
be removed by cistern filters.169 If people were not 
completely reassured by filters or additives they had the 
option of hiring Mr Allen F.C.S. who promised to examine, 
analyse and ’report on the sanitary condition of every 
description of water'.170 Even though the expense of these 
products and services meant they were they were beyond the 
reach of the poor, a large number of filters and similar 
devices were reported to have been bought ’by householders in 
dread of cholera’.171
The belief that human excrement and victims' faeces in 
particular, spread or helped to spread cholera influenced 
actions by the authorities to some extent. Disinfection, 
general and specific, was undertaken on such a scale that the 
Health Committee was forced to buy 'four times as much lime as 
usual’ in August.172 When the two suspicious cases occurred 
in September, the authorities took the various precautions 
recommended by Simon which were consistent with the view that 
patient’s discharges, and any part of their body or belongings 
soiled with the same, were capable of transmitting cholera.
The Chairman of the Guardians asked the surgeon who attended 
the Castle Street case to ensure that 'the body was at once 
put into a coffin or shell, that the room ... was locked up 
and all other steps were taken to prevent contagion’.173 The 
'other steps’ included the sprinkling of chloride of lime in 
and around the victims’ home and the destruction of clothes 
and bedding.174 The public were told that cholera was not
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'strictly infectious' and could not be caught directly from 
the sick, but that it could be contracted from their 
discharges.175
4.7. 1866 IN PERSPECTIVE
The threat of cholera in 1865-66 revealed that the 
Medical Department of the Privy Council had formulated a 
number of new precautions which were recommended along with 
general cleansing operations. These were: (i) the medical 
inspection of ships arriving from infected ports, (ii) 
disinfection of human faeces, particularly those of cholera 
patients, (iii) the provision of uncontaminated drinking 
water, and (iv) the isolation of patients with cholera. This 
programme was undoubtedly shaped by changes in the medical and 
epidemiological understanding of cholera's etiology since in 
1853-54. The greatest shift was not towards a water-borne 
theory championed by Snow, but to a variant, namely, that 
patients' discharges carried the cholera poison. The 
practical measures deriving from this were just added to the 
existing armoury, with none of the tried and tested measures 
from earlier epidemics being dropped. New knowledge was not 
'discovered' and then had an impact as a discrete thing, 
rather it was constructed and interpreted as part of existing 
discourses and practical programmes.
Administratively, the disease was once again combated by 
the familiar combination of central direction and local
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actions, the basis being emergency measures under the 
N.R.D.P.A. Within these provisions there was again room for a 
degree of variation locally and, as the case studies confirm, 
differences in the type of action taken were evident in 1866. 
Not surprisingly, the greatest contrast was between Hull and 
the three inland towns.
The experience of the 1853-54 meant that by 1865-66 
cholera was regarded as a port disease. Simon and his 
colleagues at the Medical Department believed that the disease 
was most likely to be introduced into the country by seamen 
and emigrants and from this they devised a two-tier system of 
prevention. This involved firstly an attempt to keep the 
disease out by medical inspection at British seaports; and, if 
and when this failed, the implementation of general and 
specific precautions across the whole country.
The fear that cholera might be introduced by emigrants 
was felt very deeply in Hull and shaped the local response.
But the local authorities did not just rely on medical 
inspection, it also took measures designed to prevent contact 
between emigrants and local people and traditional sanitary 
precautions. No direct attention was paid to water supplies, 
these were regarded as safe and secure.
In the three inland towns the response to the threat of 
cholera also had elements of the old and the new. In Leeds, 
Bradford and Sheffield, news of cholera's approach prompted 
the relevant local authorities to join forces and instigate
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the familiar burst of sanitary activity. However, this was 
augmented by the implementation of some of those new measures 
recommended by Simon, though there were differences in 
emphasis. As was the case in Hull, these reflected local 
health concerns and politicking as much if not more than the 
particular exigencies of cholera. In Sheffield, the problem 
was not the quality of water rather its quantity. Shortages 
meant that cleansing was difficult and that water had to be 
stored and hence became more vulnerable to contamination, 
hence there were more calls than elsewhere for boiling, the 
use of additives and testing. In both Leeds and Bradford 
warnings were given about the dangers of drinking unsafe 
water, but the overriding action was still on the broad 
sanitary front.
Emergency sanitary activity began to be scaled down once 
the epidemic abated in 1865-66 and once again it looked as if 
a temporary crisis had only produced temporary responses. 
However, the years after 1866 did see significant changes, not 
because of cholera but due to the passage of the Sanitary Act 
in 1866. This Bill was drafted by John Simon and signalled 
the end of full local autonomy as several Clauses were 
compulsory. The Privy Council, through its Medical 
Department, was empowered to make local authorities provide 
sewerage systems and water supplies.176 That the Act and 
cholera appeared in the same year was mere coincidence. The 
legislation was the culmination of several years work by Simon 
and was designed to provide lasting solutions to endemic urban
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diseases; indeed, the 1866 epidemic continued to be fought, as 
had the two previous epidemics, through the N.R.D.P.A.
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PART 5
CONCLUSION
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This part first discusses the experiences and reactions 
to the later cholera threats in 1871-71, 1883-84 and 1892-93, 
before moving on to the main conclusions.
5.1 CHOLERA 1867-93
1871-72
Initially, the official response to the threat of cholera 
in 1871 was coordinated by officers of the Privy Council who 
once again used an Order in Council to enable local 
authorities in British ports to take appropriate action.1 
Late in 1871 the powers of the Medical Department were 
transferred to the newly established Local Government Board 
(L.G.B.), an agency which has been described as Britain’s 
first 'unified public health administration'.2 The new Public 
Health Act, 1872 provided the L.G.B. with wider powers, 
including provision to establish District Sanitary Authorities 
(D.S.A.) and the compulsory appointment of a (qualified) 
Medical Officer of Health (M.O.H.).3 In terms of keeping 
cholera at bay, the powers allowing the creation of Port 
Sanitary Authorities were particularly important as they 
institutionalised the two-tier approach to the control of 
epidemics which first emerged in 1866.4
Not unexpectedly, the greatest activity in Yorkshire was 
seen in Hull, where as soon as cholera reached the Baltic 
ports in 1871 warnings were issued about the dangers posed by 
emigrants and the need for sanitary vigilance.5 The message
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was reinforced at the end of July by the confirmation of two 
cases on board a ship which had sailed from the Baltic.6 The 
Privy Council immediately ordered that all ships arriving at 
Hull from infected countries should be subjected to a thorough 
inspection before entering the port and that necessary 
measures for burial of victims at sea, for isolating the sick 
and for disinfection should be 'strictly enforced1.”7 
Simultaneously, the local authority introduced more 
inspections and cleansing.8 Throughout the cholera scare of 
1871-73 frequent warnings were again issued about the danger 
posed by water contaminated with the excreta of victims. In 
Hull, as in 1866, there was confidence in the water supply and 
greater fears were expressed about the possibility of 
contaminated water being inadvertently carried into the town 
on ships. The crews of local vessels leaving for 'cholera 
districts' were warned to 'take enough good water from Hull so 
as not to have to fill up in cholera ports where healthy water 
is not available'.9
Whilst there was mounting confidence that medical 
inspection would prevent the importation of cholera, the 
experience of 1866 left medical men and officials in no doubt 
that additional precautions were necessary. Thus, D.S.A.s 
everywhere were instructed to implement the familiar 
precautions to ensure that if cholera did arrive it would not 
spread. Alongside providing medical facilities, undertaking 
cleansing operations, and advising on matters like diet and 
hygiene, there were now clear statements that steps to ensure 
that water supplies were not liable to contamination.10 In
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the inland towns of Yorkshire this message was taken seriously 
and appropriate measures adopted.11 Epidemic cholera did not 
become established, indeed, the Registrar General’s returns 
showed fewer cholera deaths in both 1871 and 1872 that there 
had been in 1870.12 In the event, the threat in 1872 appeared 
rather remote, yet the absence of even localised outbreaks 
boosted confidence in sanitary science and its applications.
1883-1884
The next threat in 1883-84 was more immediate and taken 
more seriously, especially following reports of high mortality 
on the continent.13 The medical inspection of ships, their 
crew and passengers was now firmly regarded as the key to 
keeping cholera out of the country. A new factor now was that 
suspicion also fell upon ships cargoes, particularly those 
which were thought to be 'capable of conveying infection' and 
inspection was widened to include these.14 In Hull there were 
worries that rags imported for recycling in the West Riding 
shoddy trade represented a very serious threat, as there was 
no way of knowing who had last used it or how.15 As a result, 
the Medical Officer of Health (M.O.H.) and his staff were 
instructed to impound and disinfect all imported rags before 
allowing them to be transhipped to their inland destinations. 
Beyond this there was a slightly different balance of 
priorities, with greater attention was given to water 
supplies, the inspection of lodging houses and the provision 
of isolation hospitals. The latter being particularly
367
associated in the 1880s with the control of infectious 
diseases.
The threat of cholera was again a source of anxiety to 
officials in the inland towns of Yorkshire. Indeed, the news 
that cholera was present in Europe in 1883 prompted the 
Yorkshire Association of M.Os.H. to convene a special meeting 
in Leeds to discuss preventive action.16 The meeting resolved 
that M.Os.H. representing inland Sanitary Districts, including 
Leeds, Bradford and Sheffield, should ensure that: (i) 
attention be given to water supplies; (ii) general sanitary 
cleansing and disinfection be adopted; and (iii) lodging 
houses be inspected and overcrowding removed. These measures 
were more traditional than those taken in Hull, but 
demonstrate clearly that cholera could still shock inland 
towns into temporary sanitary action. Legislative changes now 
made cholera easier to combat. Most large towns had M.Os.H.. 
and sanitary authorities already active in public health and 
increasingly used to intervening in health crises.17 Many of 
the actions taken had changed very little since 1865-66, or 
from 1848-49 for that matter. While few, if any, measures had 
been dropped from the sanitary armoury, many new priorities 
and methods had been added. This aggregate approach reflected 
continuing uncertainties about cholera's cause and mode of 
transmission amongst the medical profession in Britain and 
internationally.
Throughout the 1870s and early 1880s a number of theories 
were discussed in the medical and lay press, especially as
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investigators tried to assimilate cholera into the model of a 
germ theory of disease.18 Pettenkofer’s theory, which he and 
others had refined considerably since the 1860s, continued to 
receive widespread support in Britain and abroad.19 
Similarly, the work of Robert Koch, who claimed to have and 
isolated the cholera vibrio in 1884, was widely discussed.20 
His microscopic and other evidence was received coolly in 
Britain, where many doctors continued to believe that cholera 
was not caused by a specific microbe, but that the germs of 
ordinary diarrhoea or dysentery took the new form and 
properties of epidemic cholera in particular conditions in the 
gut or environment.21 British medical authorities were no 
longer interested in the investigation of cholera. When the 
disease reached Egypt in 1883, the German and French 
governments obtained permission from the Foreign Office to 
send research teams, the British authorities despatched a team 
of doctors to set up preventive and treatment measures.22
For the British government cholera was by the 1880s 
primarily a colonial disease and one which due to late 
nineteenth century imperialism was growing in importance.
With India the home of the cholera the Imperial government, 
along with that in India, was under pressure to control 
epidemics at source by the implementation of quarantines or 
the introduction of sanitary improvements into India itself.23 
Both demands, made increasingly through the International 
Sanitary Conferences, were resisted because of their impact on 
trade and public spending. Besides, the authorities and 
medical men in India were much more hostile to quarantines and
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sanitary policing than metropolitan agencies had become.24 It 
seems that London bowed more to European diplomatic pressure, 
while in India the local problems of urbanisation, pilgrimages 
and finance held sway; though it was also true that colonial 
doctors held on to miasmatic ideas much longer than their 
European counterparts.
1892-93
During the early 1890s Europe was once again host to 
epidemic cholera. Whilst levels of mortality on the continent 
were significantly lower than in previous visitations, some 
places suffered badly. In Hamburg, for example, 10,000 people 
died in just six weeks in 1992.25 With cholera at such close 
quarters, officials and the public in Britain became 
increasingly nervous.
Hull’s close trading links with Hamburg meant its 
authorities did not need to be told to take action. By the 
time the L.G.B. ordered Port and Riparian Sanitary Authorities 
to take steps, the Hull and Goole P.S.A. had already acted, 
making the necessary arrangements for the medical inspection 
of ships and the provision of medical facilities.26 All ships 
arriving at Hull were inspected, suspect cargoes destroyed or 
fumigated, and passengers or crew found to be suffering from 
’infectious diseases’ sent to hospital. Meanwhile, in the 
town itself, sanitary cleansing and disinfection were stepped 
up and the public advised to seek immediate treatment for 
diarrhoeal illnesses.2”7 Whilst there was virtual unanimity
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amongst government officials and the medical profession that 
medical inspection represented the most effective means of 
keeping cholera at bay, there was a feeling in Hull that the 
P.S.A. needed greater powers to 'prevent emigrants arriving 
from Hamburg'.28 The news in September that a case of cholera 
had evaded medical inspection prompted the local press to call 
for a seven day quarantine for all shipping which had sailed 
from infected ports. The Eastern Morning News demanded to 
know, 'Why should ships from a cholera devastated city ... be 
permitted to bring the deadly germ into the heart of our 
town'?29 However, medical opinion saw no need for a return to 
quarantines in Britain. At a meeting of the B.M.A. in 
Newcastle in 1893, Hull's Port Sanitary Authority's Medical 
Officer, J. Wright-Mason, explained that quarantines were 
futile, because they had never worked and diverted attention 
away from sanitary measures, the tried and tested way to 
combat cholera.30
Fears that the town was vulnerable appeared to be 
warranted. In August and September 1993 a spate of cholera 
cases, several of them fatal, were reported amongst local 
people.31 Initially, there was a degree of confusion about 
whether the cases were true 'Asiatic' cholera, though this was 
quickly settled when the M.O.H. used the bacteriological 
services of the L.G.B. to confirm the worse.32 With the full 
support of the L.G.B. the authorities in Hull sought to 
prevent the further spread by action on several fronts. First 
general sanitary and medical precautions were stepped up.
This saw four 'sanitary columns' comprising Inspectors of
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Nuisances, sanitary officers, flushers, limewashers and 
disinfectors, mount a blitz on sanitary hazards in their 
respective districts. Additionally, a steam pump was hired to 
ensure that sewers and drains continued to flow and the 
Guardians agreed to supply disinfectants to the poor for use 
in and around the home. Meanwhile, all medical men were 
requested to notify cases of diarrhoea to the M.O.H., 
medicines were provided free of charge and the public were 
urged to take a number of special precautions.33 Where cases 
were reported, sanitary measures were more ’concentrated'. 
Sufferers were removed to hospital and corpses to a temporary 
and isolated morgue, and then to a separate burial ground.
This was followed by the removal of any excreta for cremation, 
the destruction of clothes, bedding, floor coverings and 
furniture, the cleansing and disinfection of privies and the 
flushing and disinfection of subsidiary drains. Where cases 
of diarrhoea were reported the authorities provided pails 
charged with disinfectants for 'the reception of evacuations 
of the patients'. These were collected daily by sanitary 
staff and taken away for cremation. As had been the case in 
previous scares, no steps were taken to protect the town's 
water supply which was considered to be safe. During the 
'epidemic' of 1893, a total of 17 cases and 12 deaths occurred 
in Hull.
News that cholera was present in Hull caused apprehension 
in the large towns of the West Riding.34 However, Leeds, 
Bradford and Sheffield were prepared. In both Leeds and 
Bradford the local authorities had responded with alacrity.
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Reports of solitary cases in both towns saw the authorities 
take immediate steps to isolate victims (and in Leeds, other 
householders), to disinfect their possessions, homes and 
privies, and to clean and disinfect adjoining sewers and 
drains.35 In Sheffield, the City Council took steps to 
cleanse insanitary districts, a measure which was praised in 
local newspaper.36
In 1894 a handful of imported cases were reported in 
Britain. Neither these, nor the cases and deaths amongst the 
indigenous population in 1893, dented widespread faith in what 
was increasingly seen as the British method of combating 
cholera. Commenting on demands by certain P.S.A.s for the 
reintroduction of Quarantine, Dr Thorne Thorne, President of 
the L.G.B., argued that quarantines,
’would have involved a grave departure from the 
traditional attitude of England in the face of cholera; 
an attitude which has been one of the main forces in 
securing for this country that sanitary administration 
and those habitual sanitary practices which have won for 
her the esteem and envy of other nations, and which have 
been at the root of the greatest saving of life from the 
preventable diseases that has ever been recorded in the 
history of the world1.3-7 
For all their sophisticated laboratory medicine and 
bacteriology, Germany could still experience a crisis like 
that in Hamburg, whereas Britain’s sanitary science and 
associated public health system had once again ensured freedom 
from epidemic cholera.
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5.2 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF 
CHOLERA, 1848-93
As noted in the Introduction, the substantial body of 
work on cholera in Britain, which followed in the wake of the 
seminal contributions of Briggs and Rosenberg, has not pursued 
their agendas for comparative and sequential studies. Studies 
of single epidemics, usually the first in 1831-2, or of a 
single town or theme still dominate the field. The neglect of 
the later epidemics has been justified on the grounds that the 
first epidemic had the greatest impact, and that after this 
cholera really belonged to the history of public health and 
medical science. This study has shown that the impact of the 
later epidemics was different from that of 1831-32, but no 
less interesting and perhaps more revealing of official and 
other attitudes to health crises. It has also shown, in line 
with the expectations of Briggs and Rosenberg, that there were 
variations in the experiences of towns due to different 
physical and economic geographies, and to different socio­
political structures and relations.
The ideal in comparative studies is to consider the same 
issues and variables in different conditions or different 
variables in the same conditions. However, historical data is 
rarely complete or consistent enough to allow these ideals to 
be realised. Such was the case with the records on cholera 
and public health across the three epidemics and four towns 
considered in this study. For example, for the 1848-49 
epidemic there was only qualitative information on the
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official response in Bradford, but for later epidemics there 
was detailed quantitative data, even down to the number of 
drains unblocked. In the case of Sheffield there are no 
records of the Board of Guardians. On the other hand, 
Sheffield’s lively radical culture and press made the popular 
responses easier to document than in Bradford where the 
working class voice found little recorded expression. Despite 
the unevenness of the sources, this study has tried 
consistently to discuss the same issues and themes throughout. 
The consideration of three epidemics over sixteen years, means 
that I have had to rely on secondary sources for contextual 
information on wider political and public health measures in 
the four towns. However, these sources have not been treated 
uncritically and on a number of occasions their 
interpretations have been questioned. Inevitably a study that 
seeks to compare four towns cannot match the painstaking 
detail that is often a feature of single town histories, but 
then I did not set just to create another piece of a jigsaw, 
rather the aim has been to create pieces that match, which can 
be put together and to make sense of the picture that emerges.
The scope of this study - four towns over two decades - 
has meant that certain themes have not been pursued as fully 
as would have been possible if the focus had been on a single 
or even two towns. For example, local political variables 
have only been introduced when they were overtly important.
No systematic attempt has been made to analyse the local 
political response in terms of links and relationships between 
party politics and local government structures over time. The
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background of party in-fighting and other factors remains to 
be fully explored. There are likely to be ’rich pickings' for 
future researchers who take up the long term development of 
sanitary reform, though such variables were clearly less 
important in short term responses to epidemics. A cautionary 
note should be made however; anyone wishing to undertake a 
comparative approach along such lines will have to tread very 
carefully as common 'party lines' across towns may be 
difficult to discern, not least because of the differences in 
the composition and policies of the different parties in each 
of the towns and over time.
5.2.1. EXPERIENCES
This study has shown that the understanding we have of 
the 1831-32 cholera epidemic is a poor guide to what happened 
in subsequent cholera crises. The mortality in 1848-49 was at 
least double that of 1831-32, but there was less sense of 
national crisis and fewer instances of local social unrest. 
While the 'two nations' model, most effectively used by Morris 
and Durey remains the most valuable approach, it has been 
shown that this must take on board the fact that class 
relations varied between industrial towns in the same county 
and altered over time. The 'two nations' in Hull in 1849 were 
quite distinct from those in Sheffield. Nonetheless cholera 
remained a disease suffered mainly by the working class and 
like other urban diseases was perceived and acted upon as a 
working class problem.
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In 1848-49 there were major differences in mortality 
between the towns, with Hull and Sheffield at two ends of the 
spectrum nationally and regionally. In 1853-54 and 1865-66 
none of the four towns experienced a major epidemic, though 
they did experience exceptional levels of public health 
activity, such that one can talk of an ’epidemic 
consciousness' being present in every town. While nationally 
there was an incremental fall in cholera mortality over the 
three later epidemics, in the four towns there was a single 
fall after 1849. As each scare passed there was growing 
confidence that the disease was controllable. By 1865-66 
cholera was increasingly seen and acted upon as a port 
disease, though this did not halt precautionary measures being 
taken by the inland towns, right up to the 1890s. This shows 
that despite its diminishing impact on mortality, cholera was 
still a ’shock’ disease and that despite increasing scientific 
understanding and success in control it still had a profound 
psychological effect. It is impossible to say what 
combination of circumstances produced the varied mortality of 
the four towns, though it was possible and interesting to 
speculate. What is clear is that in Sheffield in 1849 and 
elsewhere in later epidemics, official actions were felt to 
have 'worked' and prevented or contained the epidemic. Thus, 
after the 1840s cholera was no longer regarded as capricious 
or a divine judgement beyond the control of human agency, but 
a disease which could be combated by rational measures.
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5.2.2. OFFICIAL RESPONSES
The administrative arrangements and disease experiences 
of the four towns were all different in 1849 and changed 
between, and sometimes during, epidemics. An important 
finding of this study has been that there were significant 
changes in the official response over the three epidemics. In 
1848-49 there were major differences between the towns in 
levels and forms of activity both to the approach and the 
containment of the epidemic. This was due to a number of 
variables: social relations and class attitudes, the role of 
the medical profession, theories of cholera’s etiology, local 
reactions to relations with central government, the intensity 
of the mortality crisis and past experiences of epidemic 
diseases. Over the four towns in 1848-49 arguably the most 
important and consistent factor in shaping the official 
response was social relations and attitudes. In Hull the 
epidemic revealed the inadequacies of local government and 
class attitudes which reflected the social apartheid of the 
town. Whilst in Sheffield, relatively close social ties led, 
with one notable exception, to class cooperation and consensus 
on appropriate measures. The relative importance of other 
factors varied. For example, in Bradford it was the intensity 
of the epidemic which prompted major revisions in sanitary and 
medical actions, whilst in Leeds the recent experience of 
fever epidemics provided the framework for action.
The most striking feature in 1853-54 was the lack of 
variation in official actions across the four towns. Local 
government and medical agencies all seemed to have ’learned
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lessons' and tried to implement the 'Sheffield Plan' which had 
worked in 1849 and was now recommended by the G.B.H. 
Historians, taking their lead from Chadwick's well known 
antipathy to curative medicine, have tended to see public 
health only in terms of sanitary measures and environmental 
improvements. However, during cholera and other epidemic 
crises there was a clearly defined and important role for 
curative medicine which complemented sanitary initiatives. 
Despite this growing symmetry, the Local Board of Health in 
Hull, recognising the vulnerability of the town and the 
possible damage another epidemic could have on the local 
economy, pioneered port medical inspection. This was not a 
return to quarantines, it was a new measure involving the 
policing of shipping and emigrants, the establishment of 
isolation hospitals and the insistence on 'burials' at sea.
In general, these anticipated the growing adoption of a two- 
tier approach to cholera, which involved preventing the entry 
of the disease through ports, and only secondarily pursuing 
sanitary measures in inland towns. After 1866, the movement 
of cholera became a matter of international concern, involving 
the Foreign Office, India Office, the Board of Trade and a 
series of International Sanitary Conferences which led to 
international agreements on the policing and control of the 
disease. Thus, between 1849 and 1893, the agents of control 
changed from Poor Law Guardians to high diplomats.
A well known feature of the epidemics of 1848-49 and 
1853-54 is the work of John Snow and his claim that cholera 
was a communicable disease, transmitted via faeces and spread
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most commonly by contaminated water. A number of historians 
have noted that these ideas, together with the complementary 
work of Budd, were only accepted slowly by the medical 
profession and had a very limited impact on sanitary practice. 
This study has shown, however, that from 1865 and in all four 
towns, new measures based on Snow’s ideas were adopted. These 
’specific' measures did not replace tried and tested actions, 
they were added to them. The new measures were recommended by 
John Simon in a series of Memoranda issued through the Medical 
Department and confirm local authorities' increasingly 
reliance on expert advice from central government. This 
contrasts with the situation in 1848-49, where there was 
resistance to central interference by both local officials and 
medical men.
5.2.3. SOCIAL CLASS AND SANITARY REFORM
Throughout the thesis social class has been used as a 
tool to examine and explain the behaviour and attitudes of 
different groups and individuals. The notion of class adopted 
is similar to that used by Morris and Durey in their studies 
of the cholera epidemic of 1831-32, something that has allowed 
comparisons to be made between their work and this study. 
Central to the approach is the view that each of the major 
classes was bound by a group identity, common interests and a 
distinctive culture. Working from this perspective it has 
been argued that a number of factors associated with class 
position help to shed light upon the different forms of 
response to the successive cholera threats and epidemics.
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Past experience of diseases, access to resources to flee or 
fight, subcultural mores, and expectations of the actions of 
other classes all played a part in shaping distinctive 
attitudes and in determining behaviour. This does not mean 
that people from a particular class behaved uniformly; indeed, 
much of the evidence examined shows that people within the 
same class acted differently and even in contradictory ways. 
Clearly, the impact of the factors mentioned above varied from 
place to place and time to time - something which helped to 
explain differences in the way individuals and groups within a 
class responded.
Middle class responses to the 1848-49 epidemic varied 
greatly even within a town. In Hull, for example, the 
inaction of authorities contrated greatly with the efforts of 
medical men and local philanthropists to ameliorate 
conditions. The crucial point here is not so much that the 
individuals and groups behaved differently, but that their 
class position meant they were in a position to chose to act 
in one way or another. The working class did not have such 
choices and the recognition of this difference was an 
important factor in class consciousness.
More generally, the middle class responses in 1848-49 
were less towards cholera as such and more towards the form of 
the local official response. In Leeds, philanthropic measures 
complemented organised sanitary measures and continued a 
tradition of responding to working class distress. However, 
in Hull the actions of the ’concerned’ middle class attempted
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to compensate for the absence of effective official measures 
and for much of the epidemic even medical men were forced to 
work outside of the official preventive machinery. The case 
of Hull also shows that even with cholera threatening and 
present there was no truce between 'reformers' and 
’economists’. In later epidemics, there was less scope for 
middle class action because the official response was stronger 
and more uniform; there was by then at least some consensus 
that authorities had to take action. Another reason for the 
relative absence of philanthropic action after 1849 was that 
none of the four towns experienced a serious mortality crises. 
Nonetheless, across all three epidemics the commonest middle 
class view was that those who suffered in the epidemics were 
culpable, due to their ignorance and fecklessness. In other 
words, the problem was not so much the disease as the people. 
While this view was often shared by those supporting sanitary 
reform, they did acknowledge that only local authorities and 
rate-payers were in a position to effect and fund lasting 
environmental improvements.
This study has uncovered new evidence on a subject that 
has long been a lacunae in the history of public health, 
namely, what did the ’public’ or working class think about 
public health and sanitary reform? Most historians have 
ignored this question and where it is discussed, as in Wohl's 
generally excellent Endangered Lives, the working class is 
said to have been ’tired, beaten down and compliant’ and are 
characterised by 'dull resignation’ and 'mute acceptance’.38 
This seems to accept the verdict of middle class sanitary
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reformers that the ’public’ were ignorant and indifferent, or 
even obstructive towards sanitary reform. This study has 
shown that working class reactions to sanitary reform were not 
characterised by ignorance or hostility, but rather were 
varied and patterned. There are examples of the working class 
taking up official sanitary precautions, ignoring them, and 
resisting them, not to mention the adoption of self-help or 
alternative measures. In each case actions were guided by a 
specific, usually local, understanding of urban disease 
ecology and of the wider determinants of health and disease. 
This knowledge of the local physical environment was linked to 
views on rights and responsibilities. More generally, 
sanitary and other measures were judged on their rationality 
in terms of this local knowledge. The working class did not 
share the one dimensional environmentalism of the sanitarians; 
instead they contended that many other factors were 
determinants of health, not least wages and hours of work. 
Thus, to understand public health ’from below’ we have had to 
go beyond the Chadwickian agenda of filth, foul air and 
legislation, and explore rights and responsibilities, popular 
understanding of urban ecology, and food, shelter and fatigue. 
There was then in the four towns two mutually uncomprehending 
cultures which often saw the urban environment and the 
determinants of health quite differently.
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5 . 2 . 4  CHOLERA AND SANITARY REFORM
There is now a view based on studies of national 
legislation and action that cholera was not the sanitary 
reformers' best friend. Also, historians now agree that the 
history of nineteenth century public health and sanitary 
reform, at least in the period 1848-66, should not concentrate 
on national developments, but those at the local level. The 
question must then be asked again, was cholera the local 
sanitary reformers' best friend? The answer is again no, but 
this has to be qualified in several ways. The official 
response to cholera was mostly short-term measures - crisis 
actions for a crisis. The main legislative instruments 
through which action was taken - the Nuisance Removal Act and 
the later the Nuisance Removal and Disease Prevention Act - 
required temporary measures only. These Acts, implemented 
largely through Boards of Guardians, were also the basis for 
much routine sanitary work and their importance has been 
overlooked by historians who have too often concentrated on 
the Acts which attracted most political controversy. In 
Sheffield after 1849 and Bradford after 1854, the 'success' of 
temporary measures worked against permanent improvements. 
However, cholera was on occasions a catalyst for 
administrative reform or specific improvement projects, for 
example, after the 1849 crisis local government reform in Hull 
and the new drainage scheme in Leeds. It would be claiming 
too much to say that cholera the local sanitary reformers' 
best friend, it was an ally which in certain circumstances 
could be a valuable ally and in others redundant. However,
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this study has once again confirmed that the disease remains a 
valuable friend to historians wishing to explore the social 
history of medicine and health in mid-nineteenth century 
Britain.
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